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ABSTRACT 
In Muslim-majority countries such as Egypt, there has been a consensual premise that the state 
should acquire Islamic legitimacy. In order to establish faith in the system, Islamic political spirit 
from Islam must serve as a motivating force to legitimize the state and its institutions. The 
scholars as a metaconstitutional institution have a key role in helping to define and facilitate that 
Islamic legitimacy. 
In the colonial and post-colonial era, traditional interpreters of Islam, scholars and 
Islamic jurists, has been typically reduced into specific institutions recognized or even 
established by the state. This dynamic of state control of Islamic institutions, which are supposed 
to contribute in the state’s legitimacy, instead created an essential dilemma and a crisis of 
legitimacy. Therefore, to build trust and faith in the system, several Muslim-majority countries 
adopted a repugnancy clause, or an article (normally Article 2) in its constitution where Islam 
was recognized as a source or the source of legislation. 
In this setting, the right to Islamic interpretation became even more crucial because of its 
impact and legitimizing tools. Hence, the Islamic constitutional articles brought their own issues 
respecting the question: who has the interpretive authority, and which institutions should have 
v 
the final say on Islamic matters? In my dissertation, I focus on the Islamic scholars or jurists and 
their role as interpreters of Islamic jurisprudence and how their role relates to the constitutional 
arrangement. 
My dissertation will explore the role that juristic institutions play in Islamic states with a 
primary focus on the role of Egyptian Islamic scholars generally, and those of Al-Azhar in 
particular. I will show that the scholars themselves, whether or not affiliated with a formal body 
such as Al-Azhar, in fact constitute important “imagined” institutions. They are not a state 
institution with a formal role in actual governance, nor can they be regarded merely as a private 
actor. Instead, juristic institutions play a central role in legitimizing the state, and the state’s 
approach to questions that involve Islam. They do so in a primary, constitutive fashion that, I 
contend, renders their arena the “meta-constitutional sphere.” 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
In the final month of 2010, in the small Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid, Mohammed Bouazizi, a 
young vendor, self-immolated out of despair. Bouazizi had been prohibited from selling on the 
street for not having a “permit” - an indirect way of the police to ask for a bribe. Refusing to give 
a bribe, Bouazizi was also ignored by the governor’s office. Bouazizi’s story angered the public 
and started a series of protests that swept from city to city, and country to country in the Arab 
world. The protesters rallied against corruption, tyranny and social injustice.1 Then began the 
upheavals that would later be called the “Arab Spring.” 
Each country involved in the Arab Spring responded differently to the mass protests, and 
were led down varying political paths. Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya went through radical regime 
changes, while other countries such as Yemen, Morocco, and Jordan made important changes to 
their systems of government. Other states, such as Bahrain and Iraq, resisted any meaningful 
changes, while most tragically, Syria has largely disintegrated, resulting in a humanitarian 
disaster of untold proportions. The most important two countries to my research are Tunisia and 
Egypt. Tunisia represents the model that adopted democracy and participatory politics, with 
                                                 
1 Michael Hoffman & Amaney Jamal, Religion in the Arab spring: Between two competing narratives, 76 THE 
JOURNAL OF POLITICS, 2-6 (2014). PHILIP N HOWARD & MUZAMMIL M HUSSAIN, DEMOCRACY'S FOURTH WAVE?: 
DIGITAL MEDIA AND THE ARAB SPRING 3-16 (Oxford University Press on Demand. 2013). 
2 
bumps in the road. Egypt, on the other hand, is still in a state of relative flux, with the 
revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces in contestation with one another.2  
Within the Arab Spring phenomenon remains the question of the role of Islam, and 
whether it motivated the protests, or was part of the events at all. Michael Hoffman and Amaney 
Jamal identified two major narratives. The first is what they call “mosque to square” narrative 
that recognizes the role of mosques and religious activities in organizing and motivating protests 
against regimes of Egypt and Tunisia. The other narrative portrays the protests as purely civil 
demands of young people who aspired to live in a democratic free country that respects human 
rights. Using data in Tunisia and Egypt (collected shortly after the fall of the regimes in each 
country in 2011), Hoffman and Jamal concluded,  
[R]eligion was a significant factor in motivating the Arab Spring, 
but perhaps not in the expected ways. Individual piety played a 
significant role in influencing protest behavior, but communal 
religious practice did not. While the mechanisms behind these 
relationships are indeterminate, there is evidence to suggest that 
many of the revolutionaries active in the Arab Spring were 
motivated, at least in part, by a psychological attachment to 
religion.3 
The analysis of Hoffman and Jamal emphasizes the role of religion not as an ideological political 
party, but rather as a broader motivating force. This observation of the Arab Spring in respect to 
religion reminds us of the historical reemergence of Islam as a strong force during upheavals, 
crises, and revolutions. With the comeback, Muslim scholars rise as an influential group that 
survives political and constitutional crises, as they have countless times in Islam’s past. 
Therefore, it is vitally important to study religious institutions and understand their dynamics, 
especially how the state deals with with the post-revolutionary Islamic institutions and scholars. 
                                                 
2 About the revolution and counter-revolution in Egypt, see, Brecht De Smet, Revolution and counter-revolution in 
Egypt, 78 SCIENCE & SOCIETY, 11-3 (2014). 
3 Hoffman & Jamal, THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, 21 (2014). 
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The striking feature of Muslim scholars is that, while they are not solely a popular force 
during crises and upheavals, they tend to play a more important role during these extraordinary 
times. This role and phenomenon asserts the quality of their operation as a work beyond the 
constitutional arrangement. Scholars do not collapse as political or constitutional systems do, but 
instead grow in importance at such times. This is due to the scholars’ nature, their relationship to 
society, and to their ever-lasting role. 
Muslim scholars’ authority precedes political arrangements because it is established by 
principles and values that the public observes and follows. Preexisting morals and rules are by 
and large shaped by the scholars, and their interactions with the people and texts.4 It is fairly 
common to see popular values that are typically represented by Islamic scholars prevail during 
times of tension or even mayhem - their responsibility grows as much as problems do. Crises 
such as invasions, conflicts, civil wars, transitions and revolutions remind us of the importance 
of jurists and their relationship to people. This could also explain the nature of scholarly “retreat” 
from politics at times when an issue is purely political.5 At the same time, the “retreat” can be 
overstated. The popular attitude toward scholars also caused them at times to have the basic 
quality needed in order to be brokers, mediators, and peacemakers between rivals or between 
ruler and the ruled.6 
                                                 
4 See in general, CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 52 (Duke University Press. 2004). 
5 NIKKI R KEDDIE, SCHOLARS, SAINTS, AND SUFIS: MUSLIM RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 
1500 121 (Univ of California Press. 1972). 
6 MEIR HATINA, 'ULAMA', POLITICS, AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN EGYPTIAN PERSPECTIVE 159 & 24 (2010). Ulama 
acquired a more active role in politics during the wars between the Ottomans and Mamluk due to the fact that both 
sides wanted to align with the scholars to appeal to the public and their morals. Similarly, ulama enjoyed a stronger 
influence during the Hispano-Moroccan war, and during the series of French and English colonization of various 
countries in the Arab and Muslim world. One commentator described this phase as the “golden age of the ulama.” 
Edmund Burke III, The Moroccan Ulama, 1860-1912: An Introduction, in SCHOLARS, SAINTS, AND SUFIS: MUSLIM 
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1500 98-9 & 121, (Nikki R Keddie ed. 1972);KEDDIE, scholars, 
saints, and sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle east since 1500 173. 1972. For more details on the 
basic roles of ulama, see the second chapter of this dissertation.  
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There is a reason that the role of scholars (ulama) seems to increase dramatically with 
crises. It is because they reside in a non-political sphere, so all political forces seek their support. 
While political players seek support from these “meta-constitutionalists,” society turns to them to 
guard its interests and values, and build its trust and faith in the system. 
In Muslim-majority countries such as Egypt, there has been a consensual premise that the 
state should acquire Islamic legitimacy in order for there to be faith in the political system. In 
order to establish this faith, Islamic political spirit from Islam must serve as a motivating force to 
legitimize the state and its institutions.7 In any constitutional state in which the people’s will is a 
core constitutive force, and where the people overwhelmingly expect and demand a central role 
for Islam, Islam will need to be recognized as a basis upon which the state operates. Otherwise, 
the state will lose the popular legitimacy it requires. The scholars as a metaconstitutional 
institution have a key role in helping to define and facilitate that Islamic legitimacy. 
In the colonial and post-colonial era, traditional interpreters of Islam, scholars and 
Islamic jurists, has been typically reduced into specific institutions recognized or even 
established by the state. This dynamic of state control of Islamic institutions, which are supposed 
to contribute in the state’s legitimacy, instead created an essential dilemma and a crisis of 
legitimacy. Therefore, to build trust and faith in the system, several Muslim-majority countries 
adopted a repugnancy clause, or an article (normally Article 2) in its constitution where Islam 
was recognized as a source or the source of legislation.  
However, scholars and jurists were rarely consulted to determine the contours of 
repugnancy. In this setting, the right to Islamic interpretation became even more crucial because 
of its impact and legitimizing tools. Hence, the Islamic constitutional articles brought their own 
                                                 
7 See, EMILIO GENTILE, POLITICS AS RELIGION 20, 125 &128 (Princeton University Press. 2006).  
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issues respecting the question: who has the interpretive authority, and which institutions should 
have the final say on Islamic matters? In my dissertation, I focus on the Islamic scholars or 
jurists and their role as interpreters of Islamic jurisprudence and how their role relates to the 
constitutional arrangement. 
My dissertation will explore the role that juristic institutions play in Islamic states with a 
primary focus on the role of Egyptian Islamic scholars generally, and those of Al-Azhar in 
particular. I will show that the scholars themselves, whether or not affiliated with a formal body 
such as Al-Azhar, in fact constitute important “imagined” institutions in the state. Moreover, 
these institutions are autonomous and nongovernmental. They occupy a unique role that does not 
easily fit into traditional concepts of the modern, Westphalian nation-state. They are not a state 
institution with a formal role in actual governance, nor can they be regarded merely as a private 
actor whose influence is purely that of an outsider. Instead, juristic institutions play a central role 
in legitimizing the state, and the state’s approach to questions that involve Islam. They do so in a 
primary, constitutive fashion that, I contend, renders their arena the “meta-constitutional sphere.” 
1.1 CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
Usually, constitutional research about religious institutions is conducted in a top-down approach, 
in the sense that it focuses on how to position or reposition these religious institutions 
constitutionally from a state point of view. That is to say that most research is concerned with 
religious institutions in the constitutional setting and how states treat or should treat them. As a 
result, researchers tend to discount or deemphasize the role of religious institutions from the 
people’s point of view. For example, researchers investigate how courts or constitutions deal 
6 
with religious institutions, but overlook the class of jurists who work underneath these official 
apparatuses. In practice the jurists actually empower courts and constitutions in one way or 
another by creating the popular legitimacy these institutions require to function effectively. 
Examples of this top-to-down approach include different works such as that of Clark Lombardi, 
Nathan J. Brown, Ran Hirschl, Larry Backer, Noah Feldman, and the major theme in the book 
“Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and Continuity.”8 
My methodology is instead a combination of both a bottom-up approach dealing with 
how religious institutions position themselves, and how their arena affects the state, in addition 
to the top-down pattern. Unlike the top-down pattern, my research will not ignore the critical role 
in what I call the “meta-constitutional sphere”, where religious institutions function outside of 
the state manipulation and control. This framework better explains the meta-constitutional 
sphere, where jurists and religious institutions like Al-Azhar lay down the preexisting concepts 
of Islam and general rules for interpreting it in the state. Both top-down and bottom-up methods 
may ask the same question, but understanding the role of religious institutions toward themselves 
and the state is quite a different approach from understanding the role of the state in respect to 
these institutions. Using both methods will construct a more complete picture of the task 
religious institutions carry out in the Arab world. Understanding this dual nature of religious 
institutions themselves will help us know to what extent possibilities exist to resituate religious 
institutions in the state according to different proposals. 
                                                 
8 CLARK B LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN EGYPT: THE INCORPORATION OF THE SHARĪʻA INTO 
EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 88-267 § 19 (Brill Academic Publishers. 2006);NATHAN J BROWN, 
CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB BASIC LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABLE 
GOVERNMENT 161-195 (Suny Press. 2002); RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY 26-40 (Harvard University 
Press. 2011);Larry Catá Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a New Global Legal Ordering, 16 
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES, 1 (2009);NOAH FELDMAN, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State, 
103-51 (2008);RAINER GROTE & TILMANN J RODER, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES: BETWEEN 
UPHEAVAL AND CONTINUITY 77, 89, 109, 121, 135, 147, 171 & 201 (Oxford University Press. 2012). 
7 
Noah Feldman and Asifa Quraishi come closest to recognizing the historical role of the 
Muslim scholar and religious and scholastic institutions, but there are limitations to their work. 
Specifically, Feldman mostly compares them to the role of the legislature.9 However, jurists are 
not and have never been lawmakers. Although they acknowledge the fact that the role of scholars 
was to counterbalance the ruler, it is important to note that the rulings of the scholars in Islamic 
history, at least in the Sunni school, were not binding laws.10 These scholastic institutions 
therefore fall into the realm of “meta-constitutional” institutions more than that of a separate, 
official branch of government. 
There is some literature on how religious institutions may operate outside the state 
setting, in civil society in particular. Niels Nielsen’s and Jose Casanova’s works demonstrate 
how religious institutions thought to have undergone a history hostile to modernization, can 
actually be democracy standard-bearers, or at least positive participants in democratic change, as 
civil society institutions of a sort.11 However, these two works seem to scrutinize the transitional 
role of revolutionary religious institutions rather than their long-term role in a post-revolutionary 
democracy. Moreover, Islamic institutions and scholars have deeper influence on the people than 
civil society institutions alone usually do. 
                                                 
9 FELDMAN, 103-51 (2008);Asifa Quraishi, The Separation of Powers in the Tradition of Muslim Governments, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES: BETWEEN UPHEAVAL AND CONTINUITY 71-2, (Rainer Grote & Tilmann 
Roder eds., 2011). 
10 See for the Islamic “Law” whether it is Law, Haider Ala Hamoudi, Baghdad booksellers, Basra carpet merchants, 
and the law of God and man: Legal pluralism and the contemporary Muslim experience, 83 (2008). Abdullahi 
Ahmed An-Na'im, Religion, the state, and constitutionalism in islamic and comparative perspectives, 57 DRAKE L. 
REV., 1-44 (2008). 
11NIELS C NIELSEN JR, REVOLUTION IN EASTERN EUROPE: THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS 2, 5, 14, 20, 42, 50, 61, 68& 159 
(Orbis Books. 1991);José Casanova, Civil society and religion: retrospective reflections on Catholicism and 
prospective reflections on Islam, SOCIAL RESEARCH, 4 (2001). 
8 
According to Intisar Rabb, by employing “coordinate Islamic constitutionalization” in the 
Iraqi case, jurists function as the “Fourth Branch.” 12 However, her work on the subject is more 
focused on Shi‘ism with its history and approach toward jurists. In the case of An-Najaf, as an 
example of the Shi‘i school, there is a more formal institutional structure, the “marji‘yyah,” as 
opposed to the flexible or dispersed authority generally seen in the Sunni case.  
Respecting the presence of religion broadly, David Hollenbach argues for a more 
involved religion in civil society and criticizes privatization of religion and religious 
institutions.13 Hollenbach describes the locus of religious presence as the “cultural sphere” where 
preexisting cultural backgrounds shape our shared values. Nevertheless, Hollenbach tends to 
utilize theological reasoning for religion’s civil role from a Roman Catholic perspective, and in a 
functionalist way that uses religious discourse more than recognizes it and respects it on its own 
terms. 
Examining the modern roles of Al-Azhar and political Islam, Kristen Stilt has presented 
and analyzed the proposals of political Islamists, mostly the Muslim Brotherhood, for how to 
promote independent and active Islamic religious institutions.14 Other studies have dealt with the 
religious institutions in Egypt, but usually from a historic and scholastic perspective more than 
on the basis of how to understand their contemporary political and legal relevance in a post-
revolutionary Egypt.15  
                                                 
12Intisar A. Rabb, "We the jurists": Islamic constitutionalism in Iraq, 10 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 10 (2008). 
13 David Hollenbach, Contexts of the political role of religion: Civil society and culture, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV., 877 
(1993). 
14 Kristen Stilt, Islam is the solution: constitutional visions of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, 46 TEX. INT'L LJ, 
73 (2010). 
15 See for e.g., MUHAMMED ABD AL-MUN'IM KHAFAJI, AL-AZHAR KHILAL ALF 'AM [AL-AZHAR DURING A 
THOUSAND YEARS] § 1 ('Alam al-Kutub & Maktabat al-Kullyyat al-Azharyyah 2nd ed. 1988). For Al-Azhar’s roles 
in Egyptian political society particular in post-revolutionary age, see NATHAN J BROWN, POST-REVOLUTIONARY AL-
AZHAR 3-15 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Washington. 2011). 
9 
In this review, I should emphasize that these works are insightful and that I benefitted 
from this literature to fill gaps in these studies. Various works used different approaches that 
inspired me to incorporate different elements into my own proposal. Departing from their 
varying approaches, I will use these valuable works to try to develop a more comprehensive 
project aimed at understanding the role religious institutions from within, in addition to the 
constitutional view. 
1.2 METHODOLOGY AND CHAPTERS 
This research is deemed to be theoretical in nature, presenting detailed, legal analytical 
discussions of the current role of religious institutions and their possibilities in the public sphere. 
History contextualizes the movements and concepts of today’s jurists with regard to their role in 
the state and society, whereas legal comparison will help in understanding the mixed system that 
has grafted traditional and modern elements onto what is described as a democratic state with a 
Muslim majority. Egypt will be a case study, while Islamic scholars and al-Azhar, the main 
Islamic institution in Egypt, will be examined with a focus on their role within their own sphere. 
This will be developed by observing their attitudes toward political and public issues, reading the 
legislative history of constitutional articles and proposals related to the role of al-Azhar, and 
studying the different narratives about al-Azhar in the political players’ discourses. I will include 
discussion of their rulings, and how the public, including political players, adapt to the 
consensual rulings of the Islamic scholars. This will show how these political players adopt 
juristic language deployed by Al-Azhar in order to appeal to the public. 
10 
Observers and researchers often fear more religious semi-theocratic states in the Muslim 
world. The study of the genuine role of these institutions will help guide us in dealing with 
religious-inspired societies and their political models. It will show that theocracy would not be a 
fulfillment of the traditional juristic role, but rather a distortion of it. 
The first chapter will discuss three main issues. First, it will address the role of political 
faith in establishing a political system and constitutional orders. This is a process that traditional 
religions’ representatives participate in to shape civil religion. This chapter will also provide 
descriptions of competing forms of legitimacy found in the academic literature. It will argue that 
a form of legitimacy, such as procedural legality, is insufficient for a long-term stable system 
which needs a normative initiatory, along with continuous legitimacy to respond to popular 
expectations and political imagination. Finally, it will address the concept of religious legitimacy 
generally, which effectively influences even some secular regimes. From there I reach the point 
that Islamic legitimacy is a particularly important form of religious legitimacy to establish 
confidence in the political system. This task is typically exercised by religious institutions; 
specifically, unofficial independent institutions that are not politically controlled by the regime. 
Following the legitimacy discussion, I will assess the locus of authority and where 
Islamic scholars operate in society. The debate about where religious, and particularly Islamic, 
jurisprudential work resides in today’s Muslim state is related to the legitimacy debate. States 
whose religious institutions participate in the making of legitimacy continuously encounter 
debate respecting these religious institutions’ work and sphere. The first chapter suggests that the 
legitimacy of the religious institutions themselves, as well as the legitimacy of the states, requires 
that these institutions be independent and autonomous. 
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The second chapter focuses on the space of Islamic institutions in Muslim countries, 
specifically on Egypt as a case study. The second chapter is divided into four main sections. The 
first section discusses the meaning of “religious institutions” as imagined institutions in the 
Islamic context. This is important, because we must first understand precisely what we mean by 
a “religious institution” in Sunni Islamic discourse before discussing its role in the state. In short, 
religious institutions are imagined institutions that are represented by dispersed Muslim jurists. 
This is true in Islamic history, and to a larger extent in today’s Muslim states. The second section 
presents the different roles of these scholars historically. The third section deals with the 
conception of scholars and their very nature and sphere, describing it in modernity as being 
“metaconstitutional.” It is “meta-constitutional” to imply that the sphere is not established by 
constitutional power, does not need official recognition of its existence, and does not have direct 
constitutional power. This meta-constitutional sphere emphasizes that there is no binding 
authority like a state institution, but the scholars can define and redefine cultural and religious 
vocabulary in its own sphere. The fourth section discusses the idea that, although autonomy is 
crucial for Muslim religious institutions to operate in the meta-constitutional sphere, these 
institutions do not and should not acquire direct power, as this goes against their very own 
nature. I will use history to show that this proposal is the position that the ulama historically 
occupied, and what they have always normatively theorized. 
On the basis of this, I craft a role that fits the ulama’s nature according to their very own 
literature and social dynamics. This role places them in a position that is socially stable, as well 
as constitutionally plausible. 
Having discussed the traditional role of the scholars in the second chapter, the third turns 
to the issue of the modern constitutional setting and the role of Muslim scholars in the Muslim-
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majority states. Examining the scholars in modernity is a way to test the stability of the 
traditional locus of these scholars. The different constitutional experiments in the Muslim world 
provide examples of how the Islamic elements and Islamic scholars are treated. Egypt is given 
special attention as a case study while other countries sharing similar features, such as Pakistan, 
are also included where relevant insights may be gleaned.  
The third chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section explores the current 
constitutional context in the Muslim and Arab world, and the different early phases of Islamic 
constitutionalism. The second section explains the role of Islamic scholars in the constitutional 
orders and in constitution-making. The scholars’ role is examined in two areas: law-making, and 
judicial adjudication. The third section discusses Islamic constitutional articles with special 
emphasis on Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution. Then, it will turn to the issue of authority of 
interpretation, concluding with the judicial application of Islamic law in Egypt. The final section 
examines my two-prong proposal of overlapping jurisdictions. This is to recognize the 
traditionally established imagined institution of the jurists to continue to strongly retain their 
space as a forum for Islamic jurisprudential debates and discussions. Through these means, the 
jurists remain the primary force that legitimates the state from a constitutive metaconstitutional 
perspective. At the same time, at the state level, the legislature should be the main interpreter of 
what Islamic law is. 
Thus, the first chapter introduces the nature of the relationship between scholars, the 
people, and the state in light of the jurisprudential mechanisms and socially powerful tools the 
scholars have. The relationship revolves around the concepts of faith, trust and legitimacy. The 
second chapter is to study the sphere that the scholars typically operate in, and how that can 
affect the state and its political sphere. The third chapter explores in greater depth the discussion 
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of the meta-constitutional sphere as well as the constitutional debates respecting Islamic articles, 
and their interpretation. As a result, the chapter defends the precedence of the legislature over 
other institutions in regard to question: who has the right to Islamic interpretation?  
In answering this question, the chapter concludes by reinforcing the two-prong proposal 
that bifurcates the question into one of interpretation for the perspective of state law, which the 
legislature controls, and traditional jurisprudential expression as a source of metaconstitutional 
legitimation, which remains, as it has always been, within the locus of control of the jurists. 
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2.0 CHAPTER ONE: THE ROAD TO LEGITIMACY 
Religious institutions within the Islamic thought are composed of different jurists. The jurists’ 
relationship to people makes them the resource of the traditional legitimacy as carriers and 
protectors of the traditions and jurisprudence. Because religion is politically inevitable especially 
in Islamic communities, jurists acquired their importance as religious legitimizers. This paper 
addresses the manner in which jurists and juristic academies in the modern Sunni world retain a 
great deal of relevance. This is because they confer a form of legitimacy on the nascent Muslim 
democratic state that is necessary if it is to succeed, and on the current Muslim democratic state 
in order to survive and revive.  
This chapter will discuss three main issues. First, it will discuss the role of political faith 
in establishing a political system and constitutional orders, a process that traditional religions’ 
representatives participate in to shape the civil religion. Second, the chapter will provide 
descriptions of competing forms of legitimacy found in the academic literature. It will argue that 
a form of legitimacy like procedural legality is insufficient for a long-term stable system that 
needs a normative initiatory along with continuous legitimacy to respond to popular expectations 
and political imagination. Finally, it will address the religious legitimacy which effectively 
influences even some secular regimes. From there I reach the point that Islamic legitimacy is a 
particularly important form of religious legitimacy to establish confidence in the political system. 
This task is typically exercised by religious institutions; specifically, unofficial independent 
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institutions that are not politically controlled by the regime. This is because such control will 
curtail the jurists themselves, and thereby detract from their credibility and legitimacy.  
In a later chapter, I will locate the arena in which these legitimizers should work. 
However, this chapter is to understand legitimacy itself in the way that shapes constitutional 
orders.  
2.1 THE FAITH IN THE SYSTEM AS A LEGITIMIZING VEHICLE 
For a people to have faith in their political system is to accept its legitimacy and the standards 
that this system is subjected to and judged by. Faith, in this sense, is a legitimizing vehicle that a 
state, especially recently established ones, needs to utilize in order to stabilize and prosper. In 
this part, I will discuss the profound need for faith, and how it underpins the legitimization 
process.  
Max Weber distinguishes between three types of legitimate authority according to the 
claims they pose and the grounds that they rest on:  
1- Legitimacy on rational grounds when validity is based on a normative ground that 
is rationally proven and accepted. 
2- Legitimacy on traditional grounds when the basis of the authority is based on 
inherited principles. 
3- Legitimacy on charismatic grounds when the authority centers on individual hero, 
person, or the like.16 
                                                 
16 MAX WEBER, ON CHARISMA AND INSTITUTION BUILDING 46-47 (University of Chicago Press. 1968).  
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In Weber’s account, the rational legitimacy associates loyalty with the individual or 
individuals who occupy the rationally accepted positions only for the time and tasks assigned. In 
the case of the traditional legitimacy, loyalty and obedience are associated with individuals who 
are authorized and bound by the traditions. In the third type, charismatic legitimacy, loyalty is 
paid to the individual that carries the charismatic nature.17 These distinctions are powerful when 
we, in later chapters, want to draw attention to the authority some group or institution has in the 
society. However, for the purposes of this chapter, I focus on how Weber classified legitimacy 
grounds according to the claims of the authority or order and, thus, linked loyalty and obedience 
of the people to these objective grounds. 
Interestingly, any notion of faith carries less significance in Weber’s account. In other 
words, Weber seems to focus more on grounds and claims rather than the belief in them. Thus, 
Weber’s approach seems to address legitimacy grounds and claims as standards that are 
measureable objectively. This can be contrasted with the position of another theorist, Paul 
Ricoeur. Ricoeur’s approach is to deal with the legitimacy grounds more as societal belief that 
can vary according to the people’s backgrounds and culture. In other words, it is 
intersubjective.18 Ricoeur thinks the belief of a given ground of legitimacy is what gives 
legitimacy its meaning rather than just the objective normativity of a certain claim.19 Ricoeur 
asserts that “the equivalence of belief with claim is never totally actual but rather always more or 
                                                 
17 Id. at, 46. 
18 See, MOHAMMED A BAMYEH, ANARCHY AS ORDER: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF CIVIC HUMANITY 65-66 
(FT14) (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2009). (Bamyeh speaks of different degrees and levels of legitimacy.) A 
notable aspect of intersubjectivity that depends on social belief is to vary from a group/individual to another of the 
degrees and levels of belief. Interestingly, Islam speaks in Quran about the decrease and increase of faith (Quran 
3:178). This conception is accurately the case here in the intersubjective nature of the social belief of a claim of 
legitimacy. 
19 George H Taylor, Developing Ricoeur’s Concept of Political Legitimacy, PAUL RICOEUR AND THE TASK OF 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 66-67 (2012);Paul Ricoeur, Lectures on ideology and utopia, 202-203 (1986). For Weber, 
see, WEBER, On charisma and institution building 46-47. 1968.  
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less a cultural fabrication.”20 Therefore, in Ricoeur’s account, the intersubjectivity of the 
legitimacy grounds indicates that a societal belief in a claim of legitimacy is what empowers this 
“legitimacy” or even what makes it legitimacy in the first place.21 Consequently, the normative 
presuppositions of rules and ethics of a society are more likely to work here as a mechanism to 
recognize a ground as legitimate, and a claim of legitimacy itself as legitimate. This element of 
social recognition of a claim of legitimacy happens by means of political belief.  
I will start this part by emphasizing the inevitability of faith, then focus on political faith 
as a requisite for new democracies, and end this part by showing how the public imaginary 
contributes to building legitimacy.  
2.1.1 The Inevitability of Faith 
Why Faith at all? Faith in fact is inevitable. It is not whether you have faith or not but what kind 
of faith you have and to what degree. Practically, there must be some faith for anything to be 
operative in our life. Even the most agnostic approach in regard to metaphysics ought to have 
some faith in other areas of life to live. Traditional atheists have a faith of their own on the idea 
of godlessness to different degrees.22 Ironically, the further a group reaches toward the 
“disbelief” of something, the closer they get toward another belief even though that belief is the 
absoluteness of “disbelief”. The dogma of the denial of believing in God or gods, for example, is 
no different than the other dogma of believing in God or gods. The faith on science or nature is 
                                                 
20 Ricoeur, 13 (1986). 
21 Id. at, 201. 
22 The French Philosopher Simone Weil described this issue perfectly by saying  
No human being escapes the necessity of conceiving some good outside himself towards which his thought turns in 
a movement of desire, supplication, and hope. Consequently, the only choice is between worshipping the true God 
or an idol SIMONE WEIL, FIRST AND LAST NOTEBOOKS 308 (Oxford University Press. 1970).I am indebted to Haider 
Hamoudi who drew my attention to this great quote. 
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no different than the faith on God or gods as far as the core and characteristics of faith are 
concerned. That marks what Ronald Dworkin describes as “religious atheism”.23 Dworkin 
brilliantly notes that “[m]any millions of people who count themselves atheists have convictions 
and experiences very like and just as profound as those that believers count as religious”.24  
In the US case United States v. Seeger, 25 the Supreme Court decided that atheism that 
prohibits military services on an ethical basis is treated legally as religion in regard to the 
“conscientious objection” exemption that Congress provided. It is obvious that the Court did not 
intend to examine the religiosity of every secular or atheist group but it looked at the 
characteristics of some atheists and found that they have similar features that religious have in 
regard to the consequences. If someone believes that military service is prohibited based on a 
moral faith, it does not make difference whether she or he confirms that God presents or denies 
it. In the end, denying some religion or even religiosity altogether could itself qualify for another 
religion. On the other hand, if someone practices a secular or seemingly non-religious act but 
thinks or believes it is related to religion, this belief is what matters in some jurisdiction to 
qualify for a “religious act.” In 2004, the Canadian Supreme Court in Syndicat Northcrest v. 
Amselem26 ruled that a practice where the individual sincerely believes it is practiced out of a 
religious conviction is treated as religion regardless of whether the practice is required by a 
religious authority or not. The point here is that someone does not have to identify herself or 
                                                 
23 RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD 4 (Harvard University Press. 2013). 
24 Id. at, 2. The case of New Atheism is a good example of the extreme irreligious (or rather: religious) trend that 
advocates a godless world and believes that traditional religions (including Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) are 
themselves a delusion that “poisons everything” See, CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: HOW RELIGION 
POISONS EVERYTHING 0 (Random House Digital, Inc. 2008). RICHARD DAWKINS & LALLA WARD, THE GOD 
DELUSION (SciELO Brasil. 2006);SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR, AND THE FUTURE OF REASON 
(WW Norton & Company. 2005). Compare, DWORKIN, Religion without God 7-9. 2013;BRUCE LEDEWITZ, 
CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN SECULARISM 171-190 (Indiana University Press. 2011). 
25 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S. Ct. 850, 13 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1965). See, DWORKIN, Religion without 
God 4. 2013. 
26 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 2 S.C.R. 551, 2004 SCC 47. See, HIRSCHL, Constitutional theocracy 169. 2011. 
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himself as being affiliated with a traditionally known religion or “authoritative” source of belief 
for their stand to be considered as a faith or belief. This is the latent but powerful feature of any 
sociopolitical entity or active group that seeks change or aspires to influence in (political) life. 
When religion is kicked out the door, it comes in through the window. 
Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 1349) in his theological poem27 argued tirelessly against all his 
theological opponents, and was faced with the anti-theological project proposed by atheists and 
materialists. According to Ibn al-Qayyim, the argument is that the atheistic and materialistic 
argument is that theologians are all worshippers of God while atheists are free from worship.28 
Ibn al-Qayyim responded with the interesting remark that worship of and devotion to God that 
materialists escaped were simply replaced by worship of and devotion to self and devil.29 
Regardless of whether his theological project was plausible or not, his early comment of how 
worship and religion can take naturalistic and materialistic forms was irrefutable. In Qur’an, a 
verse dealing with similar idea condemns whoever “takes his own lust (vain desires) as his ilah 
(god)”30 pointing out that one’s self and desires can be her or his own gods and fetishes. The 
features of religion, then, are apparent in some religions and faiths while latent in others but in 
                                                 
27 The full name of Ibn al-Qayyim is: Mohammed Bin Abi Bakr Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawzyyah . Ibn al-Qayyim’s poem 
is one of many in different sciences and literatures in medieval Islam. The use of poetry was common among 
scholars to make it easier to both memorize and comprehend the knowledge of a certain science. See, BRINKLEY 
MORRIS MESSICK, THE CALLIGRAPHIC STATE: TEXTUAL DOMINATION AND HISTORY IN A MUSLIM SOCIETY 26-28 
(Univ of California Press. 1993). 
28 Materialism is a modern term but in Islamic medieval literature was sometimes described as Jismaneyyeen (from 
the Arabic word Jisim which means body/substance) like in AlShaherstani ABU AL-FATH AL-SHEHRESTANI, AL-
MILAL WA AL-NIHAL 4 (Dar Al-Kutub Al'ilmyyah 2nd ed. 1992). In other books, what is known now as 
materialism is interestingly classified as a separate faith called dahri (derived from the Arabic noun dahr which 
means eon or era implying that dahris (which we can call eonists) directly or indirectly worship materialistic life and 
the spirit of the time where they live. See Jamal al-Din al-Afghani’s book in Arabic that was titled “Al-rad ‘ala Al-
Dahreyyen” and interestingly translated into English as “Refutation of the Materialists.” NIKI R KEDDIE, AN 
ISLAMIC RESPONSE TO IMPERIALISM: POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS WRTITINGS OF SAYYID JAMĀL AD-DĪN" AL-
AFGHĀNĪ" 130-191 § 21 (University of California Pr. 1983). 
29 Ibn AlQayyem Aljawzeyyah, AlKafyah AlShafyah (known as: Noonyat Ibn AlQayyem), 1925, at 218, available at 
AlTaqaddum Al'elmyyah Publisher. 
30 Quran (54:23). 
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both cases religion easily finds its way back and restore some crucial features even in the heart of 
the most inimical or neutral toward it. 
Faith in a modern philosophical context indicates that those who do not believe that 
religion can be rational in nature could end up believing that rationality is religious in nature.31 
According to Habermas’ interpretation, Kant finds faith as something that could be religious or 
secular. Thus, Kant translates the religious concept of “in the image of God” into the secular 
context of promoting “equality.”32 Ironically, even Marx, who is associated with the idea of 
condemning using religion as the “opium of the people,”33 has taken advantage himself of the 
religious concept “kingdom of God” to preach a secular salvation that categorically rejects the 
traditional use of religion but falls within the same trap of exploiting traditional religious 
concepts for modern religious (or secular) purposes.34 Habermas, in the end, justifies these 
secular translations of religious concepts in order to relax this “scientific” self-worshiping world 
and to infuse it with ethical limitations and standards.35 It seems, though, that religion is 
unavoidable but the issue is whether someone is able to consciously recognize it, deal with it, 
translate some of its concepts to other arenas, and take advantage of its powerful faith. 
Otherwise, religion will subconsciously maneuver and come back even if its believers refrain 
from calling it “religion.” 
                                                 
31 See in general, JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN NATURALISM AND RELIGION: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS (Polity. 
2008);DWORKIN, Religion without God. 2013. 
32 HABERMAS, Between naturalism and religion: Philosophical essays 221. 2008. 
33 Karl Marx, Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, DEUTSCH-
FRANZÖSISCHE JAHRBÜCHER, 1 (1844). 
34 HABERMAS, Between naturalism and religion: Philosophical essays 231. 2008. 
35 Id. at, 107&238. 
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2.1.2 Why The Need for Political Faith? 
The inevitability of faith36 applies to political and constitutional domains almost as much as it 
does to traditional religions even if some societies are far more apparently sympathetic to 
traditional religious discourse.37 In the previous section, we have seen that some religious 
concepts have been secularized while others have leaked and influenced politics. We will see in 
this section that some of religion’s genuine characteristics have been lent to political and 
constitutional domains. The political faith and constitutional salvation narrative were examples 
of this process of secularization of religion on one hand, and religionization of politics on the 
other.38 Legitimacy rests upon not only meeting the ethical and political requirements for a state 
but also responding to the belief of the people on what the state is supposed to be.39  
Whereas traditional religions have been reduced to certain arenas and suffered different 
degrees of privatization, the concept of religion has been reborn anew. The secular world has 
produced its religions that replaced traditional scriptures, prophets, ethics, and faith with new 
ones, all present in the public sphere. In his book, Politics as Religion, Emilio Gentile studies 
modern secular religions and demonstrates that democratic systems with the passage of time 
                                                 
36See, Ricoeur, 201-294 (1986). I should here distance the idea of “political faith” here from the notorious concept 
of “political religion” that was associated with the totalitarian regimes in the nineteenth century like Nazism and 
Fascism. In contrast, political faith refers to the basic idea when people have faith in their state and its institutions. 
For more about “political faith,” see generally, J. M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN 
AN UNJUST WORLD (Harvard University Press. 2011). This basic idea of political faith, however, is sometimes 
described in its more religious dimension as “secular religion” For the concepts “political religion,” “secular 
religion,” and “civil religion,” see, GENTILE, Politics as religion 2, 21,129& 59-70 2006. 
3737 BALKIN, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World 74. 2011. See generally, SANFORD 
LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (Princeton University Press. 2011);George P Fletcher, Three Nearly Sacred 
Books in Western Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. (2001). 
38 See, TAHA ABDULRAHMMAN, ROOH AD-DEEN 51-181 (Al-Markaz Al-Thaqafi Al-'arabi 2 ed. 2012).(In this book, 
AbdulRahman devotes a good deal in describing the two processes: the first is the secularization of religions, and the 
other is the religionization of the secular world).  
39 Taylor, PAUL RICOEUR AND THE TASK OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 15 (2012). See, BALKIN, Constitutional 
Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World 230-233. 2011. 
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have crystallized civil religion that centers on a democratic national salvation story while 
totalitarian systems have produced political religion to preach its own national political 
narrative. Despite the great systematic difference between these two secular religions, both have 
incorporated, inter alia, themes, concepts, vocabularies, and historic references from traditional 
religions to build popular faith in the system.40 
The first civil prophet that used the term “civil religion” to preach civil salvation and its 
covenant, the social contract, is Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the Enlightenment philosopher (d. 
1779).41 Rousseau does not deny that civil religion, like its traditional counterparts, entails faith 
in the social contract as a worldly redemption, but also he thinks this faith formed the “positive 
dogma” in the relationship between authority and the citizens.42 This religiosity of the social 
contract inspires the faithful believer to protect its temples (institutions) and legitimate rules.43 
Tocqueville compares the French Revolution to a religious revolution, stressing that 
“[t]he French Revolution, though political, assumed the guise and tactics of a religions 
revolution.” He explained this religiosity by noting that the French Revolution, “like religious 
revolutions, spread by preaching and propagandism.” 44 The secular religion that the French 
Revolution embedded was accurately realized just decades after it took place: 
The French Revolution acted, with regard to things of this world, 
precisely as religious revolutions have acted with regard to things 
of the other. It dealt with the citizen in the abstract, independent of 
particular social organizations, just as religions deal with mankind 
in general, independent of time and place…. It inspired 
                                                 
40 GENTILE, Politics as religion 16-45. 2006. It is not my intention here to analyze and compare the two religions but 
to understand them and how they made their contribution in crafting the political faith , an element is needed for any 
system. 
41 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: AND DISCOURSES 129-141 (Dutton. 1950). See, GENTILE, 
Politics as religion 1-2. 2006. 
42 ROUSSEAU, The social contract: and Discourses 139-140. 1950. 
43 See, HIRSCHL, Constitutional theocracy 211. 2011.(Hirschl recognizes the phenomenon of religionizing the 
political institutions and constitution and dealing with them as traditional religious institutions and documents.) 
44 Alexis De Tocqueville, The Old Regime and The Revolution, trans. John Bonner 25 (New York: Harper & 
Brothers 1856). 
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proselytism, and gave birth to propagandism; and hence assumed 
that quasi religious character which so terrified those who saw it, 
or, rather, became a sort of new religion, imperfect, it is true, 
without God, worship, or future life, but still able, like Islamism, to 
cover the earth with its soldiers, its apostles, and its martyrs.45 
Tocqueville describes the Revolution that is deemed secular but obviously incorporated 
remarkable components of religion; namely, the “passion” and faith that inspires “its soldiers, its 
apostles, and its martyrs.”46 In the course of state-building and afterward especially in the more 
religious societies like most of the Muslim-majority countries, secular religion (civil or political) 
needs traditional religions in order to clothe its institutions and rules with faith that guarantees a 
sort of stability in the long run. For a secular religion, civil religion in our case, to be popularly 
built with its “system of beliefs, myths, values, symbols, and rituals that confer a sacred aura on 
political institutions,” it may have to translate some traditional religious concepts to civil 
religion. It may thus leverage the power of traditional religion in order to proselytize a civil 
religion.47 This process is even more foundational for states that experience a transitional period 
toward democracy but at the same time, deal with mostly Islamic society. 
                                                 
45 Id. at, 26-27. Italics are mine. I should comment on this quotation in two points. The first: although it is a brilliant 
observation by Tocqueville that the French Revolution resembles a religious revolution in some features, he failed to 
treat the concept “worship” the same way that he did to “religion.” Other later researchers dealt with “worship” as a 
concept that applies to political interaction as much as religion. The relationship between what is considered a 
“national hero” and an ordinary citizen when the former claims authority that needs submission and subordination 
by the later looks like worship in a secular religion. See e.g., GENTILE, Politics as religion 9, 29, 32, 63, 68 & 86. 
2006. The second point I want to make here is that the word “Islamism” that Tocqueville used seems to mean 
“Islam” as a religion while about a century later of Tocqueville’s work “Islamism” has become a different 
phenomenon that describes not just typical Muslims but those among them who work socially and politically to 
implement Islamic principles according to the Islamic authority according to the Islamists’ claim. For more about 
Islamism, see RICHARD MARTIN & ABBAS BARZEGAR, ISLAMISM: CONTESTED PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL ISLAM 
(Stanford University Press. 2010). 
46 De Tocqueville, The Old Regime and The Revolution, trans. John Bonner 27. 1856. 
47 GENTILE, Politics as religion XV. 2006. 
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Some analysts see that the faith in the civil salvation story is the only way to enjoy the 
worldly democratic heaven.48 Just as in the Bible, the wicked son was excluded from the 
Covenant because he did not believe in the narrative, the modern bibles, the constitutions, 
represent a modern civil salvation narrative whereby whoever believes in it shall enjoy its civil 
covenant, the social contract.49 William Cavanaugh criticizes the attempts to strip the society of 
the sacred salvation story. He notes that their attempt ended up creating its alternative sacred 
narrative. According to Cavanaugh, this process of substituting one sacred narrative for another 
takes advantage “of the sacred from some profane remainder”.50 
Out of the traditional Jewish story and its survival from slavery, the American survival 
from political modern slavery and persecution became a national narrative. The American 
narrative, just like its Jewish sister, has conveyed a set of rituals, faiths, rules, lessons from the 
past, promises for the future, and resulted in even a newer testament, the United States 
Constitution.51 Ran Hirschl notes that “[c]onstitutions and constitutionalism may become a 
religion-like domain of their own, thereby counterbalancing or even replacing more traditional 
religious symbols, interpretive discourses, and sources of authority.”52 In American political 
history, Roosevelt speaks of the Constitution as a political and civil bible, saying “[l]ike the 
                                                 
48 BALKIN, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World 53. 2011;TAYLOR, Modern social 
imaginaries 101. 2004. See, GEORGE LAKOFF, THE POLITICAL MIND: WHY YOU CAN'T UNDERSTAND 21ST-CENTURY 
POLITICS WITH AN 18TH-CENTURY BRAIN 22 (Viking. 2008). 
49 BALKIN, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World 53. 2011. 
50 JOHN MILBANK, et al., RADICAL ORTHODOXY: A NEW THEOLOGY 203 (Routledge. 2002).(Cavanaugh here 
criticizes progressive secularist wing of being paradoxical in the way that they distance themselves from traditional 
sacred narrative while, in the end, adopted another sacred but modern one. I, however, focus on this premise of the 
need for a narrative disregarding the original argument by Cavanaugh in criticizing the progressive story.) See, 
JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION 101 (Princeton University Press. 2004). 
51 BALKIN, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World 53. 2011. See, STOUT, Democracy and 
tradition 20. 2004. Stout deals with the American civil religion and its interpretation while “Bloom…declares 
Emerson the founding prophet of the American religion.” Id. at.  
52 HIRSCHL, Constitutional theocracy 82. 2011;Taylor, PAUL RICOEUR AND THE TASK OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 3 
(2012). 
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Bible, it ought to be read again and again”53 which spurred some constitutionalists to think of the 
constitutional interpretations and schools as similar to the theological schools and its 
interpretation. Jack M. Balkin sees the American “constitutional legitimacy” partially as a result 
of “protestant constitutionalism.”54 
Political faith is the intersubjective, and very significant, dimension of legitimacy. 
Believing in the civil religion, like a traditional religion, varies according, among other factors, 
to the state’s fulfillment of the “justice,” and the degree of conviction, i.e. whether it meets the 
intersubjective doctrine and whether it succeeds to trigger the traditional sociopolitical 
components that empower the faith. In this sense, political faith can be a very effective vehicle 
that carries popular legitimacy. That being said, as discussed further herein, the Muslim countries 
that struggle toward building democratic systems should consider more the need and respect for 
the traditional religion, Islam in our case, in order to strengthen or even build a civil religion of 
its own. 
2.1.3 The Legitimizing Imaginary 
Legitimation is a complex process that involves dynamics that range from rational to emotional, 
and from the real to the imagined world. From the role that initiatory legitimacy plays in setting 
up the original role model for the state, the efforts exerted to convince people of the current 
generation may lead to the establishment of an imagined state that later people use as standards 
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for their state and order.55 This is one way to build this imagined state while another, important, 
way is the long narrated model or rule that is found in history, religion, or culture in general.56 
The work of legitimation is no different than any other work that involves 
communication with others in that legitimation uses imagined states and the subconscious mind. 
Cognitive scientists assert that 98% of thinking is subconscious, and they further declare that 
emotion can be legitimately used in politics.57 Political narratives, figurative stories, artistic tales 
and expressions, and myths build different parts of the consciousness.58 As George Lakoff, has 
said “[c]ognitive studies show that thinking is imaginative and it depends fundamentally on 
metaphorical understanding.”59 
The imagined legitimate state is not the real world state, but one that provides the basic 
tools necessary to understand the real state. The descriptive nature and hermeneutic role of 
imagined states and utopias, however, becomes prescriptive and normative. The imagined states 
of the past that we describe and admire could become part of the normative standards that inspire 
the new states.59F60 Therefore, the legitimizing imaginary is the set of rules, expectations, policies, 
etc. that reside in the public imagination and affect how people evaluate the legitimacy of the 
real state and react to it. The social imaginary in this context works as part of normative 
legitimacy. Legitimacy may employ the imagined state’s characteristics to either challenge a real 
state’s legitimacy or to render a certain rule or polity legitimate. 
                                                 
55 See in general, TAYLOR, Modern social imaginaries. 2004.  
56 See in general, LAKOFF, The political mind: why you can't understand 21st-century politics with an 18th-century 
brain. 2008. 
57 Id. at, 3&8. 
58 Id. at, 22-24. 
59 GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK 41 (University of Chicago Press. 
2002). 
60 TAYLOR, Modern social imaginaries 6-9. 2004. 
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Because normative legitimacy derives from wide public support, the social imaginary is a 
public imagined field that creates standards according to culturally accepted and widely shared 
norms. Theories (and jurisprudence rules, in our case) that succeeded in convincing people to 
adopt them as part of their core normative convictions will end up as legitimizing social 
imaginaries.61 Imagination is the typical playground for what is sometimes called the “Higher 
law.”62 Higher law is the ethical and general principles that may govern the society in the public 
sphere even sometimes if the state’s law is in conflict with some of the higher law principles.63 
In other words, Higher law is the imagined law in the imagined sphere that crucially affects the 
understanding of state’s law and its making.  
Similar to De Tocqueville’s early idea of common belief as a prerequisite for a possible 
common action, Charles Taylor stresses that “[t]he social imaginary is that common 
understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy.”64 
The common belief and public opinion is created in the imagined public sphere to facilitate 
people’s action and social practices.65 The legitimizing social imaginary, then, is in a dialectical 
relationship with the social practices, as these practices may be a product of long imagined and 
desired society. Conversely, new social practices may themselves make up a new legitimizing 
social imaginary. The imagined public sphere and its forces are entitled socially to draw the 
borders of legitimacy. Therefore, the process of legitimization is not necessarily imprisoned in 
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Background of American Constitutional Law, HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 365 (1929).  
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64 TAYLOR, Modern social imaginaries 23. 2004. 
65Id. at, 85. 
28 
the current constitutional setting. Rather, it could be done beyond the scope of a given political 
hierarchy and order.66 
Public will, public sphere, higher law, people as a whole, and even the nation are just 
politically and legally involved examples of imagined parties and fields.67 Although the actual, 
written Constitution of the United States gained legal, political, and social attention in the 
everyday lives of Americans, Jack Balkin declares, “[we, Americans] bow down to a 
Constitutions of our imagination.”68 He does not imply that this Constitution of the United States 
is not real but refers instead to the very wide and legitimate interpretations of the Constitution 
that are largely constructed rather than an accurate reflection of the legal state of the document. 
The imagination that empowers the Constitution is itself part of the working legitimacy. 
One interesting dimension of this legitimizing imaginary is Ricoeur’s idea of “prospective 
identity.” In our context, this allows a constitution to contain the generations-to-come by the 
flexibility of the texts, and the creativity of the interpretations. Identity can derive from our 
future as well in committing to the future’s expectations and conditions.69 For a constitution to 
be continuously legitimate, it must be flexible enough to be understood by different interpreters 
according to the general principles, and to be flexible enough to include future interpretations 
and elaborations according to the context and understanding of that future.70 
In this part, I have shown that faith is inevitably part of our social and political fabric. 
This faith takes a political shape when legitimizing a state through interaction with people. A 
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notable way of the interaction is to understand the public imaginary and how it affects the way 
legitimacy works. 
The following part will discuss the different forms of legitimacy and how these forms 
undergird the foundation of a state that still look at faith and even traditional faith as a basis for 
life. 
2.2 THE ROAD TO LEGITIMACY (FORMS OF LEGITIMACY) 
Legitimacy as a concept is loaded with different meanings and can be looked at from different 
perspectives. It is not the intention of this chapter, however, to present all of the rich meanings of 
the term and debates surrounding them. However, it is important to highlight and utilize different 
aspects of the concept in order to build towards my final argument. To understand how 
legitimacy works in the context of Islamic jurists, it is important to lay out some aspects of 
legitimacy and legitimation processes.  
In the previous part, we have seen how faith can play in upholding legitimacy; in this 
part, we will see how different forms of legitimacy can found the state and stabilize it, and why 
this cannot be achieved without considering the faith of the people and its values. 
2.2.1 Procedural Validity as a Reductionist “Legitimacy” 
Procedural validity, sometimes called procedural legitimacy,71 is the typical legal force that 
judges and lawyers incorporate in their arguments on almost a daily basis to prove whether a 
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party is right or wrong. Lawyers and jurists are usually preoccupied with the validity of an 
argument or a party’s position according to the already legislated official codes, laws, and 
procedures. Procedural legality simply ensures that everything is following the procedures of the 
system laid down.72 
Because procedural validity is solely concerned with meeting procedural requirements 
and conditions, it is sometimes described as validity and legality more than legitimacy.73 
Therefore, what is called “procedural legitimacy” is best described as legal validity to distinguish 
it from legitimacy that goes beyond the procedural level. Validity is to fulfill the legal and 
official conditions and procedures while legitimacy, in a more specific sense, is to measure and 
examine these conditions and procedures. Legal validity (procedural legitimacy) is descriptive 
and performative in nature whereas legitimacy, in a more specific conception, is prescriptive and 
normative.  
When Carl Schmitt dealt with legitimacy, he stressed the difference between “legality” 
and “legitimacy,” where legality refers to fulfilling the official procedures and requirements 
                                                 
72 The school of legal positivism may have facilitated shifting the focus to the issue of whether administrations 
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the concept of infikak aljihah (literally: the disentanglement of sides) by which they could describe an action as 
religiously and legaly valid but at the same time religiously not allowed. Most Islamic jurists ruled that the prayers 
are religiously valid (sahihah) but the person is wrongdoer (aathim) because the two sides, validity and morality are 
disentangled. I will explain the concept later in this chapter. For more about it, see, ABU HAMID AL-GHZALI, AL-
MUSTASFA 3:199-203 (1995);MUHAMMED AL-'MEEN AL-SHINQEETI, AL-MUDHAKKIRAH FI USUL AL-FIQH 27-31 
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while legitimacy goes beyond legal procedures. Legitimacy, according to Schmitt, depends on 
pre-legal values and norms.74 
Legitimacy thus precedes legality in time and importance. Legitimacy is what gives 
legality and procedures its authority, and the more legitimacy a legal procedure has, the more 
lasting and authoritative it is. Habermas describes this difference between validity (legality, 
procedural “legitimacy”) and legitimacy when discussing Bockenforde’s question about the 
positive constitutional system to hint that legitimacy is “pre-political.” Habermas accurately 
takes Bockenforde’s question to reach the conclusion that: 
a completely positive constitutional system requires religion or 
some other “sustaining power” to lend cognitive support to its 
legitimizing principles. The claim to validity of positive law, on 
this reading, is supposed to require grounding in the pre-political 
ethical convictions of religious or national communities. The 
reasoning is that such a legal order cannot legitimate itself in a 
self-reflexive fashion through a democratic legal procedure 
alone.75 
A salient aspect of Schmitt’s distinction of legality (procedural validity) and legitimacy 
(pre-political authority) is the locus of legitimizers. He launched an attack on what he described 
as a “closed system of legality,” accusing it of exercising a monopoly over legislation and 
destroying itself. He made reference to the “legislative state” where “there cannot be numerous 
‘sources of law.’” To overcome this dilemma of a monopoly over legislation, he proposed a 
more open system that is characterized by a counterbalancing power to end up with a form of 
state that guarantees, inter alia, moderation and freedom.76 His proposal involved more power to 
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the radical “legitimate” revolutionary, the popular president, which turned out to be quite 
dangerous and problematic in the context of Weimar Germany.77 By contrast, I argue for a 
power-free zone in a meta-constitutional sphere which I will discuss in more details in a separate 
chapter. 
Bockenforde’s pre-political values78 and Schmitt’s pre-legal norms79 emphasize that 
legitimizers cannot legitimize themselves in closed circle of legality. Rather, for legitimation to 
be more authoritative, and the legitimizers to be more impartial, it must be exercised from 
outside the system. Even in a constitutional order, Habermas comments, “[t]he exercise of power 
that cannot be justified in an impartial manner is illegitimate because it reflects the fact that one 
party is forcing its will on another.”80 This idea of the need for free will to recognize the 
legitimacy of an order is what leads to the necessity for outside legitimizers who work in 
harmony with the system but independently enough to exercise legitimation impartially.81 
Legitimacy is best attained through fair legitimizers who are more socially trusted to have been 
providing the definitions and meanings of the pre-legal pre-political values. Even in a democratic 
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80HABERMAS, Between naturalism and religion: Philosophical essays 122. 2008.  
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constitutional system, constitutional legitimacy is achieved through popular and hegemonic 
struggles that usually reside in the public sphere away from the state’s direct surveillance.82 
A state can perfectly procedurally claim “legitimacy”, but if these procedures are not 
popularly ratified, the procedures themselves will be deemed illegitimate. Even authoritarian 
regimes may follow certain procedures and formalities but this does not prevent them from being 
despotic.83 Therefore, even with the “legitimate” constitutional procedures found inside a 
system, this system needs to resort continuously and simultaneously outside of its own system 
but within the society to carry the task of legitimation. This process of continuous need for 
outside legitimizers may encompass some compromises, which are part of counterbalancing the 
powers, but it prevents procedural tyranny and legal monopoly.84 
As an initial point in regard to the Islamic religious institutions, jurists’ use of 
legitimation is more normative and ethical than procedural and formal. Therefore, the legitimacy 
that jurists are controlling is not comprehensive in its domain (because it is normative and not 
procedural), nor in its nature. The jurists’ very arena in regard to rendering legitimacy is not the 
procedural, legal, and formal sphere where a political and legal state’s institutions operate; 
rather, the jurists manage the scope of legitimacy by interacting with people, influencing the 
social imaginary, and empowering constitutional faith. 
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Legitimacy, thus, is far more than procedural, and operates well beyond legal formalism. 
It goes to a deeper set of shared values and beliefs. 
2.2.2 Normative Legitimacy 
In constitutional orders, the legitimation process is the way toward stability in the long run. In 
order to obtain long-term stability, such orders must obtain a legitimacy that is normative in 
nature and widely accepted.85 When legitimacy is referred to as normative, it means that the 
establishing principles of an order are justified and supported by preexisting ethics, religion, 
doctrines, and traditions.86 For a constitutional order to be widely accepted, it needs what Alexis 
De Tocqueville referred to as “common belief” in order to make “common action.” This is 
because without common action, he asserts, no society can exist.87 Although Tocqueville does 
not suggest that a polity should adopt a sectarian faith, he seems to imply that there should be a 
reasonable level of common belief to make things work in any constitutional project.88 
To reach the common belief, John Rawls introduced the idea of “overlapping consensus” 
to allow necessary, or rather helpful, pluralism and set the ground rules for all comprehensive 
doctrines to reach liberal and democratic ends.89 This consensus Rawls argues for is based in 
every group’s own preexisting beliefs and tradition as those groups conceive this consensus. 
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35 
Regardless of the plausibility of Rawls’ idea, his project indicates the need for agreed upon 
values that go beyond the temporary agreements and modus vivendi. According to Ricoeur, even 
in secular states, legitimacy needs something more lasting than “contractual agreements;”90 there 
have to be shared values. These shared values and common belief do not, however, require being 
merely religious in the traditional understanding of the word; they could be societal values or 
cultural beliefs.91 Nonetheless, traditional religions are commonly root sources of these widely 
accepted values. As Charles Taylor rightly puts it, “[e]ven great innovative religious founders 
have to draw on a preexisting vocabulary available in their society.”92 The idea here is the role of 
traditional religions in producing and processing these vocabularies as part of the powerful 
preexisting traditions. These traditions are what define a certain course as normatively legitimate, 
and, thus, allow for smoothly initiating an order that is compliant with, or at least not 
contradictory to, the traditionally accepted rules.  
The prerequisite of drawing on already accepted or widely agreed upon tradition is 
indispensable for any new system to be established. A good example of this prerequisite in 
modern times is the Enlightenment elaboration of the social contract. Grotius, in anti-
revolutionary mode, delivered the idea of social contract for reasons that were opposite of those 
who came after him. Grotius agreed with others on the requirement of people’s consent for a 
political order to be legitimate. All this theorization was done not to limit the government, but 
rather to justify that current rule as being legitimate, because illegitimate rule will cease to exist 
if it is thought of by people as such. With this context, John Locke used the same theory but for 
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revolutionary purposes and to demand a limited government.93 It is interesting here to note that 
this Enlightenment movement was, then, under pressure to use the same language and adopt the 
same theories and metaphors of that period even if they wanted to reach different meanings. In 
other words, despite the revolutionary nature of the Enlightenment, it borrowed concepts from 
preexisting, even sometimes opposing, long-established traditions in order to catch the heart of 
the targeted audience, the people. The Enlightenment acted out of the realization that a legitimate 
system must be justified with the widely accepted traditional and ethical rules.94 
From a cognitive perspective, George Lakoff asserts that “[p]eople can’t obey your 
orders if they have a different idea than you do of what those orders are.”95 If we are to have a 
common understanding of the basic orders, we have to lean on our shared ethics and virtues. 
Although they differ on whether the current liberal democracy has it or not, both traditionalists 
along with new traditionalists and pragmatists agree that shared values are necessary to establish 
an admirable and stable system.96 The popular consensus is normative and actual when it is 
reached after long-standing cultural debates.97 Therefore, a normative legitimacy emerges from 
values that are consented to by the society as a whole and seen as such for long enough to be a 
basis for any current or future constitutional order.  
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2.2.3 Initiatory Verses Continuous Legitimacy 
Because proceduralism is a reductionist approach toward legitimacy, normative approach is 
essential as I have shown above. Here I discuss two different forms of legitimacy as how to 
apply legitimation process in the new established state (initiatory legitimacy), as opposed to the 
long established system (continuous legitimacy). 
The debate of initiatory legitimacy dates back to medieval Islamic history. When Ibn 
Khaldun (d. 1406) dealt with his theory of assabyyah (group solidarity),98 he complained of the 
problematic scholastic analyses that center around the role of force and power but disregard, or 
overlook, the role of “group solidarity.” He attributed their unfinished analyses to the 
methodology that they adopted in focusing on the way an order can continue rather than the way 
it was originally established. Therefore, a new order to take place needs more dependence on the 
targeted group’s or people’s accepted ideals than any existing order that seeks continuity, though 
both need them. As a result, Ibn Khaldun proposed the idea of group solidarity. He thinks that 
this idea of solidarity is what explains the legitimation process that sets up a given political 
system throughout history. Until today, some researchers define the work of legitimacy as to 
safeguard the continuity of a state.99 In fact, legitimacy starts long before that; it starts in the 
moment when the state comes into existence. This is initiatory legitimacy.100 
                                                 
98 In his work, the Well-Protected Domains, Deringil described Ibn Khaldun’s theory as “the requisite nature 
(assabiyya) to constitute this authority, served in particular to legitimate the rule.” SELIM DERINGIL, THE WELL-
PROTECTED DOMAINS 20 (IB Tauris. 1998). However, Ibn Khaldun’s theory describes something that constitute 
solidarity and sociopolitical belonging more than a merely “nature.” From my reading of Ibn Khaldun, he is using 
the word “assabiyya” in a similar meaning of today’s use of the word “ideology.” Assabiya, as far as this account is 
concern, describes the meaning that brings a group together and justifies their existence together whereby they can 
constitute a political order. See, Ibn Khaldun, Al-Muqaddimah, at 100-184. 
99 E. g., see in general, HABERMAS, Legitimation crisis 16. 1975;DERINGIL, The well-protected domains 43. 1998.  
100 Compare, WEBER, et al., The theory of social and economic organization 154. 1947. (Here Weber can be a good 
example of what Ibn Khaldun more than five centuries ago criticized. Max Weber in defining the state as the only 
entity that can legitimately use physical force, he was preoccupied with the continuous legitimacy rather than the 
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After Jeffrey Stout, a pragmatist, criticized at length traditionalists and new traditionalists 
for their reductionist interpretation of traditions, he argued that the social practices that have long 
been incorporated in modern democracies have become themselves a tradition. 101 From this 
perspective, we can predict that this process of the traditionalization of democratic culture took 
generations to be transmitted and inherited as part of a legacy passing through generations. The 
understanding of tradition being expanded by Stout is not merely of a religious or pre-modern 
nature. Instead, it is something that modern democracies and secular systems do as well. This 
innovative approach, however, does not apply to the situation where what can be called 
“initiatory legitimacy” is at issue. In order for a democracy to be established and continue as a 
stable state, its initial legitimacy needs to be based on older traditions. This older tradition 
strategy for building legitimacy was the case of the United States’ initiatory legitimacy, for 
example, as will be shown shortly.102  
Thus, in transitional periods and times, and when founding fathers of any proposed 
democracy or state seek to build a new democratic system, initiatory legitimacy becomes a 
defining component of the constitutional building process. Whereas continuous legitimacy tends 
to meet its establishing demands throughout an existing state’s operation, initiatory legitimacy is 
what defines these demands in the first place.103 Therefore, initiatory legitimacy works to 
institute a state in reality, while continuous legitimacy gives the state the ongoing popular 
justification to maintain its current status as legitimate. As Deringil explains, “[w]hen the 
population at large accepts the historical inertia of a particular order of things, half the battle has 
                                                 
101 BALKIN, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust World 118&152. 2011. 
102 See references to God’s natural law in the founding fathers’ discourse, Barker, THE REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS, 
105-9 (2012). 
103 See in general, TAYLOR, Modern social imaginaries 87. 2004;HABERMAS, Legitimation crisis 3-4. 1975. 
DERINGIL, The well-protected domains 181. 1998.  
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been won; it then becomes a question of maintaining the status quo.”104 But this early phase of 
people’s accepting and inheriting an order, which is the task of initiatory legitimacy, is much 
easier said than done. 
As initiatory legitimacy is differentiated from continuous legitimacy, it is worth noting 
that this distinction is in regard to the task each form of legitimacy is doing. At the same time 
both are intertwined in some phases and cases. The people’s consent and respect that is originally 
present must be continuously ongoing to uphold legitimacy throughout time and place.105 When 
the original “solidarity” of initiatory legitimacy is being transformed into a different focus or 
ideology, it must reflect current cultural perspective and ideology in order to avoid political 
deadlocks.106 The lack of legitimacy starts when the “continuous legitimacy” does not match the 
tradition of the “initiatory legitimacy” and its cultural rules. Habermas defines the legitimation 
crisis as “[t]he structural dissimilarity between areas of administrative action, and areas of 
cultural tradition, [which] constitutes then a systematic limit to attempts to compensate for 
legitimation deficits, through conscious manipulation”.107 The crisis, then, begins when the 
legitimation locus shifts from one area to another without supportive cultural background or 
social backup. The legitimation shift, in order to be smoothly justified, has to carry the still 
continuously legitimate baggage and elements from the initiatory legitimacy.108 
                                                 
104 DERINGIL, The well-protected domains 43. 1998. 
105 TAYLOR, Modern social imaginaries 87. 2004;BALKIN, Constitutional Redemption: Political Faith in an Unjust 
World 34. 2011. 
106 DERINGIL, The well-protected domains 45. 1998. (when reforms, Tanzimat, introduced in the Ottoman Empire, 
“the field of tension between ruler and ruled shifted onto a different plane.”Id. at. Consequently, this shift was 
neither fulfilled nor reflecting people’s cultural tradition of how a state should operate. I here use the word 
“solidarity” as almost a synonym of assabiyyah in Ibn Khaldun’s language. See, Khaldun, Al-Muqaddimah 100-
184.). 
107 HABERMAS, Legitimation crisis 71. 1975. See, DERINGIL, The well-protected domains 181. 1998. 
108 DERINGIL, The well-protected domains 45. 1998. See, STOUT, Democracy and tradition 203. 2004. 
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Initiatory legitimacy is a necessary process to establish a new system or stabilize the 
system where the democratic states are newer, and the forms less authoritative through centuries 
of practice. This applies to states in transition toward democracy, and in particular Muslim 
societies. On the other hand, continuous legitimacy is an on-going resource that usually takes its 
meanings from agreed-upon values that have existed for centuries. This is certainly the case for 
Muslim societies and their attachment to the Islamic traditions. 
2.2.4 (Enunciative Legitimacy) the Role of Symbols and Formalities 
To build confidence that proven essential to legitimacy as I have shown, a state must lean on 
normative legitimacy that reflects people’s values and norms. Symbolic formalities help a state 
in establishing that normative relationship. These forms may try to ring a bell through using 
symbolic words or formalities from the inspiring past, or authoritative sacred or almost sacred 
texts. Enunciative legitimacy carries this task.  
In carrying out the task of upholding legitimacy, language is never neutral.109 None can 
speak without using cultural and societal references identifiable to and recognizable by the 
culture in which it is used. The Brazilian philosopher Paul Freire in his argument for “pedagogy 
for the oppressed” explains, “[t]he language of the educator or the politician…, like the language 
of the people, cannot exist without thought; and neither language nor thought can exist without a 
structure to which they refer.”110 
                                                 
109 See, LAKOFF, The political mind: why you can't understand 21st-century politics with an 18th-century brain 231. 
2008. 
110 PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 94 (Continuum. 2000).(Freire emphasizes the non-neutral nature 
of the language and education. In another text he says, 
There is no such thing as a neutral educational process. Education either functions as an instrument that is used to 
facilitate the integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present system and bring about conformity to 
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Language is part of the message that it conveys and, thus, changes the way we think of 
the message itself. The cultural references are for far more than neutral clarity and explanation; 
they utilize available vocabulary in the society but choose one word over another for direct or 
indirect objectives. For example, using a word that carries a history is very common in the public 
sphere in order to trigger the subconscious of the society or to awaken a meaning that was buried 
for some time. Drawing upon traditional or valuable concepts (in the normative sense), or 
leaning on (historical) individuals, battles, or symbols is a repeated practice that politicians, 
lawmakers, and public figures alike use, sometimes even for conflicting reasons. Symbols and 
formalities can be used for mobilization toward what Gerard Leclerc calls “enunciative 
legitimacy.”111 This repeated practice emphasizes the role of symbols, formalities, and references 
in contributing to the making up of state legitimacy.  
Although Ricoeur notes that enunciative legitimacy is more associated with pre-modern 
polities, he asserts that even modern and democratic ones still carry some significant components 
of enunciative legitimacy. While modern states are more identified by “institutional legitimacy” 
that links authority to institutions,112 the institutional nature of the latter form of legitimacy 
adopts enunciative elements inherited from the medieval era. Despite the rationality that the 
modern democratic state claims and defends, components that had been considered “irrational” 
during the Enlightenment have influenced modern institutions.113 Enunciative legitimacy has 
                                                 
it, or it becomes "the practice of freedom," the means by which men and women deal critically and creatively with 
reality and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world. Id. at, 34.) 
111 GÉRARD LECLERC, HISTOIRE DE L'AUTORITÉ: L'ASSIGNATION DES ÉNONCÉS CULTURELS ET LA GÉNÉALOGIE DE LA 
CROYANCE (Presses Universitaires de France-PUF. 1996). See, PAUL RICOEUR, REFLECTIONS ON THE JUST 94 
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(2012). 
112 RICOEUR, Reflections on the Just 94. 2007;Taylor, PAUL RICOEUR AND THE TASK OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 18-
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113 See, LAKOFF, The political mind: why you can't understand 21st-century politics with an 18th-century brain. 
2008. 
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thus never ceased to exist even in today’s systems.114 Ricoeur asserts that “there has never been a 
purely enunciative authority with no institutional authority, and today there is no purely 
institutional authority without the contribution, the symbolic support, of some enunciative 
order”115. Institutional legitimacy provides the basis for the constitutional setting while 
enunciative legitimacy is to clothe the system with a popular faith and trust through cultural hints 
and references.116 
Enunciative legitimacy is what collocates religious symbols and references in one state. 
The enunciative work of these symbols and references contributes to institutional and 
constitutional legitimacy. The latter are concerned solely with the constitutional authoritativeness 
of the institutions, but it is important not to overlook the surrounding ornaments that must not 
just look beautiful but be trustworthy as well. In other words, institutional legitimacy has 
measurable accurate standards that ensure that state institutions have the legal validity, and the 
popular trust that use, inter alia, enunciative tools in order to bind legitimacy to democratic 
modern institutions.  
To apply these lessons to a modern Muslim-majority country, I turn to the example of the 
late Ottoman Empire, which both sought to modernize, and to keep crucial elements of 
enunciative legitimacy in order to maintain people’s faith in the system and their loyalty while 
undertaking such modernization. 
                                                 
114 Ricoeur, 13 (1986);Taylor, PAUL RICOEUR AND THE TASK OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 16 (2012). 
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2.2.4.1 The Ottoman Example of Enunciative Legitimacy117:  
The late period of the Ottoman Empire deployed the tools of enunciative legitimacy widely.118 
Sultan Abdulhamid II inherited some techniques and established others designed to provide 
enunciative legitimacy.  
American ceremonial displays, even religious ones, were justified by the U.S. Supreme 
Court as a means to legitimize institutions that undergird the Republic.119 Comparably, the 
Ottomans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century used coats of arms or 
commemorative plaques to legitimize individuals or dynasties.120 This was a way to remind the 
society of the toll paid in blood and toil to build the state and reach the status quo. Enunciative 
legitimacy could be, and was, carried out by symbolic title, garment, the protection of religious 
places, and architecture. When the Ottomans took over Byzantine, they built the Ottoman Palace 
(Topkapi) on the site of the Byzantine one, thereby inheriting the implied legitimizing role that 
the city and site had in the Roman Empire. As Deringil notes “[t]he cathedral of Hagia Sophia, 
converted to a mosque after the conquest, and purportedly the scene of the Ottoman Sultan Selim 
I’s assuming the mantle of the caliphate in 1519, was especially significant.”121 
                                                 
117 Later in this chapter, Islamic legitimacy is going to be analyzed with the focus on its shared influence on today’s 
Arab states. It is not my intention, though, to study or analyze the Ottoman Empire but to take it as a good example 
of the role of enunciative legitimacy here especially with its two features: One it lent some of these formalities and 
symbols to different Muslim and Arab states because of the heritage and linkage between the Ottomans on one hand 
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(verso. 2006);TAYLOR, Modern social imaginaries. 2004. 
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As part of protecting, or rather implicitly claiming, enunciative legitimacy, Abdulhamid 
tried to sacralize his title by associating it with the holy places. This is a common practice 
deployed by different leaders by given them some supposedly blessed duty of protecting, and 
thus obviously ruling, a “holy land.” Like the “blessed Tsar” who protects the “Holy Russian 
land,” Abdulhamid would be the guardian of the Holy Mosques.122 The Sultan’s service of the 
holy mosques had to be a title specified for him only to ensure his sole legitimate right to rule.123 
Along the same lines of sacralization, the Ottoman Sublime had complete monopoly over the 
publishing and printing of the Quran on the ground that it was protecting it from change and 
distortion.124 Different cases were reported where even accurate and perfect copies of the Quran 
were officially burned to prevent any future “imperfect” or “distorted” version.125 
Many centuries later, the Ottomans continued their practices of enunciative legitimacy. In 
the late 19th century, the Ottoman’s “robe of honor” would be solely given to the Shareefs126 of 
Mecca, so as to imply that nobody can claim authority or power in the Islamic “holy places” 
except through Ottoman authorization. A document in Topkapi indicates that the Ottoman 
Sublime refused giving Ibn Rasheed (an influential ruler in Najd then) the “robe of honor” 
because the Ottomans wanted to make sure that Ibn Rasheed did not covet the holy places of 
Mecca and Medina. It is interesting that the Ottomans and others in the Arab Peninsula would 
understand a robe, a sword, or alike as a sign of power and a very political message that could 
convey an implied legitimacy or disturb an established one. 
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Abdulhamid’s rule has largely been dismissed as despotic.127 Nevertheless, similar 
methods have been used in Arab (and Muslim) countries today, including states that claim some 
sort of democratic system.128 To apply Ricoeur’s historical observation that today’s democratic 
institutional legitimacy requires some elements of enunciative legitimacy,129 modern Arab states’ 
institutional legitimacy requires the support of enunciative legitimacy inspired by some 
significant components, including those that were used in the late Ottoman Empire, in addition to 
other innovative ones. However, these enunciative legitimacy components should not exceed the 
acceptable standard of political and legal behavior of a given state. In the end, symbolic and 
enunciative legitimacy must also support the institutional legitimacy. This dynamic support helps 
associate authority with the institutions that fulfill the requirements of legitimacy rather than 
legitimizing individuals. This is what makes a state a more stable system. 
2.3 RELIGIOUS LEGITIMACY130 
In the first part, I discussed faith as a political vehicle for legitimation. The second part took the 
concept of faith to found or solidify legitimation process through showing how different forms of 
legitimacy work and should work. This final part will show how legitimacy in the Islamic 
context operates based on the arguments in the previous two parts. This involves working out 
                                                 
127 See in general, EDWIN SIR PEARS, LIFE OF ABDUL HAMID (Henry Holt & co. 1917);ALMA STEPHANIE WITTLIN, 
ABDUL HAMID, THE SHADOW OF GOD (John Lane. 1940). Compare, ABDUHAMID II, MUDHAKKIRAT ABDUHAMID II 
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128 See in general, BROWN, Constitutions in a nonconstitutional world: Arab basic laws and the prospects for 
accountable government. 2002. 
129 RICOEUR, Reflections on the Just 95. 2007. See, Taylor, PAUL RICOEUR AND THE TASK OF POLITICAL 
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130 It is worth noting that I used the word “religion/religious” in this section in the traditional understanding, i.e., 
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legitimacy in Muslim-majority states, and employing some Islamic jurisprudential elements in 
order to support legitimacy. At the end, the fatwa, or jurist’s ruling, will be given a special focus, 
in particular in Egypt, to show its role in the course of legitimation. 
The modern shift from traditional to political and civil religions applies to the concept of 
legitimacy and the understanding of legitimation processes. The religious legitimacy that would 
mean the traditional religious authority and clergy in the past has become to mean civil and 
political authority that occupies a similar position and employs similar techniques. However, this 
significant shift from traditional to civil religion could not have happened without the aid of the 
traditional religious authority, at least in one stage or another, and principles that facilitated this 
shift and legitimized it. Using the same religious frequency that people are using is what builds 
public confidence and maintains the continuous legitimacy. Otherwise, a legitimation crisis will 
disturb the state and interrupt the public confidence.131  
Interestingly, the influence of natural law (which was heavily enriched by religious rules) 
and theological philosophy on constitutional law is comparable to the role of religious 
legitimation on constitutional legitimacy. It is as if the modern state rid itself of one relationship 
to traditional religions but developed another relationship with them in order to build a whole 
different religion in the public sphere, a civil religion.132 The process of substituting one 
interpretation for another demonstrates the need for the traditional religion, Islam, as a major 
source of legitimacy in the Muslim majority countries I deal with here.133 
The different forms and concepts dealt with in this chapter have a common thread that 
religion is an indispensable element in legitimation, at least in countries that until today lean on 
                                                 
131 See in general, HABERMAS, Legitimation crisis. 1975. See, HIRSCHL, Constitutional theocracy 19. 2011. 
132 See in general, HABERMAS, Between naturalism and religion: Philosophical essays. 2008. 
133 Compare, HARRIS, The end of faith: Religion, terror, and the future of reason. 2005;HITCHENS, God is not great: 
How religion poisons everything. 2008;DAWKINS & WARD, The god delusion. 2006. 
47 
religion as a legitimizing tool. Muslim-majority countries are a good example of societies that 
still refer to religion for legitimation processes. As indicated in the previous section, normative 
legitimacy relies on religion or some genuine religious concepts to attain the stability of 
initiatory legitimacy and continuity of continuous legitimacy. On the other hand, initiatory 
legitimacy acquired more significance in the transitional periods where a new system is to be 
established. Thus, if we proceed with democratic change in a society without contextualizing it 
in cultural and religious ground, the nation-building project will be at great risk. The dilemma of 
legitimacy occurs when public confidence is lost and the already established morals are shaken. 
Ricoeur describes that as a “crisis” of “a deaccreditation of authority, authorities, institutions, 
and persons.”134 
In the “Broken Covenant”, Robert Bellah depicts a dilemma that takes place in the United 
States of America and suggests that “we must draw on deeper sources in our tradition than most 
liberals imagine if we are ever to build a public will for democratic change in America.”135 This 
is even truer of Muslim-majority countries, which are far more culturally and legally attached to 
traditional religious authorities. 
Centuries after the Declaration of Independence, and a long time after the establishment 
of a democratic system in America and Europe, Habermas asserted that “the democratic 
constitution must fill the gap in legitimation opened up by a secularization that deprives the state 
                                                 
134 RICOEUR, Reflections on the Just 94. 2007. 
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of state legitimation.”136 He was implying that mere procedural legitimacy could be fragile if not 
supported by settled principles in the society. Again, to apply this to the Islamic countries in 
democratic transition, we can say that the settled principles are inspired by Islam.137 Thus, in 
already established democracies, religious groups, communities, and institutions operate in a way 
that can stabilize and help to root democratic principles.138 By contrast, in a system which lacks 
this well-established democratic culture, these religious institutions and communities could help 
in establishing it for a more stabilized society.  
It is interesting to note that the logic behind borrowing some religious idolatry is similar 
to the use of political idolatry—both defer to an absolute authority that is transcendent and 
beyond ordinary people’s limits.139 This was a way human beings used to stabilize systems and 
societies. Regardless of the source of authority, a society needs a lasting moralistic authority that 
supports its identity and builds or maintains its state entities. “The only defensible form of 
democratic community is one in which ethical authority is treated as an entitlement (to 
deference) that one must earn by repeatedly demonstrating one’s reliability as an ethical 
judge.”140  
The legitimizing imaginary that we discussed in the first part is also an arena where 
traditional religions typically used and are still using by employing the rich concepts, 
vocabulary, symbols, and references that provide, and, strikingly, are continuously producing.141 
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It goes without saying that all these different forms of legitimacy discussed above are employing 
elements from religious legitimacy, or at least constituting one form or another of religious 
legitimacy. Therefore, in Muslim majority countries, the traditional religion that plays and must 
play the religious legitimacy role is Islam. I here argue that Islamic jurists who take the position 
as religious institutions qualify for being the outside authority with no political power except that 
similar to the civil society, to legitimize the system and continue as a checking mechanism to the 
state institutions and those in power. 
2.3.1 Islamic Legitimacy 
The Arabic verb shara‘a which means establishing a great path is the root that two different 
words we discuss here are derived. One word is “legitimacy-shar‘yyah” which usually refers to 
the validity, legitimacy or similar meaning. The other is “Islamic law (Shari‘a)” which is widely 
used in English. It is not a coincidence that these two words share the same root and, thus, 
influence each other.142 Similarly, it is intersting to note that the word “shari‘” in Arabic means 
the greatest path that most people have made use of while “shari‘a”, which now in both Arabic 
                                                 
like “in the image of God” (id. at, 110.), and “kingdom of God.” (id. at, 230.). These are just examples of the 
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142 JAMAL AD-DEEN BIN MUKARRAM (IBN MANDHOUR), LISAN AL-'ARAB 8:59-61 (Dar Sader. 2003);Majd Ad-Deen 
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opening a way. MANDHOUR), Lisan Al-'Arab 8:59-61. 2003. In Qur’an the verse (48:18) in traslation reads, “Then 
we set thee on a clear path.” See, Malik Ghulam Farid, Dictionary of the Holy Qur'an, 2006, at 437-8.  
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and English soley means Islamic law, could refer to an established custom in the society.143 By 
contrast shar‘yyah, or legitimacy, however, developed from using “shara‘a (to establish a path)” 
in legitimization and legalization which derived from “shari‘a.”144 This suggests the role that 
people and their customs play in determining some meanings--interpretations of the path (the 
Shari‘a, Islamic law). On the other hand, we could also infer from these meanings the role of 
people in establishing legitimacy as they are the ones who determine the right process according 
to their customs and values. Islam as a religion has shaped values and ethics in today’s Muslim 
society, and, thus, it is expected that Islamic legitmacy is fundemental in building a long term 
stable and democratic state. 
In Muslim-majority countries, there has been a consensual premise that the state should 
acquire Islamic legitimacy in order for there to be faith in the political system. In order to 
establish this faith, political spirits from the traditional religion (Islam) should work in 
legitimizing the state and its institutions.145 In any constitutional state in which the people’s will 
is a core constitutive force and where the people overwhelmingly expect and demand a central 
role for Islam, Islam in one fashion or another will need to be recognized as a basis upon which 
the state operates, or the state will lose the popular legitimacy it demands. It is people who paved 
the great way to the resource of legitimacy establishing a custom and value as they did in the 
past to find water by the (shari‘a) because the word shari‘a itself would mean establishing the 
path to water as a resource and it is the same word that would refer to the people’s customs as I 
have shown.146 
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2.3.2 The Theological Legitimacy 
In the seventh century, the first schism that later inspired the Sunni-Shi‘i split in Islam was about 
legitimacy requirements.147 Although that dispute used classical theological tools, it can be 
described as a political conflict that targets people through their doctrinal convictions and 
values.148 Needless to say that Islam as a religion inspired these values and convictions, thus, it 
was plausible to appeal to Islam itself in these political conflicts to approach people and build 
their faith and confidence in the system, or, on the other hand, to shake their faith and 
confidence. 
Out of the early conflicts of Islam, an anarchistic group known as the Kharijis149 revolted 
against and fought the third and later fourth Muslim Caliphs. They specifically denied the 
possibility of political human arbitration of disputes, on the grounds that decision-making and 
problem-solving was left to “God”. Some historians read the Kharijis’ position as demanding 
that society abandon the idea of a ‘state/caliphate’ itself as a political system on the ground that 
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ruling is a solely divine practice.150 Their slogan was “there is no arbitrator but God”151 inspired 
by the established testimony of all Muslims “there is no god but God/Allah” and also referencing 
the Qur’anic verse “Legislation is not but for Allah.”152 Regardless of the authority that this 
claim carries, it indicates the structural relationship between religion and state, and the 
overlapping between religion and politics where there is no sphere but one sphere. At the same 
time, the narrative showed how the political claims employed a religious basis to appeal to 
people and their understanding of the authoritative resource of legitimation. 
The Kharijis expressed their positions in the seventh century, using theological tools to 
delegitimize institutions of authority. The purpose of today’s political theology is nearly the 
opposite—to build, that is, legitimacy in democratic institutions that currently lack it.153 
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151 The slogan can be translated according to the understanding and interpretation of the Khariji’s stand. If we 
understand that Kharijis deny the whole idea of human involvement in judgment (or rule), the slogan will be 
translated as “there is no judgment/rule but God’s.” The word “hukum” can mean “arbitration,” “judgment,” or 
“rule,” but “arbitration” is the minimum degree that this word may imply so that is why I used it in order to present 
their opinion in its fundamental agreeable meaning. For the Khariji (or rather Ibadhi) perspective in their own 
understanding see, Al-Sab'i, Al-Khawarij Wa Al-Haqiqah Al-Ghaybah. 1999;AL-MAHRAMI, Al-Sira' Al-Abadi 146-
158. 2006. 
152 Qur’an (12:40). 
153 In the first half of the twentieth century in the Western experience, Carl Schmitt noticed that despite the modern 
state developments, these modern political theories were actually transferred from the field of theology but God has 
become the lawgiver in the state, and miracles (the exception of the theological natural law) has become the legal 
exceptions in modern state law theories. Moreover, theology has shaped the “systematic structure” of the modern 
state where the values and doctrine of a given society contribute in building this state and its institutions. This is 
what Schmitt describes as “political theology.” Again here is Some Islamic Jurisprudential mechanisms for 
legitimation. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 36 
(University of Chicago Press. 1985). 
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2.3.3 Some Islamic Jurisprudential mechanisms for legitimation154 
Islamic Jurisprudence is always a significant part of the social and political structures, let alone 
the legal system. Islamic legal theorists laid down different mechanisms that establish legitimacy 
and others to maneuver or even strip political authority of any legitimacy. These tools may be 
implicit and indirect but all work within the space that the jurisprudence itself determines and 
locates.155 Islamic jurisprudence in Muslim society has thus long been shown to be a rich 
significant source of values that can determine the public faith and confidence in a political 
system.156  
2.3.3.1 The example of Jurisprudential Consensus (Ijma‘) 
Although Islamic jurisprudential consensus was introduced during severe political polarization 
and was surely influenced by it, it is a jurisprudential doctrine that is widely considered 
authoritative and genuine within the Sunni school.157 The originality and authoritativeness of 
consensus as a jurisprudential tool in Muslim-majority society is what can inspire civil religion 
from within, and build an authoritative basis for Islamic legitimacy that goes along with other 
elements.158 
                                                 
154 It is not the intention of the dissertation to comprehend all political theoretical mechanism within Islamic 
Literature, but it is an attempt to highlight some mechanisms that significantly affect the “Islamic legitimacy” that 
we discuss here.  
155 ABDUL-MAJEED AL-SAGHEER, AL-FIKR AL-ASULI (Al-Mu'sasah Al-Jami'yyah 1st ed. 1994);FELDMAN, The Fall 
and Rise of the Islamic State:[New in Paper]. 2012. 
156 In Egypt, women and men are almost alike in favoring more role of Shari‘a as a source of legislation in their 
country (82-87%). Gallup World, available at, “http://www.gallup.com/poll/155324/Arab-Women-Men-Eye-Eye-
Religion-Role-Law.aspx”. 
157 See, Weal B. Hallaq, On the Authoritativeness of Sunni Consensus, 18 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MIDDLE 
EAST STUDIES (1986). 
158 I do not intend here to discuss the concept of “consensus” (ijma‘) and the details of its issues, authoritativeness, 
application etc. but I deal with it as long as legitimacy in the context is concerned. For discussions about the 
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Consensus in Islamic jurisprudence is produced in Sunni school for understandable 
reasons as they were in the Muslim society counted as majority confronted by different groups 
that disputed first and foremost the legitimacy of the system, the ruler, or the policies. At that 
time, consensus “existed primarily as a social and secular force.”159 Consensus, along with its 
jurisprudential incentives, was thus a sociopolitical project that could help stabilize society 
according to some leading Sunni jurists. Al-Jwaini is a good example of that. In his book Ghyath 
Al-Umam that was devoted to discuss Islamic political jurisprudence (siyasah shar‘iyyah), he 
found it necessary to single out “consensus” of the jurisprudential resources, and spent pages to 
ensure its authoritativeness.160 He justified his approach by saying that he did not find in the 
political sphere in Islam a more important mechanism than consensus.161 
With the Shafi‘i view that consensus is a sanctioning instrument rather than an Islamic 
resource of law,162 consensus proves to be a more powerful sociopolitical force than its 
jurisprudential components. Al-Sagheer notes that consensus, like some other notions, is shared 
between the political and legal spheres.163 He analyzes consensus as a political force that was 
used first by Al-Shafi‘i to solidify the relaxed, general jurisprudential rules in favor of the jurists 
and to protect their domain against rulers.164 Therefore, in this sense, consensus was used by the 
majority (Sunni mainstream) as a legitimation tool, and by the jurists as a mechanism to 
counterweight rulers.165 
                                                 
concept, see e.g., ABULMA'ALI AL-JWAINI, AL-GHYATHI: GHYATH ALUMAM FI ELTYATH ALDHULAM 42-45 (Dar 
Al-Da'wah 1st ed. 1980);Hallaq, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, (1986);IBN HAZIM + IBN 
TAYMIYYAH, MARATIB AL-IJMA' + NAQD MARATIB AL-IJMA' (Maktabat Al-Qudsi. 1938). 
159 Hallaq, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, 427-8 (1986). 
160 AL-JWAINI, Al-Ghyathi: Ghyath AlUmam fi Eltyath AlDhulam 42-45. 1980. 
161 Id. at, 42. See, AL-SAGHEER, Al-Fikr Al-Asuli 214-9. 1994. 
162 Hallaq, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, 449 (1986). 
163 AL-SAGHEER, Al-Fikr Al-Asuli 158. 1994. 
164 Id. at, 156-7. 
165 We can think of the word consensus as a sociopolitical force in the testimony of Al-Dhahabi(d. 1338) for Ibn 
Taymiyyah(d. 1328) when the former describes the later as a jurist who could have been a “consensual ground” 
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An overlooked aspect of consensus is that the most cited authors who recorded the 
consensus cases in Islamic jurisprudence used “consensus/ijma‘” word to mean the opinion of 
the overwhelming majority of scholars.166 This notion of allowing a majority opinion to legally 
bind the society is the basis that was and is used to legitimize a system, a policy, or an office. 
Nonetheless, majority rule could turn into tyranny of the majority if the democratic safeguards 
are weakened.167 Thus, Islamic jurists have developed a two-level consensus theory that 
distinguishes between “special consensus” (ijma‘ al-khasah) and “simple consensus” (ijma‘ 
al’’amma). The former refers to the more universal natural-law-like rules of Islamic law which 
almost every Muslim agrees to while the later refer to the more scholastic jurisprudential 
consensus that most, mainly Sunni, jurists mean when they use it in a jurisprudential context.168 
The theoretical richness of consensus in Islamic jurisprudence is not a democratized 
religious concept or a sacralized democratic mechanism of the Islamic jurisprudence but, along 
with its jurisprudential weight, is an ongoing attempt to pronounce legitimacy and to build a 
solid basis for legitimation that goes beyond legal and constitutional proceduralism. 
2.3.3.2 Commanding Common Good (Al-‘mr bil Ma‘ruuf) 
The other example of a proven, crucial tool for legitmation in Islamic jurisprudence is the 
concept of “al-amr bil ma‘ruuf wan-nahi ‘an al-munkar” .We can refer to the concept simply as 
                                                 
(kilmat ijma‘) had he been less offensive toward his opponents. Ali AlOmarn & Aziz Shams, Al-Jami' Li Sirat Ibn 
Taymiyyah 269 (Dar 'alam Al-Fawaed 2001). 
166 See, IBN AL-MUNTHER, AL-IJMA' (Maktabat AL-Furqan 2nd ed. 1999);TAYMIYYAH, Maratib Al-Ijma' + Naqd 
Maratib Al-Ijma'. 1938.(Ibn Taymiyyah notes that Ibn Hazim counted some opinions as consensus while citing 
some other opposing opinions) id. at, 16. 
167 About the idea “tyranny of the majority” see, Richard E Day, Tyranny of the Majority, 194-8 (2005). 
168 AL-KHATEEB AL-BAGHDADI, AL-FAQEEH WAL MUTAFAQQEH 434 § 1 (Maktabat AL-Taw'yah Al-Islameyyah. 
2007). (Al-Baghdadi here gives examples of the special consensus that every Muslim follows of the Mecca as a 
qiblah (a direction to face for prayers), the general idea of the obligation to fast during Ramadhan, the obligation of 
Hajj.Id. at. See also, Hallaq, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, 431-2 (1986). 
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ihtisab. Its literal meaning is “demanding common right and forbidding common wrong.”169 The 
word “common” is not just a descriptive word to better understanding of the two words “mu‘ruf” 
and “munkar.” Rather it is the word that really distinguishes these terms—ma’ruf, as common 
good, munkar as common wrong from the other two concepts popularly used in Islamic sources 
and texts, which are “khair” as a more general good and “sharr” as wrong or evil.170 In a 
Qur’anic verse urging Muslims to exercise this ritual of “demanding the common right and 
forbidding the common wrong,” the texts translates as “[a]nd there should be a group of you 
calling to the good, demanding the common good, and forbidding the common wrong….”171 So 
here there is a clear distinction in the language of Quran between the two concepts.172 Thus, the 
verse is asking Muslims to call for good and to demand common good.  
                                                 
169 For the concept “demanding the common right and forbidding the common wrong” from the medieval Islamic 
perspective see, ABU AL-HASAN AL-MAWARDI, AL-AHKAM AL-SULTANYYAH 315-339 (Dar Ibn Qutaibah 1st ed. 
1989). AL-JWAINI, Al-Ghyathi: Ghyath AlUmam fi Eltyath AlDhulam 176. 1980. For a more analytical approach 
see, MICHAEL A COOK, COMMANDING RIGHT AND FORBIDDING WRONG IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT (Cambridge University 
Press. 2010). KRISTEN STILT, ISLAMIC LAW IN ACTION: AUTHORITY, DISCRETION, AND EVERYDAY EXPERIENCES IN 
MAMLUK EGYPT 38-71 (Oxford University Press. 2012). (Stilt applied more realistic approach according to Haider 
Hamoudi’s review. Stilt studied ihtisab through cases (law in action) during the Mamluk era Haider Ala Hamoudi, 
Book Review: Islamic Law in Action, Authority, Discretion and Everyday Experiences in Mamluk Egypt, by Kristen 
Stilt, 28 JOURNAL OF LAW AND RELIGION, 101 (2013).). Selim Deringil also studied and analyzed ihtisab but within 
the Ottoman Empire specifically in the period (1876-1909). DERINGIL, The well-protected domains 68-93. 1998.  
170 In English-written literature dealing with the concept of what I can translate as “demanding common right and 
forbidding common wrong,” there is a common translation (mistake, may be) between authors and researchers. They 
tend to omit the word “common” that I insistently use here. The references mentioned-above are among those 
translate the concept of al-amr bil ma‘ruuf wan-nahi ‘an al-munkar into “commanding right and forbidding wrong” 
without the word “common” in both “right” and “wrong.” One clear requirement that Al-Mawardi provides for 
ihtisab is that a common good (and a common wrong) should be agreed upon to be considered for enforcement. AL-
MAWARDI, Al-Ahkam Al-Sultanyyah 315-6. 1989. See, STILT, Islamic Law in Action: Authority, Discretion, and 
Everyday Experiences in Mamluk Egypt 42-7. 2012. 
171 (Qur’an 3:104). For exegesis, see e. g., Ibn Kathir Tafsir al-Qur’an al-’Azim 2:92-3. 2002. 
172 It is worth saying that translating mu‘ruuf and khair as both to mean “good” will render some words redundant 
and, thus, will render an important word like “ma‘ruuf” useless which goes against most rules of exegesis. Al-Suyuti 
(d. 1505) asserts that establishing a new meaning by a new word in Qur’an precedes the method of confirming the 
same meaning mentioned in a verse/text. JALAL AD-DEEN AL-SUYUTI, AL-'SHBAH WAL NADHA'IR 1:211-19 
(Maktabat Nizar Al-Baz 2nd ed. 1997). (In this book, Al-Suyuti introduced, inter alia, two maxims that should 
govern the exegesis of Islamic texts and provide explanations and applications. Both conclude that new meaning for 
new word precedes the exegesis that renders some word just confirming or repeating the same meaning. Id. at, 211-
19.) 
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The difference drawn between “good” and “common good” is very closely connected to 
the argument here that the objective good cannot be legally enforced unless it is widely common 
to be understood as such by Muslims. This interrelates to the intersubjective nature of 
legitimation which Ricoeur mentions.173 This requirement of commonness is precisely what 
builds legitimacy and makes the mechanism of ihtisab a more functioning sociopolitical force. 
From this point, we can see the connection between this Islamic concept and the role of people in 
defining the widely accepted tradition (and good) as a way for legitimization of a given rule and 
its enforcement.174 
2.3.3.3 Islamic Procedural Legitimacy 
With the difference between legality and legitimacy that Schmitt emphasized,175 a comparable 
conceptualization can be found in classical Islamic jurisprudence. Medieval jurists have 
developed a juristic doctrine that differentiates between “validity” and “permissibility” because 
each concept of the two tackles a separate distinguishable side of the same case. This is why the 
jurists termed the doctrine “infikak al-jihah” which means the (disentanglement of the sides).176 
Islamic jurists give a classical example of a person praying in land the person usurped from 
another. The jurists consider the prayer Islamically valid but as a wrongdoer, the person stealing 
should be punished. 
                                                 
173 See, Ricoeur, 200-202 (1986). Taylor, PAUL RICOEUR AND THE TASK OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 66-67 (2012). 
174 Al-Mawardi requires a certain criteria for a “common good” to be legally enforced as such. One clear 
requirement that al-Mawardi provides is that a common good (and a common wrong) should be agreed upon which 
again assures the importance of the word “common” and its role in involving society in crafting these supposedly 
universal rules. AL-MAWARDI, Al-Ahkam Al-Sultanyyah 315-6. 1989. 
175 SCHMITT, et al., Legality and legitimacy 23&137. 2004. See also, HABERMAS, Between naturalism and religion: 
Philosophical essays 104. 2008. 
176 See, AL-GHZALI, Al-Mustasfa 3:199-203. 1995;AL-SHINQEETI, Al-Mudhakkirah Fi Usul Al-Fiqh 27-31. 2001. 
The doctrine is not agreed upon by all schools but it has been used by different schools in different cases.  
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Islamic jurists developed the doctrine of disentanglement of the sides in response to cases 
that ideally do not fit the supposed line that jurists traditionally drew but instead where there is a 
combination of right and wrong, valid and invalid, and permissible and impermissible. The 
doctrine enables the jurists to rule on the same case with a complex holding that is fair to each 
aspect of the case.  
Thus, in Islamic jurisprudential politics, jurists provided conditional legality (partial 
legitimacy) to systems and policies that are not ideally compliant to the principles they espoused. 
They dealt with circumstances “realistically” in order to facilitate people’s transactions and meet 
their needs or to reduce the difficulty that the society faced.177 This jurisprudential theorizing 
allowed jurists to maneuver and live under the control of a ruler that did not fulfill legitimacy 
requirements using a legality level similar to the one Schmitt described.178 De-facto verses de-
jure rule was taken into consideration as a scholastic tool to manage this.179  
However, legitimacy remained the crucial element that went beyond the legality level to 
provide a long-term stability. Medieval Islamic jurists interacted with the situation of having two 
disentangled sides (de facto unprincipled ruler who can issue perfectly principled polices) and 
the need for legitimacy. “A ruler may get away with the occasional lapse. A sustained pattern of 
lawbreaking over time, however, would show those in the know that the ruler was not fulfilling 
                                                 
177 One of the five most important principles in Islamic jurisprudence according to Al-Suyuti is the principle that 
“al-mashaqqah tajlib al-taiseer” which means that (hardship [should] bring jurisprudential convenience and 
facilitation). AL-SUYUTI, Al-'shbah wal Nadha'ir 1:128-140. 1997. 
178 See, SCHMITT, et al., Legality and legitimacy 23&137. 2004. 
179FELDMAN, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State:[New in Paper] 37-9. 2012;Frank E Vogel, Siyasa: in the sense 
of siyasa shar'iyya', 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, 695 (1997). See, LOMBARDI, State Law as Islamic Law in Modern 
Egypt: The Incorporation of the Sharīʻa Into Egyptian Constitutional Law 53. 2006. See also, Aharon Layish, The 
Transformation of the Sharº {a from Jurists’ Law to Statutory Law in the Contemporary Muslim World” in, 44 DIE 
WELT DES ISLAMS, 101 (2004). (Layish notes that the attitude of some ulema to justify codification was out of fear 
that it may go out of their supervision at all). 
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his function on earth.”180 So, the legitimacy is shaken in the eyes of the society which prepares at 
some point to restore legality that is in harmony with the supposed legitimacy.181 
The lesson learned from this doctrine and experience of “disentanglement of the sides” is 
that Islamic jurists can tolerate temporary legality under an illegitimate situation but in the long 
run, they challenge it and work hard to restore the other side according to the principles. They do 
that through people and belief or disbelief in the system. Legality that works within the system is 
a matter that jurists can realistically get along with at least at times, but legitimacy is something 
more—something that operates from people’s pre-legal standards and something whose absence 
is intolerable in the long run.182 
2.3.4 The Legitimacy of the Legitimizers183 
As far as Islamic legitimacy is concerned, jurists are considered the typical legitimizers although 
they do not serve in an official position.184 Rather, they are legitimate specifically because they 
                                                 
180 FELDMAN, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State:[New in Paper] 29. 2012. 
181 A modern example of this took place in Egypt in twentieth-century when the government was forced to accept 
the bargain that Al-Azhar (the most prominent Islamic institution in Egypt) offered and, therefore adopted Islamic 
reform to some extent as the government became increasingly dependent on Al-Azhar for religious legitimation. 
This shift happened in the aftermath of a series of events that were used by opponents to challenge the Islamic 
legitimacy of the government. Tamir Moustafa, Conflict and cooperation between the state and religious institutions 
in contemporary Egypt, 32 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, 3&4 (2000). In working to 
delegitimize the established order, Goldberg compares radical Islamic groups to Protestant movement. He found that 
both radical Islamic groups and Protestant movement attempted to undermine the legitimacy of the already 
recognized regime. Both also emerge from increasing rate of literacy in the society which allows them to transfer 
authority from official religious institutions to individualistic interpretation. Id. at, 20. 
182 SCHMITT, et al., Legality and legitimacy 23&137. 2004. 
183 The need for independence of jurists will be a whole separate issue. Another chapter is going to deal with this 
matter when discussing the positioning of jurists and religion institutions. However, this section is solely to highlight 
the role of independence in Islamic legitimization. 
184 See, STILT, Islamic Law in Action: Authority, Discretion, and Everyday Experiences in Mamluk Egypt 26. 
2012;Mark David Welton, Islam, the West, and the Rule of Law, 19 PACE INT'L L. REV., 4 (2007). 
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are not in an official position. The very legitimacy of legitimizers arise because they are not 
under the mercy of the regime that they are to legitimize.185  
The jurists developed different approaches in dealing with rulers, citing many different 
texts and narrations that support their stand.186 In social interaction, jurists have reached the 
conclusion that they are legitimate legitimizers if they are in the position their interests are not 
closely associated and linked to the system that they are legitimizing. Noah Feldman perfectly 
points out that “[t]he class of jurists can give legitimacy to the rulers when they’re not rulers—
when they check the balance of the rulers not become themselves a ruling class.”187 
The independence prerequisite for legitimizing jurists applies to different schools and 
cases of Islamic jurisprudence because it goes with the very nature of their social power that 
requires their role as guardians to be independent.188 
Since the late twentieth century in Egypt, al-Azhar, as the main religious institution, has 
suffered from being subordinated to the government, which has created a legitimation crisis. The 
dilemma went beyond the reach of the legitimizers (jurists) this time because they were 
themselves part of the problem. The autonomy of the jurists was at stake, and thus, they lost the 
power that they could have used to heal the wounded state and revive the dead regime, which is a 
power that all legitimate heirs to the Prophet’s legacy have. The government’s control over Al-
                                                 
185 Compare, LOMBARDI, State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt: The Incorporation of the Sharīʻa Into 
Egyptian Constitutional Law 47. 2006. Lombardi here describe the works of Sunni thinkers at some point to be sort 
of self-legitimizing body that can legitimize the same regime that they depend on. However, this is true in the level 
of Islamic proceduralist legitimacy (or rather legality) but not in the normative long term legitimacy. Lombardi, on 
the other hand, seems to describe these two theories (legality and legitimacy) as one. 
186 See the comprehensive book of JALAL AL-DEEN AL-SUYUTI, MA RAWAH AL-ASATEEN FI 'ADAM AL-MAJEE' LI 
AL-SALATEEN 24 (Dar AL-Sahabah Li Al-Turath 1st ed. 1991). (In English the title is: Narrations from Prophets 
and his Followers Warning from Coming to the Sultan’s Court and Place. In this book, Al-Suyuti cited countless 
narrations that warn jurist from getting close to rulers. Al-Suyuti started with the main narration in the issue—that 
the Prophet said, “Whoever comes to the door of the sultan will be tempted, and the closer someone gets to the 
sultan, the further he gets from Allah.”) (Translation is mine). 
187 FELDMAN, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State:[New in Paper] 136. 2012. 
188 José Casanova, Civil society and religion: retrospective reflections on Catholicism and prospective reflections on 
Islam, 68 SOCIAL RESEARCH, 4 (2001). 
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Azhar shook the faith of the public in the religious institution and with these authoritarian 
incentives, the regime could not seek refuge in the institution.189 In Tamir Moustafa’s account, 
there are three main interests for al-Azhar as the main Islamic institution: to maintain 
independence; to have the public confidence as an authoritative Islamic interpreter; and to spread 
the word of Islam.190 Two of these interests seem to be closely linked to the need of confidence 
and faith from the public to represent their values.  
The crisis of legitimation in al-Azhar as a religious institution has largely contributed in 
producing religious extremism in Egypt. Religious extremists when challenging the state’s 
legitimacy, start with the premise that the Islamic institution (al-Azhar) itself is not legitimate 
and is completely corrupted by government control.191 This is why when the government 
adopted programs to address Islamic militants, it asked unofficial jurists and Islamists to engage 
in the dialogue in order to weaken the grip of Islamic militancy.192 The Islamic legitimacy issue 
is thus a matter that can threaten the system and it becomes more threatening when the body or 
class that is supposed to lend legitimacy is itself stripped from it. 
2.3.5 The Legitimizing Fatwa 
The word, fatwa, in Arabic refers to the ruling issued by an authoritative Muslim jurist regarding 
a matter brought before him or her. The rulings are mostly issued as responses to questions 
                                                 
189 Moustafa, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, 17&22 (2000). 
190 Id. at, 12. 
191 Id. at, 10.Moustafa here gives examples of the discourse of extremists prestned by Mohammed Faraj in his book 
Al-Faridah Al-ghayibah, Shukri Mustafa, and others;HIRSCHL, Constitutional theocracy 19. 2011.  
192 Moustafa, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, 11 (2000). It is an interesting comparison that this 
technique used by the Egyptian government has inspired the Saudi government to make its own televised dialogues 
with the influential extremists in prison. The administrator of the dialogues is an unofficial jurist who may be 
thought to have more legitimacy that some appointed ones. See also, HIRSCHL, Constitutional theocracy 19. 2011. 
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presented by ordinary Muslims on a regular basis. The fatwas range sometimes from social to 
ritual to financial or even political issues.193  
Despite the catastrophic influence of al-Azhar’s subordination to the government, it and 
Islamic jurists still hold the legitimizing tool through non-state channels, and the best evidence of 
this is the continuing salience of the fatwa which is nonbinding at its core. Fatwa could be 
compared to the Supreme Court decision except the fact that the Court has a formal legal power 
while the fatwa, depending on its issuer and authoritativeness, carry purely a social power that 
can prove to be very decisive. 
Legitimizers in Muslim-majority societies exercise their legitimization work through a 
variety of different mechanisms, only some of which will be discussed here. The juristic ruling 
(fatwa) reflects the jurist’s opinion and never occupies an official classification in Muslim 
state.194 However, a fatwa works through the public faith that is proven to be crucially powerful. 
A fatwa can help to stabilize a system or to threaten it, but this is only when the legitimizer 
accumulates credibility and confidence from the public.195 
It is even illustrating to see how the strict separationist approach that ended the Ottoman 
Empire and started the new Turkey needed a fatwa that is similar in background and reasoning to 
the one that was typically used in the Ottoman era! The Young Turks who led the movement that 
                                                 
193 To read a classical Sunni book in the literature of fatwa and its requirements and issues, see in Arabic, IBN 
ALQAYYEM ALJAWZEYYAH, I'LAM AL-MUQE'EEN (Dar Al-Kutub Al-'elmayyah. 1991). In studies about the 
influence of fatwa in different issues see, Judith Tucker, ‘And God Knows Best’: The Fatwa as a Source for the 
History of Gender in the Arab World, BEYOND THE EXOTIC: WOMEN’S HISTORIES IN ISLAMIC SOCIETIES 
(1994);Mughees Shaukat, General Preception of Fatwa and Its Role in Islamic Finance, KUALA LUMPUR, INCEIF 
(2009);Hussein Ali Agrama, Ethics, tradition, authority: Toward an anthropology of the fatwa, 37 AMERICAN 
ETHNOLOGIST (2010);MEHDI MOZAFFARI, FATWA: VIOLENCE & DISCOURTESY (Aarhus Universitetsforlag. 1998). 
194 See in general, ALJAWZEYYAH, I'lam Al-Muqe'een. 1991. Ibn alQayyeem here beginning from his title describes 
the role and rules of opinion-givers of the jurists. He describes fatwa-givers as if they are “signing a ruling on behalf 
of the All-legislator, God”. This is, however, does not invoke any godly nature of their rulings because it is an 
undisputed consensus that no jurist can represents the whole truth , and thus should be unconditionally followed 
except the prophet (PBUH).Id. at, 1:6.  
195 See, Hamoudi, JOURNAL OF LAW AND RELIGION, (2013). See also in general, Agrama, AMERICAN ETHNOLOGIST, 
(2010). 
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established today’s secular Turkey needed a very traditional religious declaration, a fatwa, to 
depose Abdulhamid and replace him with a new system of power.196 “The same fiqh school, 
Hanafi, that was used to legitimize the Ottoman state was used by the Kemalists, too, but to 
delegitimize the Ottoman Empire.”197 
Similar to the secular utilization of religious phenomenon like issuing fatwas to 
legitimize the system, Jamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt tried to control al-Azhar in order to 
legitimize his own political project and socialist approach.198 Ironically, Egypt’s Sadat used Al-
Azhar’s fatwas to legitimize his overturn of Nasser’s land reforms and to legitimize the Peace 
Treaty with Israel.199 Mubarak, in his turn, used a fatwa, too, to justify his participation in the 
second Gulf War.200 During that war, another famous fatwa was issued by Ibn Baz, the grand 
mufti of Saudi Arabia, which legitimized the deployment of American troops in Saudi Arabia.201 
They are just examples of how powerful a fatwa is deemed to be, and how far it was utilized 
even by the strictest secularists in Arab world. 
Fatwa is just a juristic opinion, with no formal legal effect. However, it gets its 
importance from the society that accredits the issuer and has faith on the fatwa-giver. A fatwa-
giver as a legitimizer will be accredited and authoritative in the eyes of the public only as much 
as the legitimacy of his won is not widely disputed.  
  
                                                 
196 DERINGIL, The well-protected domains 173. 1998. The secular separationist, as opposed to accommodationist, is 
the secularist that defends a strict separation of religion and state and support a more religion-free politics. See, TED 
G JELEN, THE POLITICAL WORLD OF THE CLERGY 2 (Praeger Westport, CT. 1993).  
197 DERINGIL, The well-protected domains 174. 1998. 
198 Moustafa, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, 7 (2000). 
199 Id. at. 
200 Id. at. 
201 See, FELDMAN, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State:[New in Paper] 97. 2012. 
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2.4 CONCLUSION 
We have seen that Islamic religious institutions acquire their importance by being the body that 
carries the values and principles of the public. Achieving normative legitimacy, then, is to adapt 
the state to people’s values as reflected in the religious institutions. This process of making the 
system complaint to social values needs initiatory legitimacy that legitimizes the primary cause 
of the very existence of the state while continuous legitimacy ensures that the state is living up to 
that cause. A regime may come into existence without responding to the expectation or 
imagination of the people, but it will lack long-term stability. A state that lacks popular faith is 
doomed to collapse and this is why even the most authoritarian regimes use popular signs and 
language as a way of achieving what has been described above as enunciative legitimacy.  
This being said, Muslim-majority countries are even more sympathetic to religious 
discourses. As a result, Islamic legitimacy is a political requirement that can be exercised by the 
typical legitimizers, jurists, who can use acceptable juristic language and mechanisms to 
legitimize the system, or, on the other hand, to challenge it. Thus, the locus of power of the 
jurists and their interaction with the system is through societal channels by means of public faith, 
confidence, and support. Legitimacy is the tool that jurists use to influence politics, an exercise 
that needs to be independent of the control of the system in order to legitimize that same system 
and for that legitimization is to be credible. The nature of jurists’ political exercise can be 
described as a soft indirect presence that sweeps like their fatwas do as long as they appeal to the 
public and speak the language that the people believe and support. 
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3.0 CHAPTER TWO: RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD: THE 
META-CONSTITUTIONAL SPHERE 
The debate about where religious, and particularly Islamic, jurisprudential work resides in 
today’s Muslim state is related to the legitimacy debate. States whose legitimacy religious 
institutions participate in the making of continuously encounter debate respecting these religious 
institutions’ work and sphere. The first chapter suggests that the legitimacy of the religious 
institutions themselves, as well as the legitimacy of the states, requires that these institutions be 
independent and autonomous. This chapter focuses on the space of Islamic institutions in Muslim 
countries, focusing specifically on Egypt as a case study.  
Thus, this chapter contains four main sections. The first section discusses the meaning of 
“religious institutions” as imagined institutions in the Islamic context. This is because it is 
important that we first understand precisely what we mean by a “religious institution” in Sunni 
Islamic discourse before discussing its role in the state. Institutions in this context is a term that 
is interchangeable with “jurists,” or “scholars” (ulama, to use the common Arabic term) for 
reasons explained in further detail in the first section. I can say in short here that religious 
institutions are imagined institutions that are represented by dispersed Muslim jurists. This is true 
in Islamic history, and to a larger extent in today’s Muslim states.. The second section presents 
the different roles of these scholars historically. The third section deals with the conception of 
scholars and their very nature and sphere, describing it in modernity as being 
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“metaconstitutional.” The fourth section discusses the idea that, although autonomy is crucial for 
Muslim religious institutions to operate in the meta-constitutional sphere, these institutions do 
not and should not acquire direct power as this goes against their very own nature, literature, and 
effective role. I will use history to show that this proposal is the position that the ulama 
historically occupied, and what they have always normatively theorized. 
I will try to craft a role that fits the ulama’s nature according to their very own literature 
and social dynamics. This role would stabilize society and its religious authority, as well as place 
them in position that is constitutionally possible and plausible. 
3.1 THE MEANING OF INSTITUTIONS: FORMAL INSTITUTIONS, AND 
IMAGINED INSTITUTIONS: 
This section is devoted to discussing the features of “religious institutions” in the Islamic 
context. As we will see, the religious institutions are more like “imagined institutions” similar to 
the “imagined communities” of Benedict Anderson.202 They are called imagined institutions 
because most religious movements and productions do not exist within factual institutions and 
even if there happened to be real institutions, their existence is usually irrelevant to the religious 
work and the nature of religious intellectual activities as a whole. This brings the discussion to 
the existence of clergy in the Sunni Muslim experience, where hierarchy and institutionalization 
have rarely been operative. This section ends with the debate of whether ulama are a “corporate 
group.” Different studies have different approaches to determining whether ulama and jurists 
                                                 
202 ANDERSON, Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism 1-9. 2006. See also, 
TAYLOR, Modern social imaginaries 23-31. 2004. 
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have established a solidarity that qualifies as a corporate group. I argue that, despite the existence 
of some corporate groups and guilds, the most important feature of the jurists as a class is the 
imagined sphere that governs both those in corporate groups and those outside of corporate 
groups. This sphere never gathers the different jurists, scholars, and institutions in one 
comprehensive corporate group. 
Defining religious institutions and scholars (ulama) is important. My understanding of the 
term “religious institution” will affect my appraisal of their role, their nature, and my analysis of 
the decrease or increase in their presence and influence. Epistemological presuppositions about 
how “religious institutions” look has influenced the literature in a powerful, and negative, 
way.203 Western writings have approached the issue of “religious institution” with 
presuppositions that reflect the Christian experience and its understanding of the religious sphere 
and operations rather than those present in Muslim culture.204 This section seeks to correct some 
of those misconceptions.  
3.1.1 Clergy in Islam, and the “Religious Institution” 
The phrase “religious institutions” in Islamic history may prove to be misleading for two 
reasons. First, and most importantly, most of the works and literature have conducted by 
religious jurists and ulama took place in no formal “religious institution” as we know it today. 
                                                 
203 For the idea of epistemological conflict between two cultural narratives and their powerful influence on our 
understanding and consciousness see, Alisdair MacIntyre, EPISTEMOLOGICAL CRISES, DRAMATIC NARRATIVE 
AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 60 THE MONIST (1977).  
204 The researcher Hussein Agrama noted the predicament of the presuppositions of Western studies that analyze the 
Islamic thought as a “problem” to be explained and then solved. This predicament happened because the Western 
standards and narrative were so powerful, and then shaped the presupposition about how religion operates in society. 
I may add here that the Western narrative shaped how we (and they) understand Islamic works by reducing them to 
“religious institutions” that dominated Christian literature and experience. See, HUSSEIN ALI AGRAMA, 
QUESTIONING SECULARISM: ISLAM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN MODERN EGYPT 1-42 (University of 
Chicago Press. 2012). 
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Scholars have enriched the judicial and religious literature with their debates and discussions that 
are hardly linked to an actual institution that could be identified. The books, fatwas, and 
reactions of Islamic scholars are religious works, but the religious community is not a religious 
institution nor is it largely composed of religious institutions unless we use “religious institution” 
in an imagined, metaphorical sense.205  
Second, to examine the term “religious institutions” from the point of view of the 
community described as such, we will encounter a large segment of the community having 
reservations about the existence of something called “religious institutions” taking into 
consideration the deep Christian heritage associated with the phrase. According to a number of 
influential contemporary Muslim scholars, the term “religious institution” itself has a 
connotation that relates to the Christian background in which it was used, and this contaminates 
its understanding in the Islamic context.206 My view is that the term can be used without 
distortion, but to do so requires that it be explained, as this section attempts to do. 
One may say that the vast majority of commentators and writers and scholars in Islamic 
studies207, especially Sunni ones, rightly assert that there is no clergy in Islam, with the 
implication associated with the word “clergy” as being hierarchal and representative of the 
sacred.208 Although in reality and at different points of history there were clerical flavors and 
                                                 
205 This nature of Islamic jurisprudence is going to be discussed from another aspect, the (lack of) corporate group. 
206 See e.g., YOUSEF AL-QARADAWI, AL-ISLAM WA AL-'ALMANYYAH WAJHAN LI WAJH 45 (Maktabat Wahbah. 
1987);SAFAR AL-HAWALI, AL-'ALMANYYAH 65&108 (Dar al-Hijrah. 1982);MUHAMMAD IMARAH, AL-ISLAM WA 
AL-SYASAH 28-9&70 (Al-Shorouk International. 1992).(This book is important because it was first published by the 
Center of Research in al-Azhar, and is prefaced by then-al-Azhar's Grand Sheikh: Jad al-Haqq who asserts in his 
preface that there is no sacred religious instiutions in Islam) 
207 See for e. g., ABU AL-'ALA AL-MAWDUDI, NAẒARAYYAT AL-ISLAM AL-SYASYYAH 30 (Dar al-Fikr. 1967);AL-
QARADAWI, Al-Islam wa al-'almanyyah wajhan li wajh 36. 1987;AL-HAWALI, Al-'almanyyah 65&108. 
1982;IMARAH, Al-Islam wa Al-Syasah 28-9,50&123. 1992. See also, L Carl Brown, Religion and State, THE 
MUSLIM APPROACH TO POLITICS. NEW YORK, 32 (2000).(Brown clearly distinguishes between the Church-based 
system and clergy in Western experience on the one hand and Islamic State and governance on the other in the idea 
that Islam in its traditional approach does not separate religion from state but meanwhile does not have the 
(Christian) clergy in its history). 
208 See, Brown, THE MUSLIM APPROACH TO POLITICS. NEW YORK, 32 (2000). 
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practices that sometimes were justified by different methods in Islamic jurisprudence and 
thought, these practices never formed a pattern or marked a divergence of the mainstream 
practice which was of a decidedly non-clerical nature.209 
The “religious community” whose Western counterpart would be described as a 
“religious institution” presents itself in the Muslim world as, for example, “scholars” (ulama) 
and jurists (fuqaha) more than “institutions” or establishments. The self-presentation and self-
image of this community in the Muslim world proves that they are scholars, jurists, authors, 
jurisconsults etc.210 Therefore, the whole group of ulama as conceived by ulama themselves is 
comparable somewhat to the concept of “ummah” or “nation” in the sense that it is not a 
physically identified and distinguished one identity, institution, or group separate and 
classified.211 Rather, the ulama, and “imagined institution”, I would say, are a combination of 
factual institutions and religious scholars who may or may not be affiliated with such formal 
institutions. And even if the majority of scholars are attached to a factual institution at some 
point, they act as independent scholars who gain authority from their scholastic aptitude more 
than from their institutional affiliation. This is why, for example, they care about the imagined 
school of jurisprudence more than the formally established factual schools of their times.212  
                                                 
209 HATINA, 'Ulama', politics, and the public sphere: an Egyptian perspective 2. 2010;DAPHNA EPHRAT, A LEARNED 
SOCIETY IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION: THE SUNNI _ULAMA_ OF ELEVENTH CENTURY BAGHDAD 96 (SUNY Press. 
2000). For the Christian clergy in the West, see e.g., JELEN, The political world of the clergy 23. 1993.(Jelen here 
cited a clerk who specify thier job as to represent the sacred). 
210 KEDDIE, scholars, saints, and sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle east since 1500 149. 
1972;EPHRAT, A Learned Society in a Period of Transition: The Sunni _ulama_ of Eleventh Century Baghdad 
10&14. 2000. 
211 See in general, ANDERSON, Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. 
2006;TAYLOR, Modern social imaginaries. 2004. 
212 Makdisi differentiated between the schools of law “madhab” and colleges of law “madrasas/institution.” See, 
GEORGE MAKDISI, THE RISE OF COLLEGES. INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING IN ISLAM AND THE WEST 1 (ERIC. 1981). It 
is noteworthy when Imarah in the book prefaced by the Sheikh of al-Azhar, and Abdul-razzaq al-Sanhouri, used the 
phrase “the Muslim nation with its scholars and civil institutions.” (Emphasis is mine). He distinguished between 
Muslim scholars and civil institutions instead of, say, “religious institutions” and “civil institutions.” IMARAH, Al-
Islam wa Al-Syasah 56. 1992. 
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Reducing the inquiry of religious authority to that provided in the literature of formal 
institutions misses the real rich historical debates and influence, thus, affects any possible 
realistic and normatively acceptable understanding of their proper role. This is not to say that 
formal institutions have not been established nor that they have not affected Islamic 
jurisprudence. However, these formal Islamic “institutions” were inherently more fluid, 
dispersed, and horizontal to such an extent that they, for the most part, could not even be called 
institutions. Jurists flow in and out of them, and they tend to act as individuals accountable to 
themselves, attached to the school of thought in an imagined sense more than having any sort of 
institutional loyalty or obligations to the actual institutions, if any, with which the jurist happens 
to be affiliated. Portraying official religious establishments as the monolithic representative of 
religious institutions in Islamic jurisprudence neglects the wide range of influential and, 
sometimes, more important segments of the religious community. As a result, the analysis of the 
decrease, or otherwise, of the influence of religious institutions in Muslim countries will depend 
on the approach toward the understanding of the term “religious institution.”213  
                                                 
213 As examples of analyses that suffer from this reductionist approach in a way or another, thus, concluded that 
scholars’ or religious institutions’ influence in the Muslim world decreased, see, HAMILTON ALEXANDER ROSSKEEN 
GIBB & HAROLD BOWEN, ISLAMIC SOCIETY AND THE WEST: ISLAMIC SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. 2. V 
112-3 § 1 (Oxford University Press. 1957). BERNARD LEWIS, ISLAM IN HISTORY 4 (Alcove Press. 1973);KEDDIE, 
scholars, saints, and sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle east since 1500 149-167. 1972. Compare in 
general, Malika Zeghal, Religion and politics in Egypt: The ulema of al-Azhar, radical Islam, and the state (1952–
94), 31 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, 371 (1999);MUHAMMAD QASIM ZAMAN, THE ULAMA 
IN CONTEMPORARY ISLAM: CUSTODIANS OF CHANGE: CUSTODIANS OF CHANGE 1-17 (Princeton University Press. 
2010);HATINA, 'Ulama', politics, and the public sphere: an Egyptian perspective 9. 2010;Shadaab H Rahemtulla, 
Reconceptualizing the contemporary Ulama: Al-Azhar, Lay Islam, and the Egyptian state in the late twentieth 
century (2007) SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY). 
71 
3.1.2 Ulama as Corporate Group 
After discussing the term “religious institution” and “clergy,” it is important to turn to the debate 
of “guilds” and “corporate groups.” If indeed “clergy” and “religious institutions,” as they are 
understood in the West, did not exist in the Islamic mainstream or were not that central to 
religious works as I concluded, then could guilds and corporate groups have existed and been 
influential? In this section, I will review some important ideas concerning this in the literature, 
and I will conclude that some corporate groups and guilds did exist in the Islamic context. The 
most important feature, however, is the sphere that governs both corporate and non-corporate 
groups. This sphere never gathers the different jurists, scholars, and institutions in one 
comprehensive corporate group nor does it establish a corporate relationship between all 
religious scholars. 
Following Louis Massignon in valuing the importance of “guilds” in Islamic history,214 
George Makdisi took this one step further applying the concept not just to formal schools and 
associations of craftspeople in medieval Islam but also to jurisprudential schools (madhabs).215 
Sherman Jackson, in his turn, described the relationship of the jurist to the jurisprudential school 
(madhab) as a “corporate status” where “[e]ach school (madhab) acquires the ability to confer a 
measure of protection upon its members by virtue of their membership in that particular 
group.”216 Jackson, interestingly, likened the relationship between the individual jurist and the 
corporate group, the madhab here, to the relationship between the rajih (weighted opinion) and 
                                                 
214 According to Makdisi, Louis Massignon was the first who spoke of guilds in Islam in an article published in 
1920. George Makdisi, Guilds of Law in Medieval Legal History: An Inquiry into the Origins of the Inns of Court, 
The, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV., 4 (1985). 
215 Id. at, 4-6. See, SHERMAN A JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF 
SHIHĀB AL-DĪN AL-QARĀFĪ 103 § 1 (Brill. 1996). 
216 JACKSON, Islamic law and the state: the constitutional jurisprudence of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī 72. 1996. 
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the mashhur (predominant opinion) in Islamic jurisprudence. Both individual jurist and weighted 
opinion could be more valuable in term of jurisprudence, but the predominant opinion and 
corporate group are usually more influential.217 Daphna Ephrat studies the Sunni ulama of the 
eleventh-century Baghdad in her book, A Learned Society in a Period of Transition, concluding 
that affiliation with madhab, at some point, lost the sense of “solidarity group” and became 
formal.218 Although a solidarity group was established, ulama, as a whole, never stuck to their 
group solidarity.219 
In the work, Scholars, Saints, and Sufis, different academics discuss the religious 
institutions in Islam since the fifteenth century. One theme that appears throughout the book is 
the idea of reading ulama as a “corporate group.” Unlike Massignon, Makdisi, and Jackson, the 
researchers Nikki Keddie (the editor),220 Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot,221 Edmund Burke III,222 
Daniel Crecelius,223 and Aziz Ahmed224 emphasize the idea that the ulama do not consistently 
act as a “corporate group.” 225 Marsot complains that the (high) ulama in the eighteenth century 
did not act as a corporate group and were not to handle specific functions in the state, and 
therefore, failed to be influential and more active.226 But in Leon Carl Brown’s account, in 
                                                 
217 Id. at, 83. Makdisi also presented the argument that schools were based on individuals so they did not establish 
“guilds”. Makdisi, CLEV. ST. L. REV., 10 (1985).  
218 EPHRAT, A Learned Society in a Period of Transition: The Sunni _ulama_ of Eleventh Century Baghdad 143. 
2000. 
219 Id. at, 96. 
220 KEDDIE, scholars, saints, and sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle east since 1500. 1972. 
221 Id. at, 146-150. 
222 Id. at, 101-6. 
223 Id. at, 180-1. 
224 Id. at, 264. 
225 Compare in the same book the work of Leon Carl Brown, id. at, 73-4. 
226 Id. at, 146. 
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nineteenth-century Tunisia, the ulama had a sense of their “corporate entity227 separating 
themselves from the government” but this rather seems to be an exception more than the rule.228 
To reinforce the rule again, Burke III notes that until 1900:  
Not only was there no religious institution, per se, in Morocco in 
the sense that there was no separate bureaucratic hierarchy of 
religious officials controlled from the top, it is even possible to say 
that ulama as an identifiable corporate group did not exist in 
Morocco.229 
Aziz Ahmed in describing the ulama of Pakistan notes that in 1950s and 1960 their active role 
decreased dramatically because they were trying individually not collectively as a pressure 
group.230 The researchers here presuppose that having ulama as a corporate group is what should 
have developed out of ulama's status, so, these researchers consequently criticize them of having 
lacked that quality. 
In fact, the lack of corporate grouping in the ulama's functions and roles was due 
to the nature of their role as dispersed groups who do not form overall formal institutions 
or unified guilds.231 This is why describing their operation as an imagined institution 
acting within a sphere is more accurate than describing their role as a corporate institution 
because, even when they formed guilds and corporate-like institutions, their power was 
associated with their being ulama in that imagined institution rather than being simply 
associated with the formal body of which they happened to be a member. Miriam 
Hoexter brilliantly states the case that 
Ulama were not acting as a concentrated group. They were hardly 
a “group” in the sociological meaning of the term. It was the 
                                                 
227 The use of the phrase “corporate entity” here looks to suggest “autonomy” more than real “corporate group.” 
228 Leon Carl Brown, The Religious Establishment in Husainid Tunisia, in SCHOLARS, SAINTS, AND SUFIS: MUSLIM 
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1500 73-4, (Nikki R Keddie ed. 1972). 
229 Edmund Burke III, The Moroccan Ulama, 1860-1912: An Introduction, see id. at 101, ( 
230 Aziz Ahmad, Activism of the Ulama in Pakistan, in SCHOLARS, SAINTS, AND SUFIS: MUSLIM RELIGIOUS 
INSTITUTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1500 264, (Nikki R Keddie ed. 1972). 
231 MIRIAM HOEXTER, et al., THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN MUSLIM SOCIETIES 21 (SUNY Press. 2002). 
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expertise of the Sharia that gave them authority not their 
membership of a specific group232 
Thus, as Ephrat explains, the fluid and flexible name of ulama is what guaranteed them the 
legitimate transition of knowledge despite the lack of official institutions and corporations .233 
Moreover, we should not be surprised when we see a fragmentation of authority among 
contemporary Sunni scholars because this comes from the nature of the religion itself, according 
to one commentator.234 Wael Hallaq took the extreme position of denouncing the whole idea of 
corporate personhood as being immoral and against Islamic law.235 What seems more accurate is 
that Islamic law does not contemplate or recognize an all-comprehensive kind of corporate group 
for Islamic scholars as a class, whose unifying function is the honorable one of interpreting 
Sharia. At the same time, the existence of guilds and corporate groups within the scholars as a 
class did help to perpetuate their work to the extent that they remained independent of state 
coercion.236 
                                                 
232 Id. at, 123. 
233 EPHRAT, A Learned Society in a Period of Transition: The Sunni _ulama_ of Eleventh Century Baghdad 6. 2000. 
234 D.F. EICKELMAN, et al., MUSLIM POLITICS 131 (Princeton University Press. 2004). Zeghal, INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, 372 (1999). 
235 WAEL B HALLAQ, THE IMPOSSIBLE STATE: ISLAM, POLITICS, AND MODERNITY'S MORAL PREDICAMENT 153-4 
(Columbia University Press. 2014). 
236 It is worth reading the analysis by Muhammad Zaman of the fragmentation of authority when he says, 
Throughout the Muslim-majority world, advancing levels of education, greater ease of travel, and the rise of new 
communications media have contributed to the emergence of a public sphere— some call it the “street”—in which 
large numbers of people, and not just an educated, political, and economic elite, want a say in political and religious 
issues. The result has been increasing challenges to authoritarianism and fragmentation of authority. ZAMAN, The 
Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change: Custodians of Change ix. 2010. 
On the other hand, in Rahemtulla’s estimation, the fragmentation of ulama left room for jihadists and extremists. In 
fact, it is the other way around. Fragmentation would protect the disagreements and diversity of opinions—the 
celebrated principles of jurisprudence. These fragmented individuals as a whole would dismiss the unidirectional 
discourse adopted by extremists and jihadists. Disagreements may allow for untraditional opinions or unorthodox 
discourse as well as a dangerous and extreme rhetoric but within the free sphere that by its nature dismiss the direct 
politics that is central to jihadists’ discourse. Moreover, the fragmentation protects from state control as well 
meaning provides legitimacy. Formalization of ulama and associating them with the state official institutions strip 
them from legitimacy, which leaves room for jihadists and extremists. Furthermore, going against the very nature of 
scholars does not fight extremism; rather, it helps extremists gain ground and free them to develop social networks 
that the official scholars lack. Rahemtulla, Reconceptualizing the contemporary Ulama: Al-Azhar, Lay Islam, and 
the Egyptian state in the late twentieth century 34. 2007. 
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To summarize my position here, there are four points. First, the madhabs are very loosely 
connected institutions that do not meet the criteria of guilds or corporate groups. The relationship 
of scholar to madhab is much looser still and is more imagined than it is formal. Second, though 
there have been more formal bodies in the past (meaning not madhabs but more formal 
institutions within particular geographic regions that constituted independent establishments), 
they have not encompassed all jurists nor do they explain the locus of juristic authority.237 Third, 
and perhaps most importantly, all this casting about to describe juristic authority as either 
corporate group via madhab or via some other formal institution seems to presuppose a need to 
have such a formality and organization to exert political influence, and that is just wrong, as the 
next section shows. Fourth, different madhabs and schools never constituted a one 
comprehensive corporate group that qualified for representing the community as a whole. 
3.1.3 The Dispersed Influence 
The issue that occupies the debate of “corporate group” is whether the fractured Islamic jurists 
and scholars could constitute organized and formal institutions—either through “guilds” or 
“corporate groups” or through their affiliation to the madhab or other corporate, solidarity or 
pressure groups. Similar to the debate on “religious institution,” the discussion of corporate 
group seems to have been premised on the idea that a corporate group is what assures the 
existence, leverage, and powerful sociopolitical influence of the community of jurists. Even 
when scholars agree with the existence of guilds, they tend to either point out the lack of overall 
                                                 
237 Tunisia appears to be an example when al-Fasi and others popularly acted without being affiliated to the 
establishment or its institutions. He was dismissed from al-Zitouna, he resumed his teaching in the mosque. KEDDIE, 
scholars, saints, and sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle east since 1500 77. 1972. 
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corporate organization or the incapacity of the religious institutions to act as a concentrated 
group, thereby diluting their influence and rendering them largely marginal or irrelevant.238  
What really seems to be missing from the argument is whether the overall comprehensive 
corporate group idea does any good to scholars as a community. Discussion on this is not 
completely absent in the literature, but it is comparatively rare.239 
Arguments concerning corporate groups (or the lack thereof) as formal institutions should 
be turned on their heads because most of these arguments fail to recognize the very nature of 
ulama. The ulama’s basic principle of disagreement among themselves preserves the dispersed 
authority they represent.240 This is not to say that guilds or corporate groups of different sorts did 
not influence society, jurisprudence, or politics. However, it is important to turn the focus to a 
more salient but less studied feature of scholars and jurists: fragmentation. This feature 
highlights their strengths and their freedom more than references to institutions or specific 
groups does. As I discuss in the third section, this sphere of influence encompasses guild 
members and non-guild scholars, jurists related to the state and those acting outside of it. The 
most important aspect is that the ulama regardless of their loose or firm affiliation with formal or 
imagined schools act at some point as individuals who are responsible only to themselves.  
                                                 
238 HOEXTER, et al., The public sphere in Muslim societies 123. 2002. 
239 See the brief discussion of some of the positive side non-corporate nature of ulama, Zeghal, INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, 372 (1999);EPHRAT, A Learned Society in a Period of Transition: The Sunni 
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240 I will devote the last section of this chapter for the idea of independence amongst scholars. For the concept of 
disagreement (khilaf) see e. g., IBN TAYMIYYAH, RAF' AL-MALAM 'AN AL-'AEMMAH AL-'A'LAM 8-35 (The General 
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3.2 FORMATIONS OF THE SCHOLAR: THE ROLE OF ULAMA 
The first section of this chapter draws attention to the manner in which scholars and jurists 
operated as an imagined institution rather than a formal religious one. It also showed how 
scholars retained influence despite the absence of any all encompassing association or corporate 
group. In this section, I will present the role and basic functions of the scholars and jurists.241 
The scholars’ roles and modes range from being cooperative with the state, to semi-independent, 
to resistant and oppositional. Considering the traditional roles and formations of the scholar, I 
will address their responses to the many calls for change in their traditional roles and conclude 
with what should be continued and respected. 
3.2.1 The Weapon of Speech 
The depiction of Islamic scholars as having the “weapon of speech” is common in Islamic 
jurisprudence.242 This image implies that their strength is not tangible or coercive like their 
political counterparts but rather moral and intellectual.243 
In fact, this weapon of tongue and pen alike is often deemed in Islamic discourse to be 
more important than the influence of political actors themselves. When Abdul-Rahman al-
Jabarti, an Egyptian scholar from the eighteenth century, classified the categories of Muslim 
society, he placed the scholars in the second ranking right after the prophets and before the rulers 
                                                 
241 It is not my intention to lay down all roles and functions of scholars and jurists nor to cover Islamic history but to 
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and kings.244 With this ranking, it is no wonder that the ulama say the pen is mightier than the 
sword.245 As a result of this intangible weapon, they enjoyed privileges and exercised influence 
on different aspects of society, in a manner that could be more influential than those of political 
actors. This is demonstrated by the fact that, despite their own considerable funds from 
endowments and schools, they were exempted from taxation.246 
3.2.2 The Essential Functions 
It goes without saying that the most basic and central function and role of scholars is to bear, 
carry and interpret the principles of Islamic law. To teach the rules and principles of Islam and to 
call upon society to act according to them are essential functions of ulama as well. As a result of 
these roles, they are often called to administer Islamic law as well, which itself then becomes an 
additional, fundamental role.247 The types of roles and functions of ulama and jurists conform to 
their typical interactions with people because Islamic law itself is the texts interpreted within the 
circumstances and environment of a given society at a given time.  
In addition to their basic functions, or perhaps because of them, scholars are seen as 
“guardians of faith,” “protectors of the religion,” or “bearers of Islam.”248 Although this is, 
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relatively speaking, true, they have these roles due to their sociopolitical influence more than 
because the exercise of any sort of direct power. From this perspective, scholars are the bearers 
of knowledge and jurisprudence, as well as the protectors of the faith and religion of the people 
and the nation, or the ummah.  
Scholars are therefore the most vocal demonstration of the nation’s fundamental religious 
duties.249 As Hoexter indicates: 
From the early Islamic times, the ummah (nation), not the ruler 
was bearer and interpreter of the norm and basic values of the 
proper Islamic social order. The ruler was responsible for the 
implementation of the rules250  
Within the nation, scholars are the group most associated with the work of defending and 
protecting the Islamic doctrine that defines it. 
3.2.3 The Authority Holders 
As indicated above, because Islamic law is a jurist’s law, jurists carry the authority that sustains 
it.251 Exercising the authority is not facilitated through controlling Islamic texts and traditions, 
but by controlling the taxes and endowments. In this sense, scholars are the legitimacy givers 
who, in turn, lean on people for credibility and support.252 I put emphasis on the jurists’ role 
regarding authority because, in a later section, it will be shown that locating this authority takes 
on a greater importance in the course of deciding the sphere in which the ulama work. 
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If we to apply the claim-versus-belief formula developed by Ricoeur as the first chapter 
showed,253 the self-proclaimed authoritativeness of ulama can be examined in people’s reaction 
and support of the meta-constitutional authority that I will further explain later. Throughout 
Islamic history, the mere existence of ulama’s meta-constitutionalism indicates the belief and 
trust of people in this authority. The following pages will try to review the main political modes 
of ulama, and how meta-constitutionalism existed in different forms. 
3.2.4 The Political Modes of Ulama 
The literature on scholars and their political presence fluctuates reductively between portraying 
them as bureaucratic religious officials and mediators, or presenting them as mass leaders and 
prominent figures of opposition.254 In fact, the political influence of scholars was quite 
significant, and can be divided into five main types, as discussed below. These are activism, 
mediation, consultation, counterbalance and withdrawal. 
The analysis that presents scholars as government officials or state institutions as well as 
mediators and brokers between people and the state seems self-contradictory. Mediators are 
presumed not to be officially members of one party; otherwise, their mediation would be entirely 
compromised. Some scholars address this problem by describing different types or modes of 
scholars. They conclude that ulama are divided into two groups. One group is an official 
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religious institution with members and functionaries, while the other is less reliant on the state 
and serves as a mediatory class that is always suspicious of the state.255 Still others summarize 
responses of scholars toward political events as either being in total opposition or as passive 
withdrawal.256  
All of these accounts fall short of presenting other possible responses and fail to include 
other influential groups of scholars that were not considered due to the reductionist approach in 
defining and dealing with Muslim scholars. Because ulama by their very nature are a dispersed 
authority, we should look at them as belonging to diverse groups in society, whether they were 
peripheral, madhab jurists as corporate group or otherwise, official state ulama or others 
unaffiliated with any formal institution. Due to their authority working mainly in a sphere that is 
(or at least in an ideal sense is supposed to be) uncontrollable even if they happen to work in the 
bureaucracy, ulama may resort to their own sphere if they are to issue fatwas or to work 
generally qua a scholar or jurisconsult (mufti). 
I will present examples, focusing specifically on Egypt, of different modes of political 
engagement in order to prove the existence of a wider space available for different types of 
jurists and scholars—a space where they mainly acted as scholars but with vastly different 
capacities. 
3.2.5 Outside Bureaucracy: Religious Activism 
One prominent mode of scholars in regard to politics is their activism outside state institutions, 
or sometimes against them. I avoid simplifying their activism as “opposition” because in many 
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cases it is not. Opposition in the contemporary state system means being able or willing to 
replace the government, or it may mean the competition over direct political power. Other 
understandings of opposition presume the operation of a coherent group, which leads back to the 
debate about whether the scholars as a whole are a corporate or pressure group.257 In all these 
situations, scholars cannot be described as simply a form of opposition. Therefore, I use 
“activism,” following Aziz Ahmed and others, to generally describe the scholars’ actions outside 
the state’s official sphere.258 The illustrations here are just examples of the long and diverse 
activism of scholars. I present them to help demonstrate the role of ulama in politics as 
independent moral watchdogs. Rebellion, public pressure and protests are examples of the forms 
that scholastic activism could take.259  
In his book about the relationship between ulama and rulers, Abdul-Aziz al-Badri 
presents countless cases and names of scholars in Islamic history that “stood” in front of the 
rulers and challenged the government, and thus, they paid a toll with persecution, pressure, 
imprisonment or even execution.260 
In Egypt, the case of the scholar al-‘izz bin Abdul-Salam (d. 1262) is a striking one. In 
Islamic history, he was given the title the “Sultan of the Ulama” in appreciation of his bold 
moves in addition to his scholastic books on jurisprudence and jurisprudential politics. He was 
imprisoned and persecuted because of his activism and outspokenness. When Ibn Abdul-Salam 
noticed the influence the slaves of the Sultan Ayyub gained, he became alarmed and tended to 
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invalidate the transactions they would make, which angered them. The slaves, who would 
become rulers later, complained and drove a wedge between the Sultan and Ibn Abdul-Salam. 
This led to an extreme confrontation with the ruler, as a result of which Ibn Abdul-Salam packed 
and started leaving Cairo with people and nobles following him. This forced the ruler and ruling 
elites into a position where they had to accept his authority and judgment and urge him to stay in 
order to stabilize society.261 This example helps to demonstrate the power of the ulama when 
they choose the path of activism. Despite the fact that this scholar did not have a formal position 
or political office, he could influence politics through societal and popular pressure. 
Activism could take many other forms as well. Scholars engaged in public affairs based 
on their understanding of the moral obligations and religious principles that they promoted. They 
pressured rulers as they did in the example of “Salat al-Raghaib” during the Ayyubid period 
(from the twelfth to the thirteenth centuries). Salat al-Raghaib is the prayer performed on the first 
Friday of the month of Rajab. The scholars opposed the general practice of this prayer on the 
grounds that it is an innovative religious practice. The ruler responded to their demands 
accordingly.262 During the eleventh century, jurists gathered to protest against drinking wine, 
charging interest, and allowing prostitution. This protest is an important sign of the relationship 
between these protesting jurists and the state.263 
However, scholars did not just protest or challenge orders that threatened their own 
morals or interests, but they took the lead in defending the interests of the general public. In 
1794, in Egypt after the Mamluk, the rulers of Egypt, introduced taxes on goods, the scholars 
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fiercely opposed taxation. They led a general strike against the ruler to stop tax exploitation and, 
in the end, the rulers negotiated with the ulama and the taxes were repealed.264  
Another kind of activism, and one that could mark the climax of ulama’s influence, was 
challenging the authority of existing rulers. They could morally, in the form of a fatwa, 
delegitimize one ruler in favor of another, as they did many times throughout history when they 
perceived the public interest better served by the challenger.265 In this context, Umar Makram (d. 
1822) is an important name. He graduated from al-Azhar and rose among the nobles and scholars 
of Egypt during the French colonization (1798-1801). The ulama, under the leadership of Umar 
Makram, organized a popular mobilization and recognized the challenger Muhammad Ali as the 
legitimate ruler of Egypt over the existing Wali. It was a moment when Egyptians chose their 
own government in 1807.266 Not long after that, Umar Makram told Muhammad Ali himself that 
the people had the right to remove any unfit ruler.267 
Scholars’ activism of this sort has become particularly intense in the modern era, in the 
context of resisting colonization and occupation. The jurist Rawaq, dubbed “the Sheikh of the 
Blind”, led the first opposition against the French in Egypt. Beyond Rawaq, the ulama, in 
general, orchestrated the resistance movement.268 
The Urabi movement (1879-1882) was a popular mobilization that ended up fighting the 
British intervention in Egypt. The Urabi movement in Egypt was named after Ahmed Urabi, a 
popular soldier who decided to reject the unpopular policies of Taufeeq, the ruler of Egypt. 
Scholars proved to be a critical component of the movement he inspired.  
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It is worth noting that the Urabi movement attracted diverse scholars from “both sides of 
the aisle,” from those described as conservatives like Illysh to those who were reformists like 
Muhammad Abduh.269 Illysh, Mansour al-Adawi, al-Haddad, and Salim al-Bishri were among 
the ulama who contributed to the Urabi revolution.270 In 1879, al-Bakri with his friends and other 
scholars issued the “National Charter” to request a constitutional monarchy in 1879, but Khedive 
challenged the move and sent al-Bakri into exile.271 Later, a popular fatwa by ulama, signed by 
10,000 people, delegitimized Taufeeq and called for a fight against the British occupation.272 
Despite the official position of the Grand Mufti of al-Azhar, the majority of professors and 
students joined the revolutionaries against the Khedive Taufeeq, the contested ruler of Egypt 
who was supported by the British.273 Scholars who supported the Urabi movement paid an 
expensive toll as some were dismissed from al-Azhar, some were imprisoned like Illysh who was 
80 years old, and others faced exile like Abduh.274  
The Urabi movement inspired similar activism on the part of ulama in Morocco who 
opposed the monopoly of tobacco by the government of Hasan I (1873-1894) and who wanted to 
defend public interests against the alliance of big merchants and ruling elites. The scholars issued 
an opinion condemning the monopoly, which came as a shock to the King. The King addressed 
the issue and tried to calm the public.275 
After the Urabi movement, al-Azhar participated in the 1919 revolt in Egypt. This 
revolution was led by Saad Zaghlul (d. 1927) who graduated from al-Azhar and was one of 
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Muhammad Abduh’s disciples. The movement broke out against the British occupation of Egypt 
and demanded national independence. The revolutionaries frequently met in the homes of the 
scholars.276 The movement was organized by the collective efforts of the national activists like 
Zaghlul and the other members of al-Wafd as a national delegation.277 The ulama generally 
contributed to the independence of Egypt by signing a petition to Britain that Egypt should be 
free and independent.278 
The Activism of scholars was a traditional way in which ulama sought to challenge the 
status quo, and one that they embraced. Another manner in which they engaged the state was in 
the role of mediators and peace brokers, as the next section shows. 
3.2.6 Mediation Role 
It could be said that because jurists never occupied an official political position for their 
religiosity, they continued for a long time to mediate on behalf of the people with the political 
authorities in the state in order to voice the needs and interests of the people.279 Ephrat thinks 
that ulama served as mediators because of the “heterogeneous character of their socioeconomic 
background and networks, and their close ties with the urban populace….”280  
An interesting aspect of the scholars’ role as mediators is that it serves a dual function. 
The first is defending the public and people’s interests against the ruler’s exploitation and 
overstep, and the second is being in charge of calming people down from the ruler’s side. 
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“Ulama served a communication tool between the ruler and the ruled for the ruler to manipulate 
the public.”281 A perfect example of this occurred during the Urabi Revolution when the Khedive 
Taufeeq singled out ulama as responsible for public order and for ensuring the obedience of the 
people while these ulama and others were carrying the people’s demands to him.282 
Even at times of occupation and colonization, some ulama tended to work with the de 
facto rulers so they carried on in their role of representing people but to the colonizing forces this 
time. During the French occupation in Egypt, some ulama represented the public before the 
French, while other ulama represented the public against the French. 283  
In order for ulama to resume their mediatory task, they need to be independent of the 
state’s bureaucracy, as they cannot mediate if they work for one side and part (of the state); 
otherwise, they will lose the confidence of the public as faithful mediators.  
3.2.7 The Consultation Role 
One of the most famous judges (qadis) in Islamic history is the noted early Hanafi jurist Abu 
Yusuf (d. 798). His book about the land tax, al-Kharaj, is a jurisprudential hallmark. He started 
the book by saying, the “caliph instructed me to write a book for him to study and act upon.”284 
The book, in other words, grew out of Abu Yusuf’s role of consultant and enabled the Caliph to 
act upon the rules that Abu Yusuf set. The famous political jurisprudence theorist, al-Mawardi 
(d. 1058) is another example of a jurist who played the role of consultant when he wrote al-
Ahkam al-Shar‘iyyah, which has proved to be one of the hallmarks in political jurisprudence. 
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This work was prepared under the instruction of the ruler al-Qadir Billah (d. 1031) in order for 
him to “study and act upon” it.285 Al-Juwaini (d. 1085),286 and his student, al-Ghazali (d. 
1111),287 produced similar books to instruct future rulers on how to follow Islamic principles. 
The custom of the ruler consulting scholars and scholars writing books or rulings of 
jurisprudence in response demonstrates how the consultation function worked between some 
scholars and rulers in Islamic history. The practice of consultation was not just a tradition 
established in the ulama’s practice and literature, it was also a custom and principle on the rulers’ 
part. Rulers like Nizam al-Mulk, a Seljuk ruler (d. 1092), advised rulers to consult learned 
scholars especially the experienced ones.288 The objectives of scholars in their services as 
advisors were to maintain the cooperation and understanding of rulers, and thereby have 
influence in the implementation of Islamic principles that would in their judgment maximize the 
interests of the public while furthering their own longer-term interests and influence as well.289 
With the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century, scholars and sultans reached an 
important level of cooperation and consultation where ulama who played a large part in bringing 
what one scholar regards as “a major achievement of the Empire, namely the endowment of 
Islamic law, in its Hanafi form.”290 This role of consultant continued even during the 
codification when the traditional role of scholars within the state was at stake. The ulama who 
justified the change and facilitated the codification feared that if the change was adopted without 
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their presence, it might have worsened their position as scholars. The attitude of some ulama to 
justify codification was, therefore, based on the fear that the entire process would take place 
without their input at all if they did not participate.291 The effort in the end, however, 
delegitimized not just some of the scholars involved in the codification process but the state as 
well. The effort was seen as justifying late Ottoman tyranny and monopoly of power rather than 
as an effort to implement Islamic law.  
Consultation worked in cases where the ulama consulted were associated in one way or 
another with the ruler, sultan, or government, such that the scholar acquired the confidence of the 
ruler. In the absence of such trust, it is unlikely that a jurist could have played this role 
effectively.  
3.2.8 The Official Counterbalance 
Despite partial subordination of ruler-friendly ulama to the people in power, these ulama are still 
able to function as an official counterbalance. According to Feldman, the compromise was that 
jurists offer legitimacy to the order as a realistic compromise for the acceptance of the status quo 
as a means of then exercising influence and using pressure to ensure Sharia compliance in 
society.292 Feldman presents al-Ghazali and al-Mawardi as examples.293 The move  
may be read, then, not as a scholarly concession to power, but as a 
brilliant maneuver that successfully preserved the law and the 
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scholars in their constitutional position even after the caliphate had 
failed in its assigned task of preserving orderly government.294 
Samuel Eisenstadt described this relationship as a “tacit bargaining” that the public sphere is for 
the public, and that ulama are always free to operate in this arena.295 Ottoman ulama and modern 
Islamic scholars in the official counterbalance mode use their pressure to fight what they see as 
social and economic injustices.296 Official Ottoman ulama could even issue rulings that 
circumvented the Sultan’s will and order.297 When a university of sciences was open at the order 
of the Sultan Abdulmecid II in 1870s, Sheikh al-Islam Hasan Fehmi Efendi saw it as a rival to 
the traditional madrsa system so he issued a fatwa and campaigned against it and succeeded in 
closing it.298 
Because the rulers decided to engage ulama in their legitimation process, the rulers paid 
the toll of bending to the wind created by ulama and the society they represented. In this mutual-
interest relationship, scholars developed their own jurisdiction and sphere and the state protected 
its own domain. So, the dispute sometimes seems to be over “whose jurisdiction should govern?” 
or “whose sphere is at stake?”  
The role of scholars as a counterbalance is sometimes vague due to the fact that the 
degree of “legitimacy” the ulama offer is often unclear and therefore perceived to be 
unconditional. It seems that al-Mawardi and the others would occasionally offer a temporary de 
facto solution to a political crisis by approving a ruler, but that solution could introduce a worse 
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crisis when it is later used to justify forever de facto rule. Moreover, the “compromise” that 
brings scholars under the umbrella of the government ends up stripping them from real influence 
including counterbalance, and costs them their own legitimacy in the eyes of the public whom 
they should represent.299  
3.2.9 The Time of Withdrawal? 
A salient phenomenon that repeatedly appears when ulama react to political developments is 
what some describe as “withdrawal.” Interestingly, analysts’ definitions of withdrawal differ 
dramatically from complete silence, to denial of participation in the discussion, to denial of 
participation in official governance.300 In this section, I tend to revisit the analysis of withdrawal 
in light of the fact that scholars are characterized by fragmentation, and they each have their own 
space of influence. 
Some analysts like Jackson and Hatina tend to describe ulama’s response to politics as 
quietist. Quietism describes the wide range of methods that defer direct political questions or 
disputes over direct power to politicians or ruling elites that are directly involved in politics.301 In 
this sense, quietism means abandoning (direct) politics in order scholars to devote the time and 
effort to the religious or jurisprudential work and debates. 
Some analysts who present some ulama as quietists do not take into consideration the 
factor of whether these scholars are official, government-friendly ulama or non-official. 
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Quietism does certainly exist in scholarly response to politics, but the point here is that the 
scholars’ quietism could be interpreted differently according to the locus that the scholar 
traditionally occupied.302 
If the literature that speaks of withdrawal does not interpret this move by ulama as a 
quietist approach toward public discussion, it will describe it as a method of avoiding troubles 
and adopting a passive reaction toward the serious issues in society.303 However, although 
passive withdrawal happens, most of what is described as “withdrawal” seems to be a part of the 
scholars’ typical role of operating in their own sphere and refusing to give that up for direct 
political involvement. Unlike common conception of non-political moves as simply passive 
withdrawal, the non-political attitude of the ulama can be powerful due to the nature of their 
arena, networks and authority.  
It could be part of the confusing analysis of withdrawal as quietism is that it presupposes 
the modern state’s setting where real influence is primarily through direct politics and the state’s 
institutions.304 Because the analysis seems to reduce influence to the one of state institutions in 
the modern context, they assume the same setting when analyzing medieval Islamic scholars. 
Sherman Jackson, for instance, notes that medieval Islamic jurists ignored the question of 
the proper substantive political authority and dealt with procedural validity instead.305 He gives 
the example of Ibn Taymiyyah who “shifted the focus from the top to the bottom, people, and 
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their relationship to the divine law.”306 This was the shift from the issue “who should rule” to 
“how should they rule.”307In studying al-Qarafi, Jackson points to the fact that “while Qarafi was 
conspicuously silent about the chaos and mayhem between the Ayyubids and the Mamluks, he 
finds time to address indiscretions that occur at a slighter lower level.”308  
With respect to al-Qarafi’s method in constitutional debates, his approach emphasizes 
that, although Islamic law should govern some conflicts, these conflicts reside outside the 
ulama’s own “jurisdiction.” As a result, the ulama exercise restraint in regards to matters that 
might provoke political forces to invade matters normally within their arena. In addition, they 
developed a realist technique of “procedural validity” that has allowed them to serve people’s 
and society’s needs even when essential legitimacy of the state is at stake. 
Therefore, when scholars exercise restraint from becoming involved in politics, this is not 
always passive withdrawal and quietism, but it could be to a means of protecting their legal 
domain, or protesting the current setting as well. The line between these positions is not always 
fixed, but it is important to analyze the motives of scholars by looking at their literature to 
include all these possible factors in the analysis. 
Daniel Crecelius reads the ulama’s refusal to rule during colonization as the typical 
submissive role of ulama to engage with government and direct decision-making.309 This 
evaluation reduces the “active role” to being one that exists only by means of direct political 
governance and rule in the state as we know it today. In my opinion, the ulama’s refusal to rule 
was a remarkably smart one because they resumed their typical role of representing people in 
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refusing to participate in forces that occupied their land, culture and political life. Ulama stripped 
the system of the French of its legitimacy and retained the legitimacy for themselves by proving 
to be independent and uninterested in power. Ulama, actually, put the French in a difficult 
situation because the French needed someone local to rule so they (the French) could indirectly 
rule but ulama refused this deal.310 
There may be some element of passive withdrawal and quietism on the part of some 
ulama in certain contexts. However, Jackson ignores the fact that ulama can protest by 
withdrawal, which is powerful in light of the tools of legitimacy that they have.  
Thus, in the end, refusing to serve in politics is not merely withdrawal; it could also 
signal a powerful active reaction of protesting the status quo. In the case of scholars, it is even 
stronger when we know that the public could see their absence from the state as an attempt at 
delegitimization of the state. In addition, “withdrawal” could be a stand itself as it builds a space 
that is stronger and more attached to the people—an entirely different authority that the state 
does not control.311 It is fair to suggest that the way and the kind of withdrawal must be analyzed 
to interpret this move. 
In wars between two or more powers, scholars’ refraining from engagement is not always 
withdrawal as some may suggest,312 but rather a means of maintaining their role no matter which 
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wins. For example, in the war between Ottomans and Mamluks, the scholar Arusi argued that his 
goal was the welfare of Muslim subjects, not the victory of either the Ottomans or the 
Mamluk.313 
When some scholars resort to their very locus to exercise influence, some commentators 
interpret this move as a kind of withdrawal. In explaining what some regard as a quietist 
approach, Hallaq hints at the separation of the legal and the political in medieval Islam.314 It is 
actually more of a revealing feature of the locus that the jurists and scholars work in rather than 
passively accepting the status quo.  
At any rate, whether withdrawal existed as much as some claim or not, this mode of 
withdrawal is one mode that scholars assume while they can and do assume other modes at other 
times. Sometimes, even when some ulama adopt one mode toward politics, other ulama adopt 
another mode. This is why, for example, we saw these different reactions toward one issue, one 
party, or government. 
In the following section, I will discuss the issue of westernization that threatens the 
traditional role of scholars, and how they have reacted to it.  
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3.3 THE MODERN MODE: IN THE COURSE OF “CHANGE”: BETWEEN 
REFORM AND WESTERNIZATION 
3.3.1 The Ulama and Legal Change 
When we discuss the roles of scholars and how these roles have shaped their domain, the 
response to change is fundamental. It becomes even more important when we see that the change 
could enhance the functions of scholars, and could, on the other hand, marginalize their influence 
and role.  
There are different approaches toward evaluating the importance of the role of scholars in 
the course of change in Muslim societies. One approach assumes that meaningful change comes 
from the westernized elites. Under this approach, scholars are not just less relevant but somehow 
a potential obstacle toward a useful change that an Islamic society might need.315 Some authors 
complain that the orientalist scholarship on ulama portrays them as foreign, if not opposed, to 
change and reform and that the “premodern Islamic legal tradition is a highly rigid structure, 
defined in opposition to the social and political institutions of society.”316 Another approach 
interprets the response of scholars as dependent on their interests and social position rather than 
their values and public interests. Therefore, scholars could pose a threat or lend support 
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depending on how their interests as a group are protected.317 A third approach tends to portray 
ulama as “custodians of change” as long as public interests and values are not at stake.318  
This chapter takes the position that, although scholars vary and assume different modes, 
they maintain a very significant role in advocating for change that appeals to the public. If they 
cannot enhance the common good, they at least work to lessen the inevitable wrongs. They call 
for some change while they struggle against others.  
In his book of the rules of jurisconsult and ifta’, Ibn al-Qayyem (d. 1350), following a 
settled rule in Islamic jurisprudence, asserts that fatwas change according to the time, place, 
circumstances and customs.319 This at least recognizes the possibilities of legal change. Other 
jurists have reached largely similar conclusions. Ibn Aabideen (d. 1836) authored a book that 
focuses on jurisprudential changes according to circumstances and environment.320 Therefore, 
jurists respond to people of their time in order to reach the best implementation possible of 
Islamic law. This is why, for example, Ebussuud Efendi (d. 1574), one of the most important 
scholars in the sixteenth century, relaxed a fatwa on endowments in order to respond to people’s 
needs.321 
With the modernization of our culture, we find reservations from scholars not on the 
principle of change, but rather on certain kinds of change, change that jeopardizes the values of 
people or threatens to invade the very free channels between people and scholars. This kind of 
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change is commonly described as “westernization.”322 At the same time, scholars have embraced 
changes that elevated the quality of living and allowed for free interaction between people and 
scholars. “Some ulama did not encounter problems with dealings with modernity as they applied 
to public interest rule.”323 Therefore, reforms that fulfilled the requirements of serving public 
interest, the ulama would support and adopt, but those that stood against public interest, they 
were committed to opposing. 
Some debate revolves around whether certain aspects of modernization could be implicit 
mechanisms of colonization. This applies to ways of living, dress code, languages, cultures, and 
related matters. Thus, some scholars warned against Western-style brimmed hats, jackets, and 
trousers324 while others allowed them.325 Similar reactions were narrated about fatwas against 
coffee,326 tea327 and cigarettes328 when they were attached to certain westernizing influences. The 
fatwas and rulings were relaxed on these issues when the ulama began to consider other aspects 
of those activities. 
Yet scholars were not opposed to other changes. For example, while they initially 
expressed reservations about the modern press because it was thought to have threatened the 
sacred texts,329 they started to embrace it once there arose the phenomenon of a “media mufti” 
who could use modern press to disseminate Islamic messaging.330 Their position seems to be 
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that, while technology is a blessing, using it in religious matters should be done carefully to 
protect against the distorting of the message of Islam.331 As Daniel Crecelius puts it: “The 
transformation of Islamic society under the impact of the modernization has been the major 
concern of scholars interested in the modern history of Islam.”332 
In understanding the modern ulama’s responses to changes brought about by colonization 
and westernization, and the reasons for the strong opposition of the ulama to them, the Ottoman 
era “Tanzimat” reforms prove a particularly salient example. The Tanzimat represent a turning 
point in modern Muslim history when the Ottoman Empire adopted reforms that were broadly 
viewed as severely limiting the role of scholars. In reality, however, as the next section shows, 
the Tanzimat induced scholars to return to their original role and their traditional sphere—
resorting to the people and operating in an independent and autonomous space. Between 1839 
and 1876, the Sultans of the Ottoman Empire introduced a package of political, administrative, 
legal and social reforms known as the Tanzimat.333 In this section, I will discuss these reforms 
and their aftermath in the Muslim and Arab world, with a particular focus on Egypt, to show how 
these reforms affected scholars and their role.  
3.3.2 The Tanzimat and its Aftermath 
After a long period during which the ulama enjoyed autonomy, the ulama were placed pursuant 
to the Tanzimat under the control of the Sultan when he introduced the office of chief mufti 
(Sheikh al-Islam). Religious activities then came under the control of the state appointed mufti. 
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Sultan Mahmud II (d. 1839) further made a distinction between the affairs of the state and the 
affairs of the ulama, a step that was followed by subordinating the affairs of the ulama to those of 
the state.334 The lesson of the Tanzimat is that these reforms jeopardized and actually infringed 
on scholars’ autonomy, and the autonomy of people they represented. It was not surprising to see 
scholars opposing not only the Tanzimat themselves, but other changes as well that resembled 
the Tanzimat throughout the Muslim world.335 
A notable response to the Tanzimat came from a conservative base of scholars. The 
stance of these ulama was depicted as a passive and indifferent response in that they saw these 
reforms as “worldly matters.”336 Again, as we saw from the analysis of “withdrawal,” this stand 
can also be seen as an active one, building social authority away from state affairs.  
The boldest moves of the Tanzimat involved the intervention of executive authorities in 
law making. Sultan Mahmud provided the concept of “adalat/justice” to be a resource of law 
along with Sharia and administrative ordinances, frequently referred to as Kanun (ordinances).337 
A new council was formed so that the secular elites could make laws instead of Islamic jurists. In 
1855, mixed courts were introduced. Within a few years (1840-1858), the Panel and then Land 
Codes were promulgated as well.338 
The culmination of these efforts was the creation of an Islamic Civil Code known as the 
Mejelle. Between 1869-76, a commission led by Ahmed Cevdet Pasha produced this massive 16-
volume work, meant to be an Islamic equivalent of the Western Civil Code. The grand mufti 
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firmly opposed this move, arguing that deciding Islamic law should be deferred to his office not 
a secular committee. Nonetheless, the official scholars did not oppose the Tanzimat in the hope 
that they could serve in the legal process.339 By the end of Tanzimat period, ulama did not 
actually lend legitimacy to the state but slowly and gradually stripped themselves, and perhaps 
the state, of legitimacy by subordinating religious institutions to the government. One 
commentator describes the attempts of reform during the Tanzimat to be “on the right track until 
the removal of effective law-making scholars to the advantage of the codes.”340 
The experience of Tanzimat inspired the “reformist” ruler in Egypt Muhammad Ali, and 
the year 1872 marked the beginning of modernization for ulama and for al-Azhar. The impact of 
“modernization” in Egypt led to centralizing the government and threatening people’s values. 
Muhammad Ali did not challenge ulama in their religious institutions but, rather, he created 
another order that existed alongside and gradually changed the locus of focus and influence. It is 
not surprising that modernization for ulama meant a retreat not just from political influence but 
also from social prominence. Although neglected during later period of Muhammad Ali’s rule, 
ulama still played an active role, however, through blocking some reformative projects. All 
major “reforms” proposed by Muhammad Ali were undermined by the absolute refusal of the 
ulama and students to support them. They even used space that was allowed by the reform to 
block further reforms.341 Daniel Crecelius rightly notes that, although sheikhs and students truly 
desired reforms, each reform proposed was associated with government interference, and thus 
they were committed to opposing those proposed by Muhammad Ali.342 
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To conclude, ulama could be guardians of change, but only to the extent that such change 
does not threaten their principles and public interests as they view them. If they did see the 
change as threatening, as in the case of “Westernization,” they would not hesitate to fight it 
vigorously. 
In this section, I presented the different roles and modes of scholars to reemphasize the 
different forms of engagement that scholars can assume. These were all possible because they 
transcend the traditional rigid positioning of religious institutions in the modern state. Ulama 
appeal to people and form their positions according to what they think are the best interests of 
the public, as well as the tradition they carry and seek to protect. This leads to the discussion of 
the next section, which is a discussion of the meta-constitutional sphere in which the jurists 
operate. 
3.4 THE META-CONSTITUTIONAL SPHERE OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS 
AND SCHOLARS 
Having examined the meaning of “religious institutions” in the Islamic context in the first 
section, and having explored the roles of these institutions and scholars in the second section lead 
us to the central issue: what is the arena that the role that religious institutions can fulfill in the 
setting of today’s Muslim state and society taking into consideration the inspiring setting of 
scholars in their past and literature? I argue that scholars and religious institutions occupy a 
sphere that I describe as “meta-constitutional” where they preexist the constitutional setting and 
survive its upheavals, and, because they do not possess the official power of a state institution, 
they act independently and out of the state’s control and dictation. I will revisit traditional 
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narrative of scholars in order to prove that my proposal fits the traditional setting of scholars in 
history and literature.  
The following subsections will explain this idea by starting with proposals about the role 
scholars play or the sphere they occupy. The next six subsections defend the proposal of a meta-
constitutional sphere and rationalize its features according to the self-presentation of scholars and 
to the literature on the issue. The final two subsections will shed light on the role of crisis in 
shaping our understanding of this sphere, ending with the Inquisition, the story of Ibn Hanbal’s 
persecution, as an example. 
3.4.1 Public Sphere 
In analyzing the arena of jurists and scholars in Islamic history, some academics suggest that the 
concept of public sphere could provide an explanation for the nature of Muslim scholars’ 
involvement and works.343 The interesting point is that the works and debates of jurists are 
described as neither private nor official, emphasizing the fact that ulama are not part of state 
institutions or bureaucracy, but are nonetheless part of public and not private affairs. 
To discuss the public sphere in Islamic history, it is important to revisit the idea of 
“oriental despotism” that appears in discussing politics in medieval Islam. The idea by definition 
dismisses the wide influence and existence of spheres outside the Sultan or the ruler’s tight grip. 
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So, a discussion of the public sphere in Islamic history basically questions the dominant 
presupposition of oriental despotism in analyzing medieval Islam. 
The assumption that the Islamic political context is part of oriental despotism is examined 
by recent studies and seems to be very general if not totally inaccurate.344 In asserting the early 
existence of the public sphere, these studies deny the conception that the political situation in 
Islamic history was completely controlled by the government.345 
On the other hand, because jurists portray themselves in fluid and dispersed ways as we 
saw previously, they cannot be simply described as “civil society institutions.” This is because 
the word “institutions” would suggest more focus on the corporate nature that the ulama, in fact, 
lacked.346 In addition, some suggest that civil society institutions exist when society is structured 
with institutions that took place outside the state’s tutelage, which is not the case with the 
scholars’ actions.347 
Some researchers try to approach the existence of the public sphere and the contribution 
of jurists by studying the different forms of legal interaction of scholars with the society. Rightly, 
while Hatina compares the jurists’ arena to the press in the modern state,348 Hoexter takes the 
public discussions held in Islamic history as evidence of the early existence of the public 
sphere.349 These researchers take the work of the fatwa as proof of this public sphere to the 
extent that fatwas could be considered as “popular literature”.350 
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The idea of the public sphere rightly portrays the works and debates of the jurists as a 
“sphere.” Describing it as a “public sphere”, however, disregards the essential nature of their 
debate and popular authority. The nature of the sphere and authority of the jurists is not just 
“public,” and because of this, I argue against applying the concept of public sphere to Islamic 
legal discussions. Jurisprudential works and fatwas, for example, are not just “public debates;” 
they form a unique relationship with people that can be private as well as public, political or non-
political, and what is considered traditionally “religious” in the modern secular sense or not. 
These elements constitute the meta-constitutional sphere that although it is a “sphere” and can be 
held in “public,” its operation can be popularly decisive and more authoritative than the “public 
sphere” due to its the nature and structural appeal to values.351 Moreover, the public sphere 
describes an arena that jurists share with public activists while jurists, in fact, have a more 
profound appeal to society to the extent that their positions could affect the course of a Muslim 
state. Another proposal will be the issue of the next subsection. 
3.4.2 The Proposal of a “Fourth Branch” 
In locating jurists in Muslim society historically, some, as we previously saw, employ the 
already developed concept of civil society institutions, while others employ something closer to 
the spirit of scholars and jurists who are dispersed and focus on the sphere rather than the 
institutions. Here, I discuss another proposal in regard to the scholars’ role and locus in the 
modern world in order to reach the idea of meta-constitutional sphere that I propose. 
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According to Intisar Rabb, jurists function as the “Fourth Branch.”352 Her work on the 
subject is more focused on Shi‘ism with its history and approach toward jurists. In the case of 
An-Najaf, as an example of the Shi‘i school, there is what can be called a stiff or firm authority 
“marji‘yyah,” as opposed to the flexible or dispersed authority that is generally seen in the Sunni 
case as we discussed earlier.353 Aside from this difference, Rabb’s proposal of the Fourth Branch 
is interesting. She presents jurists, the historical interpreters of Islamic law, as the Fourth Branch 
of traditional government’s three branches. She points out that jurists can play a “formal 
institutional role” which diverges from the modern liberal democratic project of “We the People” 
to promote the traditional Islamic legal norms of “We the Jurists”.354 Nonetheless, she warns, 
“the Fourth Branch does not suggest a formal branch of government. Rather, the reference is to a 
non-government entity that influences the constitutionally defined legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches” like the role of the press in the United States.355  
My reservation on the Fourth Branch proposal is that it again shifts the focus from the 
free-floating space that typifies the scholars in Sunni thought, to “institutionalized” authority. As 
we saw earlier, Sunni scholars did not “fail” to constitute a hierarchy, or overall institution; 
rather, they always intended not to establish such an institution, as this would undermine their 
literature and established practice. Moreover, the label “branch” in Rabb’s proposal reflects a 
setting that is suggested by the modern state’s arrangement more than the literature of the jurists 
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themselves. The proposal would look at the jurists as an “outside” setting that does not reflect 
their own thought and paradigm. 
Although I will explain my reservation, it would make more sense if we compare the 
scholars to the Fourth Estate, instead of Rabb’s Fourth Branch. 356 Unlike the European 
(specifically British) Estates of realm in the Middle Ages that produced clergy as the first estate, 
the medieval Islamic world had different sets of estates but never produced clergy like Europe.357 
Therefore, if we were to compare the domain of scholars and religious institutions in the 
medieval and even contemporary Islamic world to one of the estates of the realm known in 
medieval Europe, then it would be the latter introduced the Fourth Estate, which was primarily a 
description of the unofficial power of the press.358 Similarly, religious leaders and scholars were 
described as unofficial, unrecognized, and non-governmental.359 Jurists play within the 
unofficial, sometimes unrecognized and unconscious, sphere of the society influencing political 
power through their meta-constitutional power.360 However, religious institutions and scholars in 
the medieval Islamic mind were not the First Estate in politics and cannot now be described as 
the Fourth since the first (which was supposed to be clergy) is no longer a political force. 
Moreover, the scholars are distinguished by their structural attachment to the popular values, 
which makes their space more than a press-like arena. In any event, Muslim scholars cannot be 
an estate or a branch due to their anti-institutionalizing nature. Although the press in many cases 
is not an institution, it does not seem to have this resistance to the institutionalization per se. 
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Therefore, with these characteristics and elements of scholars in mind, I propose that the sphere 
both precedes the constitutional arrangement and falls short of attaining an official or politically 
binding power or authority.  
In the next section, I will argue and defend my proposal of the meta-constitutionalism. 
3.4.3 Why Meta-Constitutional Sphere? 
This meta-constitutional sphere emphasizes that there is no binding authority like a state 
institution, but the scholars can define and redefine cultural vocabulary in its own sphere. In the 
end, this cultural vocabulary affects the state and the constitutional setting. So, it is not a political 
apparatus but rather a spirit that runs through people’s minds as culture does. Because ulama 
traditionally tend to play the role of representing society and its values through rulings and 
“advisory opinions,” they would give up their popular advisory role if they became a part of the 
state. Interestingly, their “advisory opinions” are not usually presented solely to political 
institutions or government branches but mostly to society as a whole.361 
Religious discourse was and is addressed to people as a whole, and it contributes and 
affects politics by people in society not by religious institutions as a political body. This is the 
reason why it runs through the free meta-constitutional sphere and not as a government branch, a 
social estate, or an official institution. 
It is “meta-constitutional” to imply that the sphere is not established by constitutional 
power, does not need official recognition of its existence,362 and does not have direct 
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constitutional power. It preexists constitutions in a way that any possible constitutional structure 
would definitely need support from the residents of this sphere in order for this structure to take 
place and the sphere as a whole is more important to the people than a constitution. Because of 
these conditions, it may even get affected in negative way if it is integrated into the official 
sphere.363 Another aspect of meta-constitutionality is that the sphere survives constitutional 
crises because it can never be part of a direct constitutional structure. This explains why the 
scholars acquired more importance during crises and did not collapse as state institutions did. To 
illustrate the long-term survival of scholars, mufti Muhammad Rafi‘ Uthmani, the president of 
Dar al-Ulum of Karachi (an Islamic madrasa), considered this Islamic institution a safe haven 
from crises and upheavals. The sheikh said, “[t]his is a secure fortress. There might be curfew 
imposed outside, there might be strikes and riots out there. But one doesn’t even get to know 
about it here in the Dar al-‘Ulum, until one reads in the next day’s papers that there was a riot 
next door.”364 
In this sphere, ulama exist to determine the norms that govern their sphere and build their 
networks and bonds according to their own standards as long as the rulings and fatwas they 
render are not constitutionally binding. Nonetheless, these non-binding rulings and debates can 
be socially very powerful to such an extent that the state needs to take them into consideration.365 
According to one observation, even after secularizing some Muslim states, ulama “continued to 
make their presence through the masses.”366 Through speaking to the public, the jurists 
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profoundly influence the daily life of the average Muslim, which makes up the arena that the 
jurists find themselves in.367 
Different works attempt to locate jurists’ arena in Muslim society. I reviewed these 
proposals and concluded suggesting the meta-constitutional sphere as a location for ulama. In the 
following subsection I will locate the authority of the jurists to further defend this theme.  
3.4.4 The Locus of Authority 
In the section about the roles of scholars, one role discussed was that of authority holders in the 
sense that they administer some religious matters by rendering rulings about them. This 
subsection attempts to locate this authority. 
The jurists’ task of articulating what could be considered law is a force that falls within 
the meta-constitutional sphere. In this sphere, ulama claim to have authority that goes beyond 
state control but at the same time, refuse to control or establish a state or semi-state power.368 
Islamic law is acquired not by the state but informally by way of social recognition and then by 
an individual’s authorization. This “process takes place totally outside of the apparatus of the 
state.”369 
The law that Muslim jurists articulate is a body of rulings, jurisprudence, and texts along 
with their interpretations. Despite being law, it is established and developed in the meta-
constitutional sphere, away from the political sphere within which modern states promulgate 
their laws. So, it is possible to say that in Muslim society there can be two sets of laws, one 
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where its authority is located outside the political sphere but powerfully affects it—this is Islamic 
law, while the other is a politically-binding law in its sphere and enforced by the state 
apparatuses. Sherman Jackson studies the differentiation that al-Qarafi made between the 
“fatwa” and “hukm”. The difference seems to resemble the differentiation here between the 
effect of the two laws.370 According to al-Qarafi, the fatwa is non-binding while hukm is 
binding.371 Otherwise stated, for purposes of this dissertation, the fatwa is a ruling in the meta-
constitutional sphere while hokum is a ruling in the political sphere that runs through the state 
apparatuses and promulgated as official decision. The meta-constitutional could be the arena that 
one describes in Muslim society as the “parallel Islamic sector,”372 the same arena that another 
describes as the “ulama’s sphere.”373 
In order for the political law to be stable, socially legitimate, or even to work, it needs to 
conform to a part of the former, the Islamic law as the scholars articulate it.374 In Hallaq’s 
account, in traditional Islamic history, “it was rare for a judge to disregard a fatwa unless it is for 
a higher ranking scholar.”375 It is important to consider the mechanism as to how this came to be. 
One possibility lies in the example of Roman law when the jurist’s opinion was not 
binding until the Empire incorporated it into civil law and licensed it. However, Muslim jurists 
can articulate laws in the meta-constitutional sphere that addresses society and individuals 
without need for the state to authorize it.376 The Roman process of licensing an opinion has two 
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aspects: one is self-licensed and addresses individuals; the other is the state’s license. In Islamic 
law, the state does not have the exclusive authority to determine what is law and what is not 
because the locus of authority in Islamic law is outside the sphere of the state. 
The Islamic system instead traditionally recognizes a set of rules developed by Muslim 
scholars outside the state’s control, though these rules do not have the same effect as the law 
promulgated by the state. Islamic law developed by the jurists and jurisconsults leans on the 
individual Muslim’s discretion to apply it to his, or her life while the political law of the state is 
enforced by its ability to coercively implement it. However, in the eye of Muslim society, the 
law prescribed by the scholars can be more authoritative and reliable, which puts a burden on the 
state to conform to the principles of this law.377 This picture of authority and its locus shows how 
the authority of scholars resides outside the state’s offices and operates through people and the 
nation. It is self-rendered, self-licensed, and self-recognized but through its own channels and 
networks that work through its relationship to Muslim society. 
It is almost impossible to monopolize and manipulate an arena that defers its authority to 
resources for which the Ummah (Islamic nation), represented by its scholars as a whole, is 
responsible. The attempts by states to control this authority through institutionalizing religious 
groups and jurists have not worked. These attempts do nothing more than push the religious 
society to produce alternatives beyond state control as it always does. In so doing, the society 
gives these alternatives more credibility and then shakes the status quo and complicates it instead 
of stabilizing it. Ulama, in general, are more exposed to non-state knowledge, and derive their 
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authority from resources that are absolutely beyond the state and its capacity, so they are able to 
develop their own networks.  
Therefore, even if state officials control religious institutions, ulama can emerge out of 
society beyond these institutions and have a more authoritative weight, which jeopardizes the 
relationship between religion and state in a way these ulama can be more popular and develop a 
more hostile discourse to the state and its system altogether. This is why attempts to control 
religious authority are counterproductive whenever attempted.378 On the other hand, the fears of 
possible extreme discourses can be addressed by pointing out that this space is free of force and 
coercion, and is open in a fashion that corrects itself with the check of the people and their role.  
Having located the authority in the meta-constitutional sphere, the following two 
subsections will present two distinguished characteristics of this sphere. One is its anti-
monolithic feature and the other is the informality of the sphere. 
3.4.5 The Anti-Monolithic Quality 
In the Islamic context, there is no one jurist, individual, or group that should or could represent 
religion or exercise monopoly on its interpretation.379 In practice “Ulama have historically been 
far from being monolithic”380 and the Islamic “madrasas [were] far from being 
monopolized….”381 
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Jurists in the metaconstitutional sphere are representatives of the people not of religion. 
They may act out of religious principles, but they do so for the people, not claiming or 
representing absolute religious truth. What needs to be emphasized here is the idea that Islamic 
jurisprudence is non-monopolistic by nature, and because of this, taking the course of 
monopolizing religious discourse cannot control the interpretation of Islamic texts and 
jurisprudence. 
The anti-monolithic quality of meta-constitutionalism means that entitling only specific 
institution or institutions to interpretation is at odds with the typical understanding and features 
of scholars as interpreters. However, meta-constitutionalism provides a free space that dismisses 
monopoly by nature of its free space and anti-monolithic operation.  
After a long time of adopting official madras and institutions, Islamic learning and 
jurisprudence continued in learning circles (halaqas) outside the state framework.382 The lesson 
here is that having different “official institutions” or “official madrasas” does not prevent the 
fluidity of the Islamic authority to work mainly in the metaconstitutional sphere where it has 
always worked and finds itself today. 
3.4.6 The Informal Nature of Meta-Constitutional Sphere (the Resistance to 
Institutionalization) 
The feature of informality seems to be a central feature of the Muslim understanding of Islamic 
law, at least in the Sunni experience. This feature keeps religion from being completely 
monopolized by one group, state or body. The fact that ulama traditionally resist the 
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comprehensive project of institutionalization is not a modern response to the call for reforms or 
“Westernization”; it is actually a genuine characteristic of Muslim scholars. They are blessed 
with this informality just as they are with a non-corporate nature. Both are essential qualities of 
the meta-constitutional sphere they maintain. To emphasize the role of informality is not to deny 
the existence of formal learning and semi-hierarchal schools in Islamic history, but to focus on 
the quality that distinguishes the kind of Muslim learning that helps establish the meta-
constitutional sphere. 
This process took place informally by social recognition and reputation, and then by 
individual’s authorization.383 Historians acknowledge the fact that comprehensive 
institutionalization has not occurred in Islamic history.384 What they have missed is that 
institutionalization neither happened, or never succeeded, due to the authentic feature of 
informality in Islamic jurisprudence. This informality is not a way to resist the existence of 
institutions themselves but to resist the overall institutionalization that usually paves the way for 
a state’s control over the work of jurisprudence. 
The centrality of the mosque in Islamic history is an example of the informality of meta-
constitutionalism. The activities are informal in the way that they are essentially attached to the 
uncontrollable mosques (houses of Allah), thus, are not institutionally organized.385 The 
centrality of the mosques is derived from the notion that the house of Allah is not just for prayer; 
it is to deal with all different aspects of life.386 The call for prayer itself is used, for instance, as a 
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battle cry for wars just as it is for prayer.387 One important aspect of the mosque is the education 
and jurisprudence that take place in it today and throughout Islamic history. 
According to some commentators, Islamic education has remained, for the most part, 
informal and associated with individuals instead of institutions.388 The vital individualistic nature 
of Islamic learning can be seen in a phenomenon developed by the scholars that helped to 
facilitate it. Scholars care about their teachers and masters more than about their institutions, and 
this is evidenced by the fact they rarely make any mention of an institution. Students’ attention 
evolves around the teacher who then forms a learning circle (halaqah) in which they administer 
the learning process.389 Companionship (suhbah) is highly valued as an effective method in this 
informal learning. The admission process of this informal learning is absent and there are no 
requirements for “applications” if anything can even be called as such.390 The selection of 
scholars teaching in learning circles and informal madrasa is informal as well in the sense that it 
operates through the mechanism of social reputation and through an individual’s 
recommendations.391 As it is today, the “journey of knowledge” in medieval Islam was never 
structured, standardized, or stationary.392 The importance of studying under sheiks builds into the 
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individuality feature of learning, which overlaps with the lack of comprehensive corporatehood 
discussed earlier.393 After all, the “madrasa was but a glorified halaqah”.394 
While Hoexter notes that informality characterizes the pre-eighteenth century,395 there is 
evidence this informality extends to the centuries after that.396 Some think that it is just a feature 
of medieval times and that modern Islamic thought should assume the more formal features of its 
Western counterparts. In fact, it is this feature of informality that seems to be a fundamental 
feature of the Muslim understanding of studying religion—a quality that preserves religion from 
being used or monopolized by one group, state or body. This free-floating authority is what 
always succeeded in achieving two goals: one is ensuring the non-theocratic nature of Islamic 
authority (a civil demand), and the other is to protect Islam from being distorted or 
misinterpreted (a religious demand).397Informality in the latter is a way to protect the principles 
while in the former it helps keep scholars away from coercive power. 
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3.4.7 Ulama of Crisis  
A striking feature of Muslim scholars is that, while they do not just remain a popular force 
during crises and upheavals, they tend to play a more important role during extraordinary times. 
This role and phenomenon just asserts the quality of their operation as a work beyond the 
constitutional arrangement. Scholars do not collapse as political or constitutional systems do, but 
instead grow in importance at such times. This is due to the scholars’ nature, their relationship to 
society, and to their ever-lasting meta-constitutional sphere. 
Muslim scholars’ authority precedes political arrangements because it is established by 
principles and values that the public observes and follows. Preexisting morals and rules are by 
and large shaped by the scholars and their interaction with the people and texts.398 It is, then, 
fairly common to see the popular values that are typically represented by ulama prevail during 
times of tension or even mayhem, as it seems that their responsibility grows as much as problems 
do. Crises like invasions, conflicts, civil wars, and transitions remind us of the importance of 
jurists and their relationship to people. This could also explain the nature of scholarly “retreat” 
from politics at times when an issue is merely and purely political.399 
Despite the jurisprudential differences, “[d]uring clashes and near anarchy, jurists were 
determined to maintain a unified Islamic community by blurring the lines between their 
intellectual traditions.”400 This saved shared values from being jeopardized. At the same time, 
this attitude introduced scholars as having the basic quality needed in order to be brokers, 
mediators, and peacemakers between rivals or between ruler and the ruled.401 
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Ulama acquired a more active role in politics during the wars between the Ottomans and 
Mamluk due to the fact that both sides wanted to align with the scholars to appeal to the public 
and their morals. Nonetheless, the scholars’ role fell short of exercising direct involvement and, 
at times, they reinforced their position of neutrality and mediation.402 This active role grew even 
more pronounced with the onset of colonization. Hence, the status of the scholars was essential 
after the Hispano-Moroccan war when ulama burst on the scene as a powerful political and 
social force.403 During the foreign influence and occupation, ulama took the lead and inspired the 
public as they did in Morocco in regards to the French influence.404 During and after the French 
occupation of Egypt (1798-1801), the ulama rose as popular representatives. One commentator 
described this phase as the “golden age of the ulama.”405 
The role of Ulama seems to increase dramatically with crises because they reside in a 
sphere that is not political but, nevertheless, all political forces seek their support. While political 
players seek support from these meta-constitutionalists, society, in its turn, resorts to them to 
guard its interests and values. The following section will look at the example of Inquisition. 
3.4.8 The Meta-Constitutional Sphere (the Case of Inquisition “Mihna”) 
In this subsection, a famous case in Islamic history about the relationship between the ruler and 
the jurists can explain the fight over the sphere that seemed meta-constitutional for the jurists but 
not for the ruler. This alarmed the ulama, represented by Ibn Hanbal, and caused them to fight 
for their own sphere and protect the domain that essentially carries and interprets Sharia. The 
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case of Inquisition tells the story of always-persisting domain of ulama. It explains why modern 
ulama are always inspired by Ibn Hanbal’s boldness and steadfastness to do whatever it takes to 
protect their meta-constitutionalism. 
The basic facts of the Inquisition are that al-Mamun, an Abbasid caliph (d. 833), with the 
help of some Mu‘tazili406 qadis officially adopted the notion that the Quran was created by God. 
By this move, the caliph diverged from the mainstream theological understanding that the Quran 
was an eternal attribute of God revealed and brought down at the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad. The caliph decided that he would force the jurists to approve his belief. Al-
Mamun’s decision led to the Inquisition that introduced Ahmed bin Hanbal as the theological 
voice of dissent who, for the cause, paid a steep price in loss of freedom and corporal 
punishment. The Inquisition lasted a long time and involved two caliphs after al-Mamun.407 
The analysis of the Inquisition is beyond the scope of this dissertation but the case of the 
Inquisition helps us understand the meta-constitutional sphere. As far as our issue of the social 
and political dimensions of the Inquisition is concerned, I can deduce three approaches to 
understanding the dispute.  
At first glance, the events could be seen as a conflict between the political and the 
religious. This analysis tends to portray the Inquisition as a dispute over power and presence—a 
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political conflict that used theological debates to cover them.408 The second approach interprets 
the Inquisition as a dispute between two sets of scholars. One commentator describes it as a 
struggle between “philosophical theology” and “juridical theology.”409 Someone who adopts this 
approach finds that the Inquisition was an attempt by the Caliph and his allies within the ulama 
to use power to adopt an official version of Islamic theology. This then provoked a fierce defense 
from the residents of the public sphere that the jurists and Ibn Hanbal occupied against such 
outside intervention.410  
The third approach, and the best way to understand the debate, is that, despite the 
theological nature of the conflict, the conflict was not merely between two sets of ulama but 
between two different spheres. The crisis arose when the political sphere decided to infringe on 
the other sphere using the scholars of the political realm.411 It is not a clash between two groups 
competing for power but rather a struggle in which one sphere was fighting for its independence 
and the other sought to dominate it. The meta-constitutional sphere that works as a free space for 
scholars to conduct their debates and develop their jurisprudence outside the control and 
manipulation of the political was threatened. As a result, the scholars that Ibn Hanbal represented 
were alarmed, so they acted to protect Sharia and its rulings by preventing political intervention. 
This move worked perfectly and a lesson was learned for centuries to come. Then, the modern 
tale of the scholars toward the state’s infringement of the scholars’ own domain is not a fight 
between statesmen and “clergy” nor is it between the profane and the sacred or merely between 
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two political rivalries.412 Rather, it is probably a struggle of the scholars to protect their meta-
constitutional sphere as they always do. 
3.4.9 The Domain of the Political 
Explaining how the meta-constitutional sphere works, especially in the case of the Inquisition, 
brings us to the issue of the scope of this sphere. In this section, I argue that the issue of 
enforcement and execution of the law go beyond the scope of this sphere. 
One historian notes that from 1190-1350 the religiously active Damascus witnessed 
innumerable religious and theological disputes none of which saw the ruler step in. However, the 
ruler did intervene if public peace and security was seriously threatened.413 The medieval 
political mechanism in Islamic history was never to articulate a doctrine or establish a 
jurisprudence but would interfere only to protect society from public disturbances or to prevent 
the supporters of schools and madhabs from using force or turning the theological and 
jurisprudential conflicts into violent ones.414 
In the time of Muhammad Ali, scholars ceased participating directly in the 
government.415 Later, they refused to choose a leader to rule among themselves despite the lack 
of an alternative.416 Nikki Keddie asserts that Sunni ulama may occasionally decide to depose 
rulers legally, but “they never acquired an independent [political] power.”417 This is evidence of 
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why the ulama do not just fit better in the meta-constitutional sphere but also why they typically 
do what they do and why they refuse to go beyond. 
It seems that the jurists refuse to be a part of the government because they know that 
rulers and political leaders can collapse and be substituted—a situation that does not align itself 
well with the position that jurists and scholars want for Islamic law and its role. 
To conclude, the meta-constitutional sphere from its very early existence was never an 
executive or coercive power. It relegated the implementation of the rules and laws agreed upon 
with the body in charge whether it was the ruler, the political or the executive power, as we know 
it today. 
In this section, I attempted to present the proposal of the meta-constitutional sphere that 
conforms to the traditions of the scholars and is possible in today’s society. The following and 
final section is devoted to the concept of autonomy among ulama.  
3.5 AUTONOMY, NOT POWER 
In the previous three sections, I situated the religious institutions in the Islamic context focusing 
on their metaphorical meaning. Then, I discussed the roles of the scholars and those “religious 
institutions,” emphasizing their positions as non-bureaucratic groups and individuals. The third 
section introduced the idea of the meta-constitutional sphere as a normative and descriptive locus 
of authority and operations of the scholars and jurists in modern times. In this fourth and final 
section of this chapter, I consider the concept of the autonomy of the scholars, asserting its 
importance in the scholarly context if the scholars’ metaconstitutional role is to be maintained 
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and concluding that the autonomy that they seek is by no means a quest for power in the political 
sense. 
This section thus first focuses on the notion of autonomy among scholars, then turns to 
the ulama’s inherited practice in said autonomy. Then, the following subsections deal with the 
autonomy of schools and their economic independence. The case of al-Azhar in Egypt explains 
why autonomy matters. The final point made in this section is discussed in the “not power” 
subsection and stresses the necessity of the power-free feature in the meta-constitutional sphere 
that allows ulama to work freely and autonomously.  
3.5.1 Traditional Literature Against Dependence on Rulers 
The famous Islamic jurist Al-Suyuti (d. 1505) authored an inclusive book that can be translated 
as “Narrations from Prophets and his Followers Warning Against Coming to the Sultan’s Court 
and Place.” In this book, Al-Suyuti cited about forty narrations of the prophet warning against 
the practice of coming to the ruler or being associated with the power.418 One authenticated 
narration reads, “Whoever comes to the door of the sultan will be tempted, and the closer 
someone gets to the sultan, the farther he gets from Allah.”419 A number of sayings attributed to 
the prophet warn against ulama al-sultan (the government’s scholars).420 One saying asserts, “the 
most hateful in the sight of Allah are the [Quran] reciters who visit the rulers”; another describes 
the scholars who visit the rulers as “thieves.”421 This narration values the scholars but makes an 
important exception for scholars who “mix with the sultans” describing them as “betraying the 
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Prophets.”422 There are another sixty narrations that are attributed to the prophet’s companions 
and followers denouncing similar associations with the rulers.423 
After citing countless narrations and stories advising against ulama al-su’ (the scholars of 
evil), al-Ghazali divides scholars into three types according to their relation to the rulers: those 
who come to the sultans, those whom the sultans come to, and those who distance themselves 
from the sultans altogether. He classified the first as “scholars of evil,” the second as “less evil,” 
and the third are the safest.424 
Interestingly, in his book devoted to uncovering the tricks of the Devil, Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 
1201) considered going to the rulers, even for “good reasons,” as a trick of the Devil because 
establishing this type of relationship with the rulers would jeopardize the piety, honesty, and 
neutrality of the scholar.425 Although Al-Subki (d. 1369), in his turn, followed this tradition and 
spent pages warning against mixing with the rulers, he allowed it only to “correct the wrong, to 
defend the right, or to denounce injustice”.426 
Scholars who were associated with governments are historically criticized, while those 
who were independent are praised for living up to principles.427 Even when rulers received 
ulama in their assemblies to show respect for the scholars and be patrons of their scholarships, 
ulama were strongly discouraged from participating in such visits.428 
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In conclusion, jurists avoided what was historically portrayed as “the sultan’s court or 
assembly”, Balaṭ al-Sultan, where the ruler sits, runs the state, and decides its matters. This 
avoidance was able to keep the autonomy of these jurists away from the ruler’s dominance.429  
3.5.2 Islamic Institutions Paradigm  
There is not only a collection of theoretical literature against religious dependence but this was 
also a long-standing actual practice of the ulama. The majority of scholars followed the tradition 
of not being associated with the political by distancing themselves from power.430 Independence 
does not mean that there was not pressure from the state or officials; it just meant they had 
autonomy to conduct their scholarly works and juristic debates away from the state’s control.431 
Some commentators observed that some jurists could be considered part of the state but 
only in the sense that they produce the law that somehow governs the polity even though they 
never worked in a state apparatus.432 This blessing of not being affiliated with the state is 
considered a curse in the eye of Kenneth Brown who sees the ulama’s remarkable characteristic 
of not occupying an official position a failure and a passive nature toward real and direct 
politics.433 On the other hand, Leon Brown attributes the tendencies of independence among 
some ulama in Tunisia to their native Arabic-speaking culture as a way to resist non-Arabian 
influence.434 However, both analyses overlook the long traditional role scholars played as 
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separate independent groups. This independence is what presents Islamic law as a structure 
established and developed outside the political control.435  
According to Hallaq, state intervention in medieval Islamic society is the exception, not 
the rule.436 Unlike the European nation-state setting, Islamic governance “remained largely aloof 
from the affairs of society.”437 The autonomy of the jurists marks the cornerstone of this society 
although autonomy was not interpreted the same by all ulama and depended on their assessments 
of the conditions and “public interests.” For example, some ulama would tolerate relationships 
with the state to some degree while others were keen to warn against any kind of communication 
with it.438 
Scholars always narrate with pride the stories of fellow scholars standing against a ruler’s 
overstepping.439 Some tell stories of a scholar refusing to kiss a ruler’s hand, take a gift, or rise 
for the ruler’s entrance. The continuous denial of association with the rulers is told with a sense 
of honor that distinguishes the scholars as independent and free.440  
3.5.3 The Ability to Dissent: The Independence of Mufti 
When we speak of the independence of ulama and muftis, we are referring to the fact that they 
do not have to protest against government or be part of dissenting groups in order to be qualified 
as independent. Rather, their ability to dissent and their way of showing their capability is, 
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sometimes, enough for sustaining independence especially within the space the jurists occupy 
and protect. 
In order for an individual to be a mufti, he or she needed to have the required knowledge 
and acquired the qualities for ijtihad. This knowledge was provided by a privately endowed 
system of education which makes the jurists indebted to none but to their own education and 
principles.441 Consequently, muftis acted outside the government and its control.  
In the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, there were jurisprudential works on politics by 
al-Mawardi (d. 1058), Abu Ya‘la (d. 1065), and Ibn Juma‘ah (d. 1241). Jackson labels these 
three jurists as “establishment ulama” who worked in the government to legitimize the state.442 
These jurists and others are examples of the phenomenon that happens regularly in Islamic 
history where ulama served in government but not qua ulama. Although against the paradigm, 
this did not prevent the establishment of an even wider space outside the government for these 
jurists to work along with other ulama outside of state influence entirely, in a meta-constitutional 
sphere, where they debated issues of an Islamic nature. 
The autonomy of the jurists was a matter that was always contested by political 
authorities. Tireless attempts of the rulers to control jurisprudence never stopped. Between the 
years 1150 to1260, the ruling elite in Syria heavily contributed to supporting public institutions. 
This facilitated more influence on the institutions but never marked a transformation toward 
politically controlled jurists thanks to the leverage the scholars had on the rules and 
jurisprudential principles. Unlike Talmon-Heller who sees rulers’ contribution in establishing 
schools as a transition toward controlled institutions, the ruling elite’s having institutions named 
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after them and their contribution to the support of these institutions were not enough to constitute 
dominant governmental control of these institutions.443 
Another aspect of the political attempts to control jurisprudence was the appointment of 
the post of mufti from the thirteenth century onward, but this did not mark a transition toward the 
dominance of state-affiliated religious establishments. Before that, there was, actually, no such 
thing as a “mufti post,” for example.444 Even when the first post of mufti was introduced in 
Damascus with the creation of Dar al-‘adl, or the House of Justice, in the fourteenth century, the 
move was trivial and left no traces in Syria.445 This appointment had not been that significant in 
the issue of ulama’s independence because the whole separate sphere of religious and juristic 
debates was still dominant and paradigmatic. The Seljuks were active in founding schools that 
trained scholars and officials.446 Later, the post of mufti was adopted by the Ottoman state.447 
Between 1570-1622, nine of the ten muftis of Istanbul taught in official schools and madrasas, 
and received a salary in return. Judges in the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries were then 
raised and trained in learning schools adopted by the state.448 Still, jurists retained an important 
measure of autonomy throughout this period despite the rise in state involvement in juristic 
activities. 
The turning point was during the nineteenth century Tanzimat, when the chief mufti, 
Sheikh al-Islam (in Turkish, Seyhulislam) became part of the state and its bureaucracy. At the 
point, there then existed the official ulama that were appointed by the state or at least appointed 
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to act as a part of it. Those ulama that accepted the deal of the government justified their 
positions by the claim that they were trying to bring about Islamic achievements. In response to 
this implied bargaining, they were harshly criticized for their softness toward the sultans and the 
state.449 According to one researcher, the relationship between the rulers and this kind of ulama 
was a “patron-client relationship.”450 While rulers showed respect and recognition toward these 
scholars, the scholars provided legitimacy and cooperation. This arrangement maintained 
harmony between the state and these particular scholars. The official ulama in Libya, Egypt, 
Tunisia and Algeria had similar roles and shared a similar mentality.451 
This phenomenon of official ulama raises concern that Islamic law fell into the hands of 
the state instead of independent jurists. Notwithstanding their official nature, even these ulama 
that were incorporated in the political sphere tried, sometimes, to act on social and religious 
issues independent from the political sphere.452 The idea here is that even official ulama could 
serve in the meta-constitutional sphere as scholars rather than officials. In any event, having 
official ulama does not prevent the community of scholars from producing other factions that are 
never official, and at times, more popular.  
The phenomenon of official ulama leaves them being less legitimate, because of their 
association with the state, compared to the more popular ulama outside the state, who pushed the 
former faction to act independently to affirm their autonomy. In the end, attempts at making 
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ulama official carry contradicting elements because they go against the nature of the role and 
duties of Muslim scholars. 
3.5.4 The Power of Appointments 
One key indicator of the independence of scholars is the power of appointment. If the 
government controls appointments and is able to set posts for jurisconsults, influence their 
functions and control their pay, the independence of jurists is absolutely at question. 
While the appointment of qadi is a very old and necessary practice if the state is to 
adjudicate disputes and administer criminal punishment, the mere existence of the post of mufti, 
let alone the appointment of the mufti, is at odds with traditions and practice in Islamic history 
and jurisprudence. One historian describes the issue of appointing judges as a formality and a 
confirmation of already existing leadership and juristic authority more than establishing or 
influencing it. Similarly, the appointment of a scholar in a madrasa is more like a procedure that 
confirms already qualified candidates because of their academic works. In some schools that 
enjoyed more independence in respect to their procedures and curricula, the whole process was 
exercised within the school itself. The ruling elite would attempt to expand their influence from 
mere formalities and procedures to real power and control, but they were rarely successful.453 
In the course of appointing religious posts that expanded from judges to teachers in 
schools, the most threatening move consisted of late Ottoman attempts to appoint jurisconsults, 
jurists, and scholars. These attempts introduced an overlap between religious and government 
posts, with more ulama assuming official positions and being exposed to the direct influence and 
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control of the government. The ulama’s response to the appointment of scholars and jurists in 
public positions was typically negative due to traditions that respected their hostility to political 
influence as explained above. Some historians note that scholars, in accepting public offices, 
stipulated that they would maintain their independence and freedom.454 
In Richard Repp’s account, by the sixteenth century, “mufti” became an office and was 
the highest position of the learning ranks. The mufti was able to fulfill different tasks inside and 
outside the government. While the law of the Ottoman Empire (Kanunname) gives attention to 
religious rules and posts, it does not provide specifics on how to establish a scholar or a jurist. 
The chief mufti Abussauud Efendi (d. 1574) provided a rule for a scholar to be appointed to a 
school. The rule required that the candidate acquire a recommendation and the support of high-
ranking scholars. Thus, the sultan would appoint only the chief mufti, and this would allow the 
government to influence the official religious jurisconsults, and later the government could 
appoint more scholars with the consultation from this chief mufti.455 
From the mid sixteenth century onward, corruption in posts for teachers became an issue, 
particularly with the unqualified sons of teachers being appointed to the same posts their fathers 
had had. The government tried to coerce official ulama into more government offices by 
appointing some ulama as ministers, but some refused the proposal because it would undermine 
the remaining elements of their independence. The struggle for independence continued among 
the ulama for centuries. In other Islamic, especially Arab, territories, the eighteenth-century 
ulama exercised what some call a “de-facto autonomy” although the ruler could overstep and use 
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his influence through appointment. The rulers varied in respecting the independence of scholars 
as some would be more willing to appoint scholars, muftis, imams etc. while others were 
reluctant to jeopardize their relationship with the learning ranks by using political influence.456 
In light of the long experience of scholars and the relentless attempts of the government 
to make them state officials subject to state authority, the power of appointment of figures in 
religious institutions had two dimensions. One was to include scholars and jurists in public 
offices and government ministries, while the other was to establish official governmental posts 
for religious functionaries like jurists, scholars, and jurisconsults. 
Was it just an expected evolution when religious learning became official and linked to 
an official appointment that gave "ulama" their names? Or was it just a path some religious 
institutions took, while other ulama and scholars stayed true to tradition and operated outside 
official appointment and government? In this context, it is important to note that the power of 
appointment was but a tool of the political machine to challenge the independence of the 
scholars. Thus, while the post somehow became an important political appointment, the scholars 
tended to distance themselves from it and thus limit the effectiveness of the tool.  
An important example of the jurist tendency to avoid official posts is their refusal of the 
post of qadi. The long-established reservation of ulama toward political appointment is reflected 
in their historic refusal to accept the post of qadi. Al-Suyuti, who wrote warning against the 
“scholars of the devil” who are associated with the government, also wrote another book warning 
against accepting the post of judge, citing traditions and stories that upheld his position.457 Then, 
he mentioned further reports about scholars and jurists refusing to take the post of judge as part 
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of the scholars’ tradition and a sense of piety, honor, and independence. The most trusted jurists 
in Islamic jurisprudential history adopted this tradition and refused qadiship.458 Hallaq notes: 
The Islamic legal literature is replete with references to the 
precarious and dubious role of qadis as agents of corrupted 
politics. The qadi, until the Ottoman era, was the only legal 
functionary that was exclusively appointed, paid and dismissed by 
government agencies.459 
The refusal of the post of judge was a juristic challenge to the government’s taking over juristic 
work. It demonstrated the weight that scholars give to support the sphere they reside in and the 
struggle they are willing to go through in order to protect their domain and keep it free and 
independent from political influence. 
The following subsection will deal with the issue of the independence of juristic and 
religious schools (madrasas). 
3.5.5 Independence of Schools 
When we speak of independence of any institution from the influence of power, an important 
element is the control or lack of control of education. “Learning was usually, if not always, put to 
the service of the powerful.”460 In regards to this previous quote, Muslim scholars and jurists 
struggled, and still struggle, to keep their authority over learning out of the control of the 
powerful. From different parts of Islamic history, scholars of high repute have fought against 
political authorization or control of Islamic learning procedures, curricula, and staff. The 
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consensus of ulama and their jurisprudence on different issues of Islamic teaching was a leading 
force in deciding staff, teachers, and candidates.461 
In different parts of the Islamic world, madrasas (schools), or their equivalent as learning 
institutions, are a premier way by which the scholars can defend their authority.462 If Ulama are 
stripped from their independent Islamic learning institutions, they resort to mosques, halaqas 
(learning circles) and private sermons to continue their education beyond state control. Halaqas 
in the mosques are harder to control because mosques belonged to God. Thus, the government 
could maneuver only minimally so as to not provoke the Islamic public.  
The informality that we emphasized earlier was one method to keep the schools and other 
religious facilities from the direct influence of the powerful. Ijazah (authorization) is a 
mechanism taking advantage of informality whereby the scholars make sure that the legacy of 
Islamic learning reaches potential scholars and future generations of jurists without government 
influence. Ijazah is an informal document issued by senior scholars to younger and less 
authorized ones in order to differentiate between individuals authorized by the community and 
others who are formally appointed by non-scholastic, mostly political, bodies. Throughout 
history, political authorities rarely intervened in such processes because any effort by the ruler to 
politicize them would be disastrous to the Islamic learning community, as it would seem an 
attempt to distort Islamic heritage and would shake the political authorities as well.463 
Makdisi made a remarkable comparison of the process of the authorization to teach in the 
Islamic experience and that of the West. He notes that the authorization to teach in the West 
emerged two centuries after it first appeared in the Islamic world. While in medieval Islam this 
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authorization was in the hands of scholars and the learning community and was independent of 
politics, in the West, it was solely in the hands of the pope, the king, and the emperor. “It was too 
long before the practice of issuing authorization independently became universal- may be 1229.” 
The process of authorization was religious and independent in Islamic history, but in the West, it 
became independent as it became more secular.464 
At the beginning of the Ottoman influence in the Muslim world, a number of qadis and 
madrasa teachers were not even official school graduates. Later, the Ottomans tried to restrict 
official religious positions to official schools graduate.465 While most madhabs in response 
gradually adopted formal, official schools for education, the Hanbalis refrained. They had their 
reservations and feared that the ruler could later control these schools.466 
The Ottomans worked hard in other ways as well to institutionalize schools and 
madrasas, and promulgated codes to organize these learning institutions.467 According to one 
researcher, the learning places in Islam developed from the masjid to the masjid-inn complex, to 
the madrasa and other institutions. In any event, the madrasa lived actively and contributed to 
the formation of religious learning but halaqas and informal religious education are still 
dominant and administered in an individualistic fashion. This was the first phase of madrasa in 
Egypt when it tended to be more independent and centered around scholars despite the existence 
of institutionalized madrsas.  
Efforts to increase political control over religious institutions of learning increased during 
the period of Muhammad Ali Pasha (d. 1849). The project of marginalizing the religious 
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madrasas and producing modern-style schools in Egypt started in fact in earnest with 
Muhammad Ali Pasha. Parallel to his efforts, the most prestigious Islamic schools, like al-
Qarawiyyin in Morocco and al-Zaytuna in Tunisia, were likewise targeted by relevant 
government authorities for “reforms” that intended to place the secular government in charge of 
Islamic education through moves a government had never before dared in Islamic history.  
The third phase of madrsa transformation occurred during large transformation in 
Muslim society toward formal education that was undertaken in the twentieth century especially, 
after the 1950s.468 European governments, and later national states, in Muslim countries decided 
to employ the term “useful learning” to redefine education according to the state building 
officials and authorities after long being in the hands of the Islamic professors, teachers and 
scholars. The scholars own criteria of “useful knowledge” were replaced by standards set by the 
state emulating the Western-style of education. Religious madrasas were brought under the 
surveillance of the state at the same time.469  
The next subsection will deal with the economic aspect of independence represented by 
the Islamic jurisprudential concept of waqf (endowment). 
3.5.6 Economic Independence (Waqf) 
A waqf is established by a Muslim individual to contribute to maintaining the public welfare and 
creating a sphere outside political control.470 Muslim scholars were fortunate to have waqf 
(endowment) as a mechanism to protect their economic autonomy. They developed 
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jurisprudence for the waqf according to Islamic rules and principles and laid out details for 
organizing the work of endowments throughout history.  
A central theme that appears in Islamic jurisprudence in regard to endowments is the 
principle of shart al-waqif (the terms of the endower). With this agreed-upon principle, jurists 
firmly declared that endowments must be run according to the terms of the endower, not the 
terms of the rulers, jurists, nobles, or anyone else.471 With the laws and rules of endowment set 
by the scholars, ulama operated as a check on these endowments. The facilities introduced by the 
waqf served the public and stayed true to the reasons of their foundation. Once an endowment is 
announced, it becomes independent from any person, body or state including the endower.472 
Even endowments that were meant to politically influence the religious community failed to be 
political tools of the governments because of the conditions and rules of waqf set by the jurists.  
Another important theme that is shared in the different schools of Islamic jurisprudence is 
that the endowed object, land, or service could never return to the endower, and that the endower 
could not derive any special benefit from the endowment he or she establishes.473 This is a result 
of a jurisprudential consensus that beneficiaries should get their portions in full according to the 
original terms.474  
Thanks to the system of waqf, the endowments of schools, libraries, and public facilities 
in general proliferated and made up an economically independent sphere that protected them 
from state interference. Numerous madrasas, libraries, hostels, public houses, and mosques that 
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are endowments by definition in Islam, existed and funded the very meta-constitutional sphere 
they functioned within.475 According to Makdisi, the reasons given in the West to establish 
incorporated colleges/universities are all found in the waqf or charitable trust: inviolability and 
perpetuity.476 
The administrator of any endowment cannot be appointed politically but only by the 
founder of the endowment, and scholars supervise the process while judges enforce it.477 The 
chief judge may be entitled to administer endowments that do not have a specified administrator 
designated by the endower, but the endowments themselves are kept away from political 
influence.478 Compensation for professors, hostels, and funds that pay the schools’ and 
institutions’ expenses come from the endowments and sometimes from fees paid by participants 
in their activities, including students.479 
After centuries of prosperity through endowments and their role in constituting the 
independence of scholars, the rulers established big endowments in order to stipulate their terms 
over education. However, the endowments still served the public interests stipulated in the 
Islamic jurisprudence. One historian confirms that in some cities before the sixteenth century 
some waqfs from ruling elites served 80% of public purposes, indicating that they were largely 
not for the ruling elites’ own interests.480 
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In the medieval Islamic world in an extreme case where the ruler decided to infringe on 
the basic process and principles of waqf and intervene, the public represented by the vocal ulama 
and general scholars took to the “street” and mosques in protest and take back the economic 
resource of their sphere.481 
In the beginning of modern times, one of the calamities of the state “reforms” in the 
Muslim and Arab world was the appropriation of charitable waqfs and independent institutions. 
This rich resource that used to finance knowledge, jurisprudence and public services was taken 
by the state to feed the people of power. According to Rahemtulla, this move by the state had a 
“devastating impact on al-Azhar,” one of the most prestigious Islamic institutions in the Muslim 
and Arab world, “as these endowments constituted almost one-fifth of all cultivated lands in 
Egypt.”482 
The effort to change the waqfs’ supervision provoked the official grand mufti of al-Azhar 
who confronted Ismail Khedive, the ruler of Egypt at the time (d. 1895), when the latter was 
trying to put waqfs under government control.483 
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Infringement on the economic independence of al-Azhar was just the beginning of a 
series of violations and interferences in al-Azhar’s independence. The following subsection will 
discuss the issue of independence in the case of al-Azhar. 
3.5.7 Al-Azhar, the Issue of Independence 
Al-Azhar was first established and completed in 972 during the Fatimid rule in Egypt. The 
Fatimid ruler who founded it was al-Mu‘izz li-Din Allah al-Fatimi (d. 975). The Fatimid rule 
attributed their dynasty to the daughter of the Prophet (Fatimah), and this is why they called the 
Mosque, and later the institution, “al-Azhar” deriving from “al-Zahra’,” the title used to describe 
Fatimah in Islamic literature. After decades of being dedicated to the Isma‘ili, a Shia sect, al-
Azhar was embraced by the majority of Sunni in Egypt and became a jurisprudential stop for 
students in the Islamic world. The mosque that included different learning circles developed into 
an institution of learning associated with the mosque and linked to its scholars and teachers.484 
After centuries of independence in funds, process, and administration, the Ottomans’ rule 
of Egypt in the sixteenth century began to provide more support to al-Azhar.485 The mujawir, 
students dedicated to knowledge, were a self-arranged study group of young scholars to seeking 
knowledge from leading scholars. In al-Azhar, the self-arranged study of mujawir became an 
organized system in the style that is currently used. This transformation occurred as a result of 
the centralized administration and the increasing role of the state and its involvement.486 
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Al-Azhar’s affiliates, from time to time, have the honor of acting independently of 
anyone’s influence. They rely on God alone and His support, as they would say. Al-Azhar’s 
square and campus were once considered parliament-like sites where the matters of people and 
the interests of the public were discussed and debated. From al-Azhar, wars were declared, 
protests took place, decisive decisions were made, and, above all, jurisprudence and Islamic 
sciences were taught.487 Every rival sought the support of al-Azhar as a way to gain legitimacy 
and the trust of the public. Despite al-Azhar’s active involvement, its scholars rejected proposals 
that announced them as a political class because political decision-making was “outside their 
jurisdiction doctrinally and historically.”488 It was actually against the rules of their meta-
constitutional sphere they occupy. 
The independence of al-Azhar had been a target of the Egyptian state since the time of 
Muhammad Ali Pasha when the positions of ulama were curtailed despite the role of ulama in 
bringing him to office. Public figures started to disagree on how much al-Azhar could participate 
in public issues, and this was an alarming signal of the change carried out by the state to try to 
control al-Azhar.489 
A package of “reforms” contained the introduction of the position of the head of al-
Azhar. The “Mufti of Egypt,” a post different from the Head of al-Azhar, was also introduced at 
a later time, and it became the highest office authorized to deal with Islamic issues. Article 153 
of the (1923) Constitution of Egypt entitles the King to supervise, appoint officials and decide 
the budget for religious institutions. After these reforms became law, Al-Mahdi (d. 1897), then 
the head of al-Azhar, was the first to be the mufti of the state, and he was seen as pro-
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government. During the Urabi revolution, the dismissal of al-Mahdi was considered a victory for 
the revolutionaries.490 
After the 1952 Revolution, the state adopted the project of trying to undertake the 
“nationalization of al-Azhar” meaning bringing it entirely under the state’s control. The project 
started by trying to portray al-Azhar as the only institution and body authorized to publicly deal 
with religious issues and issue fatwas in order to monopolize religious interpretation in a state-
controlled institution. The ulama attempted to obstruct this change and succeeded by blocking 
the 1961 law that was supposed to officially “nationalize” al-Azhar.491 Many al-Azhar affiliates 
protested the state’s attempts and supported the ulama in their efforts.492 However, in the same 
year, the state was nonetheless able to place al-Azhar under the Ministry of Endowment, and the 
office of sheikh al-Azhar became an official state one, whose leader was appointed by, and could 
be dismissed by, the government. The different madrasas and schools were brought under the 
centralized Azhar’s administration, and in turn controlled by the state as well.493 To buy the 
ulama’s silence, the state provided al-Azhar with financial support. The Sheikh of al-Azhar 
became associated with state’s policies, and was described by critics as the “state’s puppet” who 
served the government interests and justified its policies.494 
To claim some autonomy, the state allowed a relatively active role for al-Azhar but 
within limits decided by the state and its law.495 In Mustafa’s account, the Egyptian government 
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was forced to accept the bargain of allowing Al-Azhar to exercise a more active role but imposed 
moderate Islamic reform as the government became increasingly dependent on Al-Azhar for 
religious legitimation.496 Ironically, the legitimacy of the official Azhar itself was at stake. 
Continuous government control had shaken the absolute trust al-Azhar had, and, according to 
some, had indirectly contributed to the emergence of Islamic militants.497 
One commentator notes that the project of “nationalizing” and controlling al-Azhar 
brought it under the government and produced new political behavior among ulama. The 
response was not submission or containment, but rather the development of a more diverse 
community of ulama that ranged from submissive to resistant. While bringing al-Azhar into 
state’s supervision gave it an official platform for expression, it provoked the independent 
tendencies of people by controlling both the official Azhar and the state.498 This new 
phenomenon is the subject of the next subsection. 
3.5.8 From the Non-establishment to the Peripheral Ulama 
In examining official religiosity and the state-affiliated ulama, we come across the extraordinary 
phenomenon that whenever there are state scholars, there is the rise of other scholars who are 
more vocal and resistant to the state and its discourse. 
In pre-modern history, Jackson talks about what he calls the “non-establishment ulama.” 
Ibn Taymiyyah seems to be an example of such a scholar as he refused to compromise on even 
minor jurisprudential opinions with rulers despite pressure, threats, and imprisonment.499 At the 
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beginning of modern times, al-Jabarti, another one of the non-establishment ulama, criticized 
some of the ulama of his time for being associated with the ruler and accepting rewards and gifts 
from him.500 Haim Gerber differentiates between two sets of ulama: one was close to the central 
government and graduated from state-adopted schools, while the other ulama enjoyed fewer 
privileges but maintained more independence.501 A more striking classification is the 
differentiation made between the official ulama and the knowledgeable ones, connoting that 
officializing ulama never created their authority or popularity.502 
The more the government attacks the autonomy of scholars and religious institutions, the 
more the community of scholars needs to prove its independence by producing dissent and 
resistance. The project of “nationalization” and “reforms” of al-Azhar produced what some label 
the “generation of rejectionists” and the rise of neo-ulama who attempted to protect autonomy 
through scholarly dissent.503 The dissenting voices among ulama in Egypt grew during the 1950s 
and the 1970s, and the criticism of the state gained momentum.504 
Zeghal describes these dissenting voices among the modern community of scholars as 
“peripheral ulama,” as opposed to official ulama.505 Abd al-Hamid Kishk (d. 1996) is an 
example of one of these peripheral scholars. Kishk protested the regime’s proposals to control al-
Azhar and was jailed for it. He went beyond criticizing the government to criticizing al-Azhar for 
being governmental and serving state interests instead of Islamic ones.506 
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In 1992, the Ulama Front emerged as a response to the passivity of the official Azhar in 
the face of what they saw as government atrocities. The Ulama Front acted as a protesting entity 
in the community of scholars.507 The rise of this neo-ulama group was intended to restore some 
of the public trust and legitimacy that was challenged by the Islamists in general.508 
When the Egyptian government decided to undertake a plan to rehabilitate the radical 
Islamists, the scholars and figures that administered the dialogue and assumed this task were 
those peripheral ones whose legitimacy and trust were not an issue or at least less debated.509 In 
other words, the mediation needed autonomous scholars to work, even for a state that always 
attacked the autonomy of the scholars. The lesson here is if the autonomy of the jurists is 
compromised, it takes on a protesting and rebellious form which can only be managed by the 
presence of autonomous jurists. 
The previous subsections try to focus on the concept of independence in the Islamic 
jurisprudence by discourse and tradition. They also assert the idea that the independence of 
scholars does not mean a direct political power or clerical rule of society whatsoever. The “no-
power” part of the scholars’ role means not having clergy as the head of the state, as this ruling 
clergy contradicts the basic understanding of Muslim scholars, their traditional work, and their 
established literature. 
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3.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have aimed to craft a role that historically, and normatively fits the ulama’s 
nature according to their own literature and social dynamics in order to stabilize society and its 
religious authority. At the same time, it is an attempt to place the ulama in a locus that is 
constitutionally possible and plausible in today’s society. 
I have divided this chapter into four sections. I started by examining the concept of a 
“religious institution” in the Islamic context, and concluded that it is more important to look at 
religious institutions as imagined, rather than formal brick and mortar institutions. The fact that 
there is no comprehensive religious body leaves us with a dispersed authority within Sunni 
jurisprudence. 
The second section explains the different roles and modes of scholars and ulama focusing 
on their relationship to the political authorities especially in pre-modern times. 
The third section is devoted to the proposal that the meta-constitutional sphere is the 
locus of authority for scholars taking into account their modern dynamics. This sphere is not 
political but also not merely public. The case of the Islamic Inquisition (mihna) is discussed as a 
historical example to avoid in the Sunni subconscious. 
The fourth and final section discusses the concept of independence among these imagined 
and formal institutions of scholars and jurists. The ability to dissent that characterizes the 
medieval and modern jurists demonstrates the extent and importance of their autonomy 
intellectually and economically. The case of al-Azhar in Egypt was given special attention to 
show that infringing on scholars’ independence, as occurred in Egypt, produces the phenomenon 
of peripheral ulama that are even more independent and resistant. I, then, emphasized the idea 
that the independence of scholars is central to their nature, but this independence and the 
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autonomy of these Islamic institutions and scholars never means that they have power or political 
control. 
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4.0 CHAPTER THREE: THE OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS 
The issue of the modern constitutional setting and the role of Muslim scholars in the Muslim-
majority states is a way to test the traditional locus of these scholars—a forum explained in the 
previous chapter and described as the meta-constitutional sphere. The different constitutional 
experiments in the Muslim world provide different examples of how the Islamic elements and 
Islamic scholars are treated. Egypt is given special attention as a case study while other countries 
that share similar features, such as Pakistan, are included in some sections.510 
This chapter contains four main sections. The first section explores the current 
constitutional context in the Muslim and Arab world, and the different early phases of Islamic 
constitutionalism. The second section explains the role of Islamic scholars in the constitutional 
orders and in constitution-making. The scholars’ role is examined in two areas: law-making, and 
judicial adjudication. The third section discusses Islamic constitutional articles with special 
emphasis on Article 2 of the Egyptian constitutions. Then it will turn to the issue of authority of 
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interpretation and conclude with the judicial application of Islamic law in Egypt. The fourth and 
final section examines my two-prong proposal in the overlapping jurisdictions.  
The two-prong proposal is to recognize the traditionally established sphere that has dealt 
with Islamic jurisprudence and continue to strongly retain their space as a forum for Islamic 
jurisprudential debates and discussions. At the same time, in the state level, the legislature should 
be the main interpreter that poses a plausible solution constitutionally and Islamically. 
4.1 THE CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
This section attempts to introduce the early modern constitutional context of Muslim and Arabic 
countries. These early constitutional experiments witnessed an indisputable influence and 
presence of Islamic texts and jurisprudence. The following pages discuss the constitutional 
setting and the role of Islam in Islamic countries, as well as how the early constitutional 
experiments inspired the current position of Islam in these countries. The Egyptian case is going 
to be the focus of the second half of the section, taking into account prior development in the 
Ottoman Empire and the influence of various factors in the making of the current Egyptian 
constitutional order.  
4.1.1 The Constitutional Context 
During the Tanzimat Period, namely in 1839, the Ottoman Empire introduced an early 
constitutional document, Khatt-i Sherif (the Noble Rescript), to guarantee religious freedom and 
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equality throughout the region it ruled.511 About two decades later, namely in 1857, Tunisia 
followed in the Ottoman footsteps and introduced a similar document that served as a civil rights 
charter and was called ‘Ahd al-Aman (Pledge of Security). The charter was supposed to be a 
response to the call of Tunisian reformists who still demanded a more fundamental form of 
limited rule instead of absolute rule.512 
The Tunisian Pledge of Security increased the appetite of reformists to pressure the Bey 
government for participatory politics, which, in fact, led in 1861 to Qanun al-Dawlah (the Law of 
the State), the “first modern constitution in an Arabic country…[to] provide for a constitutional 
monarchy….”513 The constitution established a Grand Council that shared some responsibilities 
with the king of Tunisia, and provided some accountability. However, this constitutional 
experiment was short-lived (1861-64).514  
The Tunisian theorist Khayr al-Din Pasha (d. 1890), who was the father of the Tunisian 
Constitution of 1861, supported the limited-rule approach by citing Islamic texts and concluded 
that only participatory politics and political delegation could meet the Islamic requirement for 
governance.515  
Another influential drafter of that constitution is Ibn Abi al-Diyaf (d. 1874). In his 
writings, he rejected absolute rule whether religious or Sultanic, and presented the participatory 
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government as Islamic, supporting his argument with Islamic texts and reasoning. In Ibn Abi al-
Diyaf’s account, the ruler is accountable to God (His Law, Islamic law), and to the ummah that 
witnesses and signs the “promise” (contract) between them and the ruler.516 Ibn Abi al-Diyaf 
concluded, “[i]f the Sultan breaks his promise, the people then assemble at the tomb of [the 
ruler], and [this] meeting is a precursor to removing him from the throne.”517 
In the central Ottoman Empire, similar ambitions to those of the Tunisians raised the 
issue of constitution-building in the state. Subsequently, a committee of elites, composed of 
military, political, and religious leaders, was appointed by the sultan to draft the Constitution that 
was promulgated in 1876 and called Kanun-e Esasi (the Fundamental Law). Similar to the 
Tunisian case, this constitution was in force for only two years. Nonetheless, the Ottoman 
Constitution of 1876 “served as the basis for most Arab constitution writing in the twentieth 
century.”518  
Similar to Khayr al-Din Pasha and Ibn Abi al-Diyaf, Namik Kemal (d. 1888), who was 
one of the main drafters of the Ottoman Constitution in 1876, advocated a limited-government 
with some sort of separation of powers and supported his argument with Islamic texts and 
reasoning. Kemal defended the Constitution of 1876 and argued that it was fully compatible with 
Sharia.519 
This period may mark what Said Arjomand considers the first phase of Islamic 
constitutionalism—Islam as a limitation to government and legislation.520 There was no 
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assumption to reconstruct the system into a “Sharia-compliant” order. This never meant that 
Islam was irrelevant or insignificant, but it was as if Sharia was socially and politically assumed 
to be a responsibility of the ummah (nation) as whole, and that the system needed just a popular 
Islamic check more than a comprehensive Islamic reconstruction.521 The second phase, 
according to Arjomand, was when Islam came to be a basis of the whole system, as it appeared 
to be in post-colonial Muslim states. In this phase, the assumption seemed to be that the basis of 
the order was a comprehensive project that rebuilt the system according to Islam.522 The return to 
the “non-ideological Islamic constitutionalism” was the third phase when the idea of limited 
government enjoyed a comeback. The law is not merely “Islamic” but Islam is one significant 
element and a “source” of legislation among many others.523 
Rudiger Wolfrum provides another categorization where Islamic constitutionalism is 
examined primarily by its legal and political consequences. Muslim states differ between those 
who mainly support a symbolic acknowledgement of Islam, with limited consequences, and 
those who, on the other hand, support a more serious commitment to Islamic law “in which the 
organization and functioning of state power reflect a deep acknowledgement of Islam.”524 
The current constitutional orders in the Muslim world responded to the circumstances of 
their own countries and took different but relatively comparable directions.525 The Ottoman 
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Empire’s constitutional experiment influenced many Muslim countries and inspired some 
important elements in both structure and content. The next section concerns Egypt as a 
constitutional case influenced by the context of Islamic countries discussed in the previous 
section, and as an important experiment that influenced other countries as well.  
4.1.2 The Constitutional Framework in Egypt 
The first constitution-like document in modern Egypt was al-La’ihah al-Asasiyyah (the 
Fundamental Ordinance) in 1882, which was as a result of the Urabi Revolution, but Khedive 
Taufeeq aborted it and, instead, issued al-Qanun al-Nizami (the Organizational Law) in 1883. 
Under the British occupation, this Organizational Law in Egypt had placed powers in the hands 
of Taufeeq and abandoned the idea of an elected legislature. On the eve of World War I in 1913, 
the Organizational Law was revised to provide the legislature with a very limited power, but the 
experiment ended in 1915.526 
In the aftermath of World War I, a nationalist movement developed from the delegation 
that negotiated with the British in order to retain Egyptian autonomy. The movement became a 
nationalist party and was named “Hizb al-Wafd” (the Delegation Party) under the leadership of 
Saad Zaghlul. Al-Wafd translated the discontent of the Egyptians over British occupation into a 
                                                 
in a non-constitutional world.” BROWN, Constitutions in a nonconstitutional world: Arab basic laws and the 
prospects for accountable government 16-29. 2002.  
526 See, Mahmoud Hamad, The Constitutional Challenges in Post-Mubarak Egypt, 14 INSIGHT TURKEY, 2 
(2012).(The author, Mr. Hamad, seems to imply that the Egyptian constitutional experiment is unique and almost 
unprecedented in the region. However, the very neighboring Tunisia had its constitution in 1861. The Ottoman 
Constitution that governed most of Arab countries was drafted in 1876. Both were established decades before the 
Egyptian first formal Fundamental Ordinance in 1882);BROWN, Constitutions in a nonconstitutional world: Arab 
basic laws and the prospects for accountable government 26-41. 2002;MUHAMMAD NOUR FARAHAT & OMAR 
FARAHAT, AL-TARIKH AL-DUSTURI AL-MASRI: QIRA'AH MIN MANDHOUR THAWRAT 2011 YANAYIR 100-15 (The 
Arabic House for Sciences Publishers & others. 2011);Roder, The Separation of Powers in Muslim Countries: 
Historical and Comparative Perspectives 326. 2011. 
155 
popular mobilization that led to the 1919 Revolution. After extensive negotiations failed, the 
British unilaterally declared Egyptian independence as a monarchy in 1922, and this move 
resulted in the drafting of the 1923 Constitution. The 1923 Constitution provided some authority 
to the parliament but provided the king with the upper hand in the ability to dissolve 
parliament.527 
In 1952, a few “Free Officers” led a revolution and announced a Constitutional 
Declaration abolishing the constitutional monarchy and establishing a republican one. By 1971, 
three constitutions were drafted during the rule of Jamal Abdul-Nasser (d. 1970)—all 
constitutions were characterized by a lack of accountability and self-serving its government.528 
The 1971 Constitution was promulgated by Anwar al-Sadat (d. 1981) as an attempt to distance 
the republic from socialist policies and to incorporate some Islamic elements into the 
constitutional structure, as we will see in later sections. It proved to be a long-serving 
constitution (from 1971 to 2011) that introduced some novel elements into the Egyptian 
constitutional structure. The elements of Article 2 and the Supreme Constitutional Court, which I 
will discuss in different sections, are examples of elements that are still in force today. 
The Constitution of 1971, as amended in 2007, reflected its drafters’ intention of 
fashioning constitutional formalities to clothe non-constitutional operations. This means that 
constitutional procedures and articles were used to justify ends that are usually in the democratic 
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systems unconstitutional.529 Although it looked constitutionally democratic, this Constitution is 
blamed for establishing an authoritarian regime and for reinforcing the long arm of the executive 
and the ruling party that lasted for decades.530 The Constitution granted election for the office of 
president (Art. 76), asserted that the system in the country “is a multiparty one” (Art. 5), and 
declared that “[s]overeignty is for the people alone; they are the source of authority” (Art. 3).531 
From 1971 to 1979, legislation in Egypt was supposed to be exercised exclusively by the 
People’s Assembly while, in fact, Nasser was the de-facto legislator. From 1979 to 2014, another 
legislative chamber was introduced with less legislative and more advisory tasks called “Majlis 
al-Shura” (Consultative Council). In 1979, a referendum resulted in favor of introducing this 
Consultative Council as an upper house of the former structure of the parliament. Judicial power 
is in specialized administrative, criminal, civil, and, more importantly, constitutional courts. I 
will discuss this next. 
4.1.2.1 The Supreme Constitutional Court 
The embryonic form of the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) was the Supreme Court 
established by a presidential decree in 1969 in an attempt by Nasser’s regime to control judicial 
power and abort its independent tendencies. As such, the Supreme Court exclusively was given 
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the authority of judicial review, and was controlled by the executive by means of appointments, 
regulating the Court, its procedures and structure.532 
The 1971 Constitution introduced the current form of the Supreme Constitutional Court. 
The Constitution explains the powers of the Supreme Constitutional Court in Articles 174-8. 
Article 175 asserted that the Supreme Constitutional Court had the right of judicial review when 
it stated that it “has the exclusive competence to control the constitutionality of laws and 
regulations and to interpret the legislative texts….”533 Despite this article, the SCC had not been 
really established until 1979 as a gesture of the President Sadat’s faith in investment in economic 
growth in Egypt. By establishing the Court, he wanted to assure to foreign investors that Egypt 
was ruled by law and investors could enjoy stability. According to Mustafa Tamir, Nathan 
Brown, and Clark Lombardi, the SCC enjoyed considerable independence.534 
The SCC’s main power is to be the exclusive arbiter of disputed legislative 
interpretations, the final judge of judicial conflicts over jurisdiction, and a negative legislator by 
exercising the authority of judicial review.535 The SCC also practiced the gate-keeping function, 
which is to request litigants to bring cases to lower courts first; then the lower courts may 
authorize the challenger to bring the case to the SCC.536 
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The Court is composed of eleven judges including the Chief Judge, All were appointed 
through nomination by the General Assembly for the Court and approved by the president.537 
This process did not change much in terms of the SCC’s power, process, and appointment.538 
After a brief introduction to the constitutional framework, the next sections will introduce 
Islamic legislation in the constitutional structure in order for us to understand the ulama’s 
position and functions in the current setting. 
4.1.2.2 Islamic Codes in Modern Egypt 
Discussing Islamic codes in Egypt intends to portray how Islam was presented in the state by 
codes as a result of an implied sense of entitlement to legislation. Although inspired and 
influenced by jurisprudential works, the codes facilitated a departure from exclusive jurists’ law. 
One of the most influential codified Islamic law drafts was the Mejelle (in Turkish: 
Mecelle, literally: The Journal). The 16-chapter code was a precedent that was supposed to be 
followed by similar codes in different areas of law in order to be promulgated as the law of the 
land. The code inspired similar projects in different Islamic countries.539 
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A comparable code by a former minister of justice Qadri Pasha (Qadri’s Code) was 
introduced in Egypt by the 1870s.540 In the post-Urabi period (after 1882), the Egyptian 
government wanted to adopt the Code in order to convince the occupying power of its modernity 
as it remained a de jure part of the Ottoman Empire but a de facto colony.541 Later, the Qadri’s 
project was officially abandoned altogether, but the idea of codified law prevailed. 
Rudolph Peters described the shift toward codifications as a transformation from jurists’ 
law to statute law.542 In Lombardi’s account, by the codification period, Egypt embarked on a 
secularized law.543 In the aftermath of the 1919 Revolution, Egyptian influential elites did not 
adopt the project of Islamization, but, instead, embraced secularized codes and schools, which, 
according to Lombardi, “loosened the grip of ulama on legal theory.”544 
For Lombardi, Egypt reached the point of consensus to have positive law in the sense that 
all governing laws whether Islamic or civil should posited and codified.545 The public was not 
opposed to positive codes with the exception of ulama and their social forces. Some of the 
ulama’s reservations were on the grounds that classically-trained Islamic jurists should be 
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allowed to be more engaged in discussing and drafting laws and codes.546 Some others were 
more opposed to the idea of having a codified law that would pave the way for secularization.547 
One project tried to solve this dilemma of secularized codes, and attempted to provide an 
alternative that meets the procedural requirements for codes and, at the same time, reflects the 
content of Islamic jurisprudence. The project was undertaken by Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri (d. 
1971) who was one of the most important legal scholars in the Arab world in the twentieth 
century. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, al-Sanhuri called for a committee that supervised 
a comprehensive codified Islamic law that can be suitable for different Islamic countries.548 Al-
Sanhuri took it upon himself to establish codes. The Civil Code was a product of al-Sanhuri’s 
efforts and work alongside others. 
In response to al-Sanhuri’s venture in the 1940s, the Code was opposed by secularists as 
too Islamic, while the ulama and Islamists opposed it as not Islamic enough. The Code was seen 
by different groups as an unsuccessful compromise. The Islamists and the ulama were suspicious 
that the codification projects would set aside the traditional role of scholars.549 However, the 
supposed role of scholars was not clear, or at least not unanimous. 
The following part will discuss the different directions the modern Muslim countries took 
in respect to the role of scholars, whether legislative, judicial, or outside the state’s apparatuses. 
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4.2 THE ROLE OF SCHOLARS IN STATE’S INSTITUTIONS 
After introducing the constitutional context of the current orders of Muslim countries, this part 
will discuss the role of scholars in the constitutional setting with emphasis on the case of Egypt. 
The part will start by examining the legislative task of Islamic jurists and how they 
carried it out in constitutional or general legal structure. Then, I will discuss their judicial 
involvement whether in positive or Islamic courts. I will conclude this part by testing the idea of 
theocratic constitutionalism and constitutional Islamization projects, and focus on how scholars 
played their role. 
4.2.1 Jurists in Law Making 
This section will explore the legislative task given to Islamic jurists in the modern Muslim state. 
The Pakistani experiment was inspired by the early Iranian model of jurists’ involvement in 
legislatures. However, Egypt took a different path by not recognizing any official role for Islamic 
jurists per se with ambiguous recognition of Islamic jurisprudence in legislation. The legislative 
role could take the form of incorporating Islamic jurists into the legislature, establishing a 
committee partially made up of Islamic jurists, or handing over some legislative task to an 
Islamic jurisprudential institution. 
The opinions of Islamic jurists, individuals who articulate and interpret Islamic law, were 
expected to be considered to understand and apply the law. How to consider these opinions in 
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modern Muslim-majority states differed not just from state to state but also from one time and 
regime to another.550 
The Pakistani experience of the second half of the twentieth century and its attempt to 
involve jurists in law-making was inspired by its Iranian counterpart. Islamic jurists led the 
masses to victory during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1906-1911) and afterwards 
apparently impacted constitution-making.551 One key demand was that all legislation by 
parliament should be under the scrutiny of high-ranking Islamic jurists. This requirement of the 
jurists’ approval on legislation was incorporated into the Supplementary Fundamental Law 
adopted by the Iranian parliament in 1907.552 The task of scrutinizing legislation was entrusted to 
a committee of at least five Islamic jurists in order for any bill to pass in the parliament. 
Inspired by the Iranian model, the Pakistani state-building invoked some elements of 
involving ulama in the constitution-making and legislation-ratification. In 1949, the Pakistani 
constituent assembly established a committee of Muslim scholars to deal with Islamic 
jurisprudence.553 In the 1950s, some Pakistani scholars proposed that they should establish a 
committee entrusted with checking the Islamicity of legislation, but the idea was dropped after 
heated opposition. In 1955, the Constituent Assembly in the final Basic Principle Report deleted 
                                                 
550 Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Centrality of Sharia to Government and Constitutionalism in Islam, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES: BETWEEN UPHEAVAL AND CONTINUITY 48, (Rainer Grote & Tilmann 
Roder eds., 2011);FELDMAN, 28-74 (2008). 
551 Arjomand, ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, 117-9 (2007). About the Constitutional Revolution in 
Iran, see, MANGOL BAYAT, IRAN'S FIRST REVOLUTION: SHI'ISM AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION OF 1905-
1909 123-43 (Oxford University Press on Demand. 1991);Said Arjomand, The Kingdom of Jurists: 
Constitutionalism and Legal Order in Iran, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES: BETWEEN UPHEAVAL 
AND CONTINUITY 147-50, (Rainer Grote & Tilmann Roder eds., 2011). The Iranian model is not part of the 
discussion except for its impact on other countries like Pakistan.  
552 Arjomand, The Kingdom of Jurists: Constitutionalism and Legal Order in Iran 168. 2011;Arjomand, ANNUAL 
REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, 118&125 (2007). 
553 Ahmad, Activism of the Ulama in Pakistan 260-1. 1972. 
163 
mention of the committee of jurists.554 The attempt to engage ulama in official legislation in 
Pakistan did not succeed for different reasons—one important reason that concerns us here is 
“the traditional Sunni rejection of clericalism.”555 
More than three decades later and after different regime changes, in 1991, Nawaz Sharif, 
the Prime Minister of Pakistan, established a committee of members of parliament, lawyers and 
Islamic scholars to draft an Islamic bill that was directed at facilitating the “Enforcement of 
Sharia,” which passed in the parliament and became law. However, according to Charles 
Kennedy, the enforcement of that law was limited. Constitutional restraints played a major role 
in minimizing the impact of the law, along with the jurisdictional boundary the Pakistani High 
Court set against the application of it.556 
Unlike Pakistan, the Egyptian experiment in regards to Islamic scholars in legislation 
dates back to the nineteenth century. When Egypt was part of the Ottoman Empire, it was 
familiar with the role of Sheikh al-Islam (the Islamic Supreme Scholar) and his check on rulings 
in order to make sure they reflect Islamic jurisprudence. This system of juristic examination of 
laws affected Egypt, and formed its early understanding of law-making. In the attempts to 
transform the system toward positive law in the late nineteenth century, jurists from different 
schools were appointed to examine the laws and their Islamicity, though it was not clear what 
authority they had and if their decisions were binding or just advisory.557 
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For decades, ulama were still a major player but did not occupy a continuous legislative 
position. In the 1930s, scholars allied with King Fuad (d. 1936) presented him as a caliph in 
order to pressure him to adopt an approach that considered Islamic scholars in law-making. The 
political movement Young Egypt supported the scholars’ proposal to check the laws and Young 
Egypt backed the idea that jurists from al-Azhar examine laws to ensure their consistency with 
their interpretation of Islamic law.558 
The legislative ulama in the official sphere suffered a setback prior to the beginning of 
the 1970s. There are factors that contributed to this decline of the legislative ulama. One 
important factor is Nasser’s regime and its hostility toward any Islamic discourse that was 
portrayed as a “reactionary movement” that would block the socialist reforms of the regime. The 
Islamic mood of Sadat revived the demand for Islamic jurists’ involvement in legislation. In 
1976, al-Azhar established a committee that could suggest legislative reforms to insure that laws 
were consistent with Islamic jurisprudence. This time, the powerful Islamist movement, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, supported the ulama’s move. Although the suggestions had an impact, the 
committee had no official legislative authority and had not been incorporated into the 
parliament.559 
In 1980, after a parliamentary vote that required amending laws according to principles of 
Islamic law, the chairman of the committee entrusted with the reform proposals released a report 
that the suggestions include the consideration of the Islamic texts, the Quran and Sunnah, along 
with the opinions of Islamic scholars and Imams.560 This mention of the scholars did not specify 
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if Islamic jurists were supposed to be part of a legislative committee, or if Islamic scholars’ 
published opinions would just be examined by the committee entitled to make the proposals. The 
committee sent the drafts of the reformed codes to al-Azhar and made changes accordingly but 
the whole idea of the scholar’s legislative examination was gradually abandoned.561  
Generally, invoking scholars in legislation seems very selective and strictly consultative. 
For example, when the controversial Family Code (known as Jihan’s Law) was to be enacted, 
Sadat (d. 1981) sent the draft to the Chief Mufti to examine its consistency with Islamic law. 
This move took place probably because of Sadat’s awareness of the law’s controversial nature so 
he would preemptively contain any Islamic opposition to the Code.562 
The norm in Egypt is to refrain from empowering any religious establishment or Islamic 
body with any official religious or state authority even in matters of Islamic jurisprudence or 
Sharia interpretation. The attempts to transmit interpretive authority to Islamic jurists were either 
consultative, which lacks any binding state-like authority, or selective in a subject matter that the 
state knew in advance the outcome and needed a legitimizing stamp from the Islamic jurists.563  
The Maghreb’s countries provide a long-established and interesting model. In Morocco, 
Tunisia, Algeria, there are no state Muftis, nor any official Islamic institution that is recognized 
by the state, or part of the state’s apparatuses. Although there are high Islamic councils, these are 
not the state’s religious institutions nor do they have any unique religious authority over 
interpretation except for people’s respect and recognition.564 
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Although Clark Lombardi describes the approach of demanding jurists’ involvement in 
legislation as a “neo-traditional” school,565 he does not seem to capture a more traditional and 
classically dominant jurisprudential canon of refraining from state’s legislation for free 
independent and especially non-binding jurisprudence. Therefore, the “neo-traditional approach” 
will seem accurate to describe the different groups of non-state jurists who, even if they establish 
an institution or are affiliated with Islamic bodies like in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, still 
produce Islamic jurisprudence and Islamic law in a way that it is not state-enacted nor state-
controlled.566 
4.2.2 Islam in the Judiciary (Jurists in the Judiciary and Total Islamic Courts) 
The previous section explored the legislative tasks or attempts that intended to incorporate 
Islamic jurists into the legislature or empower a religious institution or a juristic committee with 
a legislative task. This section is to examine the judicial tasks vested in the jurists whether in 
general courts, or in Islamic courts, usually known as “Sharia courts.” 
One researcher claims that the Sunni medieval structure was familiar with judicial duality 
where there were two types of courts in the same system. The first was Qadi and jurists-
appointed courts whose jurisdiction included different subject matters, except for cases of 
administrative nature. The second was the strictly administrative courts whose jurisdiction was 
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for cases respecting the rulers’ edicts and ordinances. These latter courts were staffed by non-
jurists.567 
In modern times, Pakistan is a salient case of this judicial duality in Sunni Islam. The 
Islamic jurists in Pakistani courts and their judicial role passed through two phases. The first 
phase began in the 1970s and lasted until 1980, and there were Islamic benches (Sharia Benches) 
that operated within the general courts. There was no representation or lawyers in these benches, 
but rather, Islamic jurists who appeared to be expert witnesses more than judges or attorneys. 
The benches were to function as Islamic appellate bodies that would decide cases in regards to 
the Islamic Criminal Code. But if the party was willing to appeal, he or she could take it to the 
Sharia bench of the Supreme Court within 60 days. The benches did not just decide cases in 
regards to Criminal Code; they, also, had the power to annul laws that they deemed un-Islamic, 
which is a prerogative usually vested exclusively in the constitutional or high courts in other 
Sunni countries like Egypt.568 
In 1980, the Sharia Benches were dissolved and replaced by an Islamic judicial system 
called the Federal Sharia Courts. These newly-established courts assumed the powers of the 
Sharia benches including the judicial authority to declare laws repugnant to Islamic law. The 
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decisions of these courts could overrule all courts and be appealed only in the Federal Supreme 
Court.569  
The notable development in the creation of Federal Sharia Courts in Pakistan is their 
inclusion of Islamic scholars in their structure. After 1985, an official positioning of Islamic 
scholars in these courts took place with a constitutional amendment that required some ulama in 
the Sharia courts. The amendment provided that not more than three well-versed Islamic scholars 
alongside five legally-trained individuals should sit as judges in the Federal Sharia Courts.570 In 
reality, according to Charles Kennedy, the Pakistani Supreme Court’s decisions ended up 
stripping these Federal Sharia Courts of many powers and denied “jurisdiction in many realms 
important to would-be Islamic reformers of Pakistan’s legal system.”571 
In Malaysia, the judicial system established Sharia courts, along with the High Courts 
and Federal Courts. Although the Federal Courts cannot decide matters pertaining to Islamic law, 
the Supreme Court can overrule and accept appeals from Sharia Courts. So, despite the 
ambiguous functions of the Sharia Courts in areas other than family law, the secular Supreme 
Court supervises the whole judicial system including Sharia Courts. Unlike Pakistan, where the 
ulama sit as judges beside others, or Saudi Arabia where judges in general courts are only 
Islamic scholars, Malaysia does not seem to have such a requirement.572  
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These experiments of Islamic courts or the existence of some judicial functions handed 
over to Islamic scholars did not seem to work well, or at least did not have the chance to work 
well due to constitutional and superior judicial limitations.  
On the other hand, modern Egypt never experienced or seriously considered Sharia 
courts. The reason for the avoidance of the idea of Islamic courts in Egypt could be the bad 
memory of the mixed courts that were always associated with showing favoritism and corruption 
along with imperialistic prerogatives for foreigners and non-Egyptians.573 
This section examined the scholars and their role in Islamic adjudication. Despite having 
functioning Islamic courts, these courts were enveloped in a comprehensive civil system that not 
only mitigated the Islamicity in the system but also decided what Islam and Islamicity were. This 
brings us to the discussion of secularization versus Islamization in legal systems, and the concept 
of constitutional theocracy. 
4.2.3 Juristic Authority and Constitutional Theocracy 
The discussion of the Islamic scholars’ role in legislation or adjudication always revives the fear 
of theocracy or its forms. But, because the Islamization project in the modern Muslim-majority 
states like Egypt does not conform to the traditional idea of theocracy, the concept of 
constitutional theocracy or theocratic constitutionalism attempts to offer an analysis of this 
constitutional phenomenon. This section introduces some concepts related to constitutional 
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Islamization, tries to examine them, and concludes with the Islamization project and the 
scholars’ role in it. 
By the end of the twentieth century, there was a confident impression of the universality 
of a constitutional law and constitutionalism that transcends countries and cultures. This 
universal system was looked at as the only normatively legitimate national constitutionalism that 
everyone should follow and respect. In the aftermath of World War II, a different trend has 
arisen and a more pluralistic understanding of constitutionalism in the American and global 
academia has begun. Like the transcendental universalistic constitutionalism that wanted to fight 
extremism and provide constitutional harmony, the more pluralistic and fragmentary current 
wanted to reach stability and combat fanaticism in an unorthodox way.574 
One major trend within constitutionalism is a system that accepts fundamental principles 
of constitutionalism, such as the existence of a constitutions, separation of powers, and the will 
of the people, and, at the same time, incorporates some local principles from religion. The 
Islamic world is the central theater of this pervasive religious constitutionalism. Ran Hirschl 
describes such a system as a “constitutional theocracy.” He notes that, while traditional 
theocracy accumulates power in the hands of clergy or religious institutions, there is a modern 
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phenomenon of “constitutional theocracy” that is run by lay political figures and in accordance 
with constitutional limits.575 
Unlike the different degrees of separation of religion and state, constitutional theocracies 
adopt formally and structurally one single faith. While Hirschl is aware of some European 
countries’ mode of having one single faith recognized in the constitution, he interprets this 
recognition as a collective entity or social boundary whereas constitutional theocracies require 
laws to be religiously compliant.576 According to Hirschl, for a constitutional theocracy to be 
described as such, it needs to have four components: (1) commitment to all essential aspects of 
modern constitutionalism, (2) having a state religion that is recognized and endorsed as the 
dominant single faith, (3) the constitutional establishment of the religion as a source of 
legislation, (4) a constitutionally recognized relationship between judiciary and religious bodies 
that is granted some sort of jurisdiction over some issues.577  
After surveying different countries of constitutional theocracies, Hirschl recognized nine 
approaches in relation between religion and state:578 (1) anti-religious states like atheist 
communism; (2) religion-free states like France and Kemalist Turkey; (3) neutrality-model states 
like the United States; (4) a lighter model of formal separation of church and state like Canada; 
(5) a loose recognition and establishment of religion as symbolic “state religion” like Norway, 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Greece, Cyprus, and England; (6) a de-facto dominance of a religion 
like Ireland, Malta, Poland, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Argentina; (7) a selective 
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accommodation of religion in certain areas of law like India and Nigeria; (8) a total 
establishment of religion with certain secular enclaves like Saudi Arabia; and (9) a dual system 
of recognizing religious principles as the basis of the law, and universalist constitutional 
principles, like Pakistan and Egypt.579 
Larry Catá Backer agrees with Hirschl that what the latter calls “constitutional 
theocracies” and universalist secular constitutionalism are incompatible. However, Backer 
asserts that theocracy is associated with despotism, while constitutionalism tends to limit power 
and distribute authority, which makes it incompatible with a theocracy.580 In furthering his 
criticism of Hirschl, Backer suspects that the former belittles the role of religion in constructing a 
set of values whereas Backer recognizes the importance of religion in constructing a system of 
values.581 More importantly, Backer disagrees with Hirschl in the idea that “constitutional 
theocracy” is a defective version of constitutionalism in comparison to universalist secular 
constitutionalism. Rather, Backer assesses these “constitutional theocracies” in their own scale as 
legitimate political systems.582 For Backer, in the sort of system Hirschl calls “constitutional 
theocracy,” procedural rule of law is observed, democratic values are respected to a high degree, 
and the basic elements of constitutionalism are established. However, the source of values in 
secular constitutionalism is different from its counterpart in religious constitutionalism. 
Therefore, Backer termed the phenomenon “theocratic constitutionalism,” stressing that it is a 
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valid kind of constitutionalism, instead of emphasizing its theocratic nature as is inferred from 
Hirschl’s “constitutional theocracy.”583 
In Backer’s “theocratic constitutionalism,” it is possible to develop a system that is 
committed to universalist constitutionalist principles, while having elements of theocratic 
constitutionalism.584 Backer seems more aware that traditional religiosity existed in secular 
regimes.585 However, both single out traditional religions as an arena exposed to theocracy, 
downplaying the untraditional religiosity of civil religion on which universalist secular 
constitutionalism is based. Moreover, secular religion is even more religious in the way it treats 
unbelievers in its system and its set of values.586 We may say that the theocratic mindset of the 
totally secular orders emphasizes their secular religiosity—a phrase that would seem 
contradictory had not we seen different political religions that did not stem from traditional 
religions like Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.587 
What Ted Jelen calls “strict separationist”588 and Hirschl describes as “anti-religion” 
states, along with “religion-free states”589 may indicate another constitutional phenomenon—we 
may call it “atheocratic constitutionalism.” Just as atheism negates religion from its system of 
values, atheocratic constitutionalism negates religion, in the traditional sense, from its public 
sphere.590 
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In the Muslim world, Kemalist Turkey is an example of this atheocratic 
constitutionalism. In 1928, a few years after the dismantling of the caliphate system (the 
Ottoman Empire), the regime of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (d. 1938) removed from the constitution 
and the law any reference to Islam or Sharia. Instead, secularism was adopted, and the word 
“secularism” was incorporated in the 1937 Constitution. Ironically, a secular ministry (the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs) was established to control religious endowments, direct 
religious affairs, and impose a certain religious rhetoric acceptable to the regime’s secular 
system.591 In short, as Ergun Ozbudun puts it, “Turkish secularism appears as a system of state-
controlled religion, rather than the separation of the state and religious institutions.”592 It reached 
this level when the secular Kemalist regime of 1982 made religious teaching compulsory in order 
to promote an enlightened interpretation of Islam, a move to which the European Court of 
Human Rights did not object.593 The Turkish case is the model Ahmet Kuru calls “assertive 
secularism” as opposed to “passive secularism.” Assertive secularism has a certain religious, or 
probably anti-religious, discourse and attitude toward traditional religion, and, thus, controls its 
teaching and movement. On the other hand, passive secularism is what others call neutrality 
toward religion, while ensuring that there is no religion established by the state.594 
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While theocratic constitutionalism and constitutional theocracy attempt to explain the 
wave of Islamization, there is thus a reverse constitutionalism that tends to negate a certain 
religion, and, in the name of secularism, adopt similar religious discourse against the will of the 
people. One demonstration of this counter-religious phenomenon is the systematic rejection of 
Islamic manifestations as part of the battle against theocracy. There remains the question whether 
the Islamization project constitutes a form of theocracy. The next section will discuss 
Islamization, especially the mechanism of codification and the role of Islamists and other players 
along with scholars. 
4.2.4 Non-Scholastic Competitors toward Islam  
The project of Islamization in post-World War II took different forms but mostly shared the 
ideas of Islamic reconstructionism that marked this phase.595 In Said Arjomand’s account, the 
Islamization of this stage is characterized by “the ideological treatment both of Islam and of the 
constitution.”596 For example, Arjomand describes the Pakistani Islamization of 1949-1956 as a 
transfer from the inherited British Raj’s legal system to the sovereignty of God.597 Pakistan was 
to adopt Islam and its law, but the way to implement it was not clear.598 
To undertake the Islamization project, there were two options: declaring Islamic law as 
superior but leaving its application to the judiciary, or taking the course of codification. Taqi 
Uthmani, an influential Pakistani scholar and a former judge in a Sharia Court preferred 
codification for various reasons including the lack of training of modern judges in Islamic 
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jurisprudence. Although Uthmani acknowledged that codification is not the traditional 
mechanism for promulgating Islamic law in the premodern era, he nonetheless, still found 
codification the best way to ensure Islamic law’s application in the modern Muslim state.599 The 
Pakistani scholars embraced codification and supported its proposals as an acceptable form of 
Islamization. Codifying Sharia in Pakistan was not seen as a threat to the jurisprudential 
authority of the ulama. Nonetheless, the jurisprudential works performed outside the state’s 
institutions continued to have influence.600 
In Pakistan, a number of Islamic constitutions were drafted and abrogated, different 
regimes followed, but Islam in the law remained undisputable. The 1977 Islamic military coup 
by Zia ul-Haqq (d. 1988) was a turning point toward Islamic authoritarianism.601 He issued 
ordinances to fight un-Islamic activities, and announced laws that criminalized “deviant 
creeds.”602 Zia arranged with the National Assembly the outline for Islamic codification, but 
soon grew impatient with the “slow progress of Islamization” and dismissed the National 
Assembly altogether.603  
Zia’s model represents the Islamization project through authoritarianism. His codification 
was promulgated solely through presidential ordinances. The codified Sharia as proposed by 
Zia’s regime was an instrument used by the person in power to tighten the grip on all 
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governmental branches and the religious sphere. The attempt to transfer religious authority from 
societal-based networks to state-controlled institutions was attained by codifying Islamic law and 
its appointed committees. In Pakistan, Muhammad Qasim Zaman notes:  
Islamization has also served to strengthen the state’s control of 
society, to extend and deepen its reach into new areas, including 
facets of religious life. Islamization has also served as the 
instrument for enhancing the government’s own authority….604 
In Egypt, the Islamization of 1971 and its Constitution were also a change provided by 
the autocratic regime of Anwar al-Sadat (d. 1981). During the Islamic plan of al-Sadat, there 
were two kinds of religious presence: religious institutions of scholars, mainly Al-Azhar; and 
religious-inspired “social” movements and political parties, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood (in 
Arabic: al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen). These scholars represent the traditional religious authority that 
carried Islam, Islamic law, and its sciences throughout history while the religious sociopolitical 
groups like the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as a modern phenomenon composed of lay 
Islamists. Today’s Islamic brotherhoods and Islamists may have been developed from the 
structure of the brotherhood system in mystical orders in Islamic history. The relationship 
between these two fractions (scholars and Islamists) fluctuated between competition over the 
claim of authority and cooperation in reinforcing the presence of Islam in society. While 
Islamism may pose a challenge to the scholars’ classical role as bearers of Islam, Islamists can 
also be seen as the political player that helps a religious institution like al-Azhar in its active 
role.605 
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While Islamization in Egypt was supposed to revive Islamic jurisprudence, the 
mechanism was, in reality, a combination of declaring of Islamic law, and codifying Sharia, both 
of which the autocratic regime of al-Sadat controlled and mastered. While he was said to have 
sympathy to Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, the way in which the 
Islamization project was administered unveiled a deep suspicion and distrust. After the codified 
Islamic drafts were announced, the regime did not tolerate any criticism especially from the 
Islamists.606 The Egyptian Islamization project was at stake when al-Sadat was assassinated in 
1981. As soon as President Hosni Mubarak assumed power, the Islamization plan was 
dismantled, and the Islamic codes were shelved.607 
Despite the fact that Islamization was intended to respond to the people’s requests, it 
employed autocratic and authoritarian mechanisms. The project attempted to replace the typical 
class of socially recognized jurists with appointed committees entrusted with Islamic 
codification. The experiment was challenged for its operation and its Islamicity. Nevertheless, 
the Islamization plan has introduced a constitutional phenomenon that includes Islamic 
codification as we saw in this section, the repugnancy clause, and the Islamic interpretation of 
the judiciary as we will see in the next sections. 
The next section will deal with Islamic constitutional articles that have become part of the 
constitutional order in many Muslim-majority and Arab states. The discussion will include the 
                                                 
2002;MARTIN & BARZEGAR, Islamism: contested perspectives on political Islam. 2010;Skovgaard-Petersen, Egypt's 
'Ulama in the State, in Politics, and in the Islamist Vision. 2013;Hirschl, TEX. L. REV., 2 (2003). 
606 LOMBARDI, State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt: The Incorporation of the Sharīʻa Into Egyptian 
Constitutional Law 116-36. 2006;Moustafa, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL MIDDLE EAST STUDIES, 3-7 (2000). In 
general see, Adel Omar Sherif, The Relationship between the Constitution and the Sharia in Egypt, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES: BETWEEN UPHEAVAL AND CONTINUITY 125-6, (Rainer Grote & 
Tilmann Roder eds., 2011). 
607 LOMBARDI, State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt: The Incorporation of the Sharīʻa Into Egyptian 
Constitutional Law 136-9. 2006. 
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way Islamic law was interpreted and the power of interpretation between legislature and 
judiciary. 
4.3 ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLES 
In this part, two main issues are addressed: constitutional texts and articles, and constitutional 
interpretation. In the constitutional texts, the issue of Article 2, and the repugnancy clause, will 
be given great emphasis because of its history and impact. There will be a separate section for 
Egypt and the question of the treatment of scholars and religious institutions like al-Azhar in the 
different constitutions. The second section discusses the interpretation of the Islamic 
constitutional articles and the authority of interpretation between the legislature and the judiciary 
in Egypt. It will also discuss the role of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), and 
what role the Islamic scholars played in the interpretation. Finally, this part will conclude with 
the current constitutional interpretation and the judicial application of Islamic law.  
4.3.1 The Constitutional Texts 
To understand the context of the Islamic constitutional articles, I will discuss Islamic articles in 
various Muslim-majority states and, then, turn to Egypt and its repugnancy clause. 
180 
4.3.1.1 In General: The Genesis of Repugnancy Laws 
In the second half of eighteenth-century in India, the British gradually established a new judicial 
system with civil, criminal, and appellate courts. Muslim judges (qadis) assisted the British 
officials for some time with judiciary duties until the position of these Muslim scholars was 
abolished altogether. However, Regulation II of 1772 provided:  
In all suits regarding inheritance, succession, marriage and caste 
and other usages or institutions, the law of the Koran with respect 
to Mahomedans [Muslims], and those of the Shaster with respect 
to the Gentoos [Hindus] shall be invariably adhered to.608 
Regulation II seems to be one of the first Islamic clauses.609 As a result of the Regulation 
II, Islamic jurists continued to advise on exclusively family law that involved Muslims until 
1864.610 To reassure Muslims that the British were not playing against their faith or values, the 
colonizers drafted an “Islamic” law that dealt mainly with family law, called “Anglo-
Muhammadan Law.”611 According to Zaman, the “Anglo-Muhammadan Law” was a hybrid law 
that attempted to marginalize the role of Islamic scholars in Islamic jurisprudence while still 
maintaining a role for Islam itself.612 
Around that time, namely in 1876, in the Ottoman Empire, there was other Islamic 
constitutional articles in which the Basic Law recognized the sultan as the Supreme Islamic 
                                                 
608 ZAMAN, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change: Custodians of Change 21. 2010. 
609 Haider Hamoudi indicates that the early repugnancy clauses in the British colonized regions were those that 
served to repeal any customary law that was repugnant to natural justice or public policy. Then, the clauses seemed 
to treat public policy and natural justice as articulated by the British as superior law to local law, which is the 
opposite of today’s Islamic repugnancy clauses that makes (local) Islamic law superior. Hamoudi, WILLAMETTE L. 
REV., 1(FT1) (2011).  
610 ZAMAN, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change: Custodians of Change 21-2. 2010. 
611 ROLAND KNYVET WILSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ANGLO-MUHAMMADAN LAW 89-130 (W. 
Thacker. 1894). The word “Muhammadan” or “Mohammadan” means “Muslim” in the language of the Orientalists 
(westerners) studying Islam in the 18th and 19th centuries. The word seems to have a condescending connotation—it 
seems to imply that Islam was a creation of Muhammad, and that Muslims should be attributed to the “author” of 
Quran and Islamic religion, Muhammad. See, EDWARD W SAID, ORIENTALISM 280 (Vintage. 1979). 
612 ZAMAN, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change: Custodians of Change 25. 2010. 
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Caliph (Article 3), and the “protector of the religion of Islam” (Article 4). Article 7 gave the 
sultan the power to supervise the enforcement of Islamic law, while Article 27 granted the sultan 
the power to appoint the post of Sheikh al-Islam.613 There was no article of repugnancy that 
would annul any law repugnant to Islam.614 
About four decades later, and specifically in 1918, the Libyan constitutional experiment 
that took place under Italian colonization could qualify to be the first that produced a repugnancy 
clause.615 It mentioned the ulama in its declaration of independence. In 1918, the Tripolitanians 
(Libyans) declared their independence, but, interestingly, they did it “according to the will of its 
great Ulama, of the nobility, of the notables and of the chiefs of the honored fighters.”616 In 
1919, a statute between Libyans provided in Article 12 that “principles that are incompatible 
with Islamic religion cannot be taught to the members of this religion.”617 The article dismissed 
teachings that were against the principles of Islamic religion, but did not per se dismiss “laws” 
against Islamic principles, while another article in the Statute declared Islamic law as the law of 
the polity. This experiment was short-lived as the Tripolitanian Republic was dismantled in 
1923. Islam was not given any emphasis in later Libyan constitutions other than it being the 
“religion of the state.618 
                                                 
613 The Ottoman Basic Law is included as a supplement in Roder, The Separation of Powers in Muslim Countries: 
Historical and Comparative Perspectives 341-59. 2011. See, BROWN, Constitutions in a nonconstitutional world: 
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UPHEAVAL AND CONTINUITY 516, (Rainer Grote & Tilmann Roder eds., 2011).(emphasis mine) 
617 Id. at, 516-7. 
618 Id. at, 515-7&521-6. 
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While the Libyan Statute dismissed teachings that were against the principles of Islamic 
law, the Pakistani constitutional order dismissed laws that were against Islamic law, and reached 
the climax of the repugnancy clause, as we know it today, including the use of the term 
“repugnant” to Islam.619 
The Constituent Assembly of the 1949 passed a resolution that stated the principles of the 
Pakistani state, known as the “Objectives Resolution.” After the Objectives Resolution faced 
some attempts by the High Court to diminish it as a preamble with no constitutional value, it was 
incorporated in the 1985 Constitution Article 2-A.620 It included the following provisions: 
The Government of Pakistan will be a state … Wherein the 
Muslims of Pakistan shall be enabled individually and collectively 
to order their lives in accordance with the teachings and 
requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.621 
Article 205(1) of the Pakistani Constitution of 1956 stated that “no law shall be enacted 
which is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur’an and the 
Sunnah.”622 As a result of that, Zia-ul-Haqq in 1988 introduced the Sharia Bill that gave 
supremacy to Sharia as “the supreme source of law in Pakistan and the Grundnorm for guidance 
of policy-making by the state and shall be enforced in the manner and as envisaged thereunder,” 
and that the court shall decide cases according to Sharia.623 
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Other Muslim-majority states, like Syria (with its short-lived Syrian Constitution of 
1950),624 Kuwait,625 Iraq626 and Palestine soon followed suit, declaring that Islam was the main 
source of legislation.627 Such a provision does not exist in the Maghreb countries of Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Algeria, however.628 The specific case of Egypt will be discussed in the next 
section. 
4.3.1.2 In Egypt 
In Egypt, as we have seen, the Islamization plan of President al-Sadat produced the Constitution 
of 1971. The first clause of Article 2, which inherited Article 149 from the 1922 Constitution, 
reads: “Islam is the religion of the state.”629 In addition, Article 2 declared that “Islamic law 
(Sharia) is a principal source of legislation.”630 In 1978, al-Azhar Islamic University published a 
proposal for “the Islamic constitution” wherein it states that Islamic law is the source of all 
legislation.631 Therefore, in 1980, Article 2 was amended to provide that “Islamic law (Sharia) is 
the principal source of legislation.”632 According to Adel Omar Sherif, an influential justice at 
                                                 
624 Arjomand, ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, 123 (2007). 
625 Id. at. 
626 Id. at, 133. 
627 Hirschl, WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW, 4 (2008). 
628 Roy, Constitutionalism in the Maghreb: Between French Heritage and Islamic Concepts. 2011. Although the 
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the SCC, the Amendment of 1980 was thought to suggest that Sharia supersedes positive law and 
possibly even the Constitution.633  
In the same Constitution of 1971, the other reference to Islam was in Article 11 that 
granted women’s equality “without violation of the rules of Islamic jurisprudence.”634 Islamic 
scholars were not mentioned either nor was al Azhar, as the most important Islamic institution in 
the state. The Constitution of 1971 remained in effect until 2011 when an uprising broke out as 
part of what is known as the “Arab Spring.”635 
On January 25, 2011, the Egyptian Army led by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces 
(SCAF) responded to the demands of the street and ousted President Hosni Mubarak. On March 
30, the 1971 Constitution was suspended, and the SCAF announced a constitutional declaration. 
However, the position of Islam did not change much in the declaration as it states: “the principles 
of Islamic law are the principal sources of legislation.”636 After the Islamists’ victory in the 
Egyptian Constituent Assembly, they along with other representatives of what is known as the 
“Civil Mainstream” produced the 2012 Constitution, probably the shortest-lived Egyptian 
constitution. The Constitution was signed by the Muslim Brotherhood president, Mohamed 
Morsi in December 2012, but was suspended on July 3, 2013 by the Egyptian Army. The 2012 
Constitution introduced novel articles like Articles 4, 7, and 219.637 
While Article 2 remained the same, declaring the principles of Islamic law as the 
principal source of legislation, Article 4 for the first time since 1952 mentioned al-Azhar—it 
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granted al-Azhar its independence as an Islamic institution with exclusive autonomy over its 
affairs.638 Moreover, Article 4 recognized the consultative task of Islamic scholars in regards to 
Islamic law when it announced that al-Azhar’s senior scholars should be consulted in Sharia 
matters. Article 4 reads: 
Al-Azhar is an encompassing independent Islamic institution, with 
exclusive autonomy over its own affairs, responsible for preaching 
Islam, theology and the Arabic language in Egypt and the world. 
Al-Azhar Senior Scholars are to be consulted in matters pertaining 
to Islamic law.639 
Unlike the commitment to al-Azhar’s independence in Article 4, the 2012 Constitution, 
Article 212, established the Endowments Commission as self-regulated but contained nothing 
about its independence.640 Also, Article 21 states that the “State guarantees and protects… 
endowments, as shall be regulated by law.”641 Nevertheless, the unprecedented provision in 
regards to Islamic interpretation of Article 2 and Islamic law in general is found in Article 219. 
The controversial article of 219 reads: 
The principles of Islamic Sharia include general evidence, 
foundational rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible sources 
accepted in Sunni doctrines.642 
It is more than likely the first constitutional article to mention the word “Sunni” in Egyptian 
modern history, and the first to limit Islamic jurisprudence to the four Jurisprudential schools. 
Article 219 of the 2012 Constitution specified some guidelines for Islamic interpretations that 
turned out to be a blow to the competing authorities within the state and a victory to what 
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Lombardi calls the “neo-traditionalist” approach that tends to consult traditional Islamic sources 
and lean on Islamic scholars and medieval jurisprudence.643 Nevertheless, Lombardi and Brown 
think that the article was a bargain that the modernist Islamists, like the Brotherhood, did not 
fight for but rather accepted as a compromise with more conservative Salafists644 and other 
political figures in the Assembly.645  
On July 3, 2013, the Egyptian military, led by then-Colonel General Abd al-Fattah al-
Sisi, orchestrated a coup that suspended the 2012 Constitution, dissolved the Islamist-dominated 
parliament, and imprisoned President Mohamed Morsi along with his cabinet. In the televised 
declaration of this change of regime, Sheikh al-Azhar was sitting first on the left of al-Sisi while 
the latter announces the change. The appearance of Sheikh al-Azhar next to the de-facto ruler 
was seen as a sign of religious support and al-Azhar’s confidence.646 
The change of regime resulted in the appointment of a fifty-member Constituent 
Assembly that drafted what became the 2014 Constitution as it was announced in January 2014. 
As expected, Article 2 remained untouched, while the controversial Article 219 of 2012 was 
completely removed.647 Article 90 ensures the “State shall encourage the charitable endowment 
system” and at the same time “shall ensure the independence thereof.” Article 90 ensures more 
independence of the endowment than existed in the previous 2012 Constitution, by stating that 
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the “affairs of such [endowment] institutions shall be managed in accordance with the conditions 
set by the person who created the endowment, as regulated by Law.”648 
More interestingly, while the Islamic articles invented by the Islamist-dominated 
Assembly of 2012 were compromised or completely removed in the 2014 Constitution, the latter 
Constitution expanded what used to be Article Four pertaining to al-Azhar and its affairs, 
granting the Sheikh of al-Azhar independence and permanence. However, more importantly for 
the civil camp in Egyptian politics, the clause about consulting al-Azhar in regards to Islamic law 
was removed. Therefore, two changes took place and should bring al-Azhar closer to its meta-
constitutional role. One is ostensibly enhancing its independence and the other is eliminating its 
formal constitutional role in evaluating legislation. Article 7 of the 2014 reads: 
Al-Azhar is an independent Islamic scientific institution, with 
exclusive competence over its own affairs. It is the main reference 
for religious sciences and Islamic affairs. It is responsible for 
calling to Islam, as well as, disseminating religious sciences and 
the Arabic language in Egypt and all over the world. 
The State shall provide sufficient financial allocations thereto so 
that it can achieve its purposes. 
Al-Azhar’s Grand Sheikh is independent and may not be 
dismissed. The Law shall regulate the method of appointing the 
Grand Sheikh from amongst the members of Council of Senior 
Scholars.649 
While various articles were adopted and changed, Article 2 was the cornerstone and the article 
that was debated in courts and had an effect on legal and constitutional issues. This section 
examined the Islamic articles in general, the repugnancy clause and Article 2 in particular. It 
started with various Islamic countries like Libya and Pakistan, and concluded with Egypt, and its 
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changes regarding Islam in the recent two constitutions as compared to the long-serving 
Constitution of 1971. The next section will explore the debate of constitutional interpretation 
especially Article 2 that has remained unchanged since 1980. 
4.3.2 The constitutional interpretation 
The previous section introduced the Islamic articles, emphasizing Article 2. The Egyptian case 
received special attention due to its centrality and role on the Arab and Islamic world. In this 
section, the interpretation of these Islamic articles will be discussed focusing on Egypt. The 
section will be divided into two main subsections. The first deals with the power of interpretation 
and the competing institutions and powers over the question of who has the right to interpret 
Islamic articles and Islam in the state. The second subsection examines the judicial application of 
Islamic law within the Egyptian modern system and the discourse of the SCC. 
4.3.3 The Dispute over Authority of Interpretation: 
This subsection about the authority of interpretation regarding Islamic law will start by 
discussing general debates about the right to interpret Islamic law in the modern state taking into 
account the context of the varying Islamic countries. Then, I will consider the case of Egypt and 
the competing powers and their role in the interpretation of Islamic law within the state’s 
structure.  
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4.3.3.1 In General: 
The classical Islamic science of the “sources of jurisprudence” discusses extensively the central 
question of the “requirements of the mujtahid” (the jurist capable of independent reasoning to 
derive Islamic rules from the revelatory sources). Classical jurists set forth requirements that the 
individual Islamic jurists need to fulfill in order to have the right to independent Islamic 
reasoning in jurisprudence. According to the classical origins of Islamic jurisprudence, one 
important requirement to be mujtahid is to be well-versed with all rulings discussed in the Quran 
and Sunnah. Another condition is to master the Arabic language as used in Islamic texts. The 
discussion of ijtihad (the Islamic capability of independent reasoning and issuing independent 
opinions) was developed to protect Islamic jurisprudence from irresponsible interpretations.650 
The classical debates on ijtihad and the right to jurisprudential reasoning and opinions 
were conducted to guide and protect the society in the meta-constitutional sphere. However, the 
discussion of the right to interpretation in a constitutional context is different—it deals with the 
right to interpretation within a state’s authorities and state’s institutions that are enforceable in 
the modern sense of the word. This should never mean that the issue of the right to interpretation 
is similar throughout the modern states because theorists disagree.651 
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As a result, the right to interpretation discussed in this context is the official authority to 
exercise interpretation of the law and the constitution within the state. In the context of Muslim-
majority countries, Article 2 is included in this debate.  
Generally speaking, in the modern state’s setting, there is a debate regarding how 
interpretation should be exercised in the constitutional literature. Vicki Jackson and Mark 
Tushnet divide the modern constitutional literature into two main camps, democratic theorists 
and constitutionalists. Democratic theorists tend to place the power of interpretation in the hands 
of the democratic institutions and elected individuals, while constitutionalists empower unelected 
institutions and individuals with the authority of interpretation. Both approaches adopt different 
degrees of distributive tendency in regards to interpretation, and nations differ in making the 
distribution of interpretive authority explicit. The distribution of interpretive authority means that 
the state distributes different authorities of interpretation issue by issue to different institutions 
and individuals that are related and more familiar with the subject matter.652 
Now, with the setting of Islamic articles in Muslim-majority states, interpretation of these 
religious articles becomes more controversial and critical. One factor is that these articles like 
Article 2 in Egypt do not resemble any similar article in non-Muslim-majority states. The 
uniqueness of these articles creates a challenge for Muslim-majority states to find an approach 
that protects their constitutionalism and their constitutional commitment to the Islamic 
principles. Because most Islamic articles adopted were not coupled with explicit language or a 
clear referral to a specific state’s apparatus lodged with interpretive power, competing powers 
dispute over the authority of interpretation. While legislatures and appointed committees of the 
executive branch play an important role, the main player is the highest courts that deal with 
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constitutional issues such as the SCC in the case of the Egyptians. Elected legislatures became 
much less involved in interpretation in general, and in regard to Islamic articles in particular as 
we will see in a later section. 
In the Pakistani experiment, Martin Lau suggests that “the Islamization of laws in 
Pakistan has been primarily a judge-led process, which was initiated to enhance the power of the 
judiciary….”653 The initial introduction of Islamic law was through the parliament until the 
creation of an Islamic Judicial system when the locus of most areas of Islamic law was shifted to 
Sharia courts.654 There were early proposals (before 1979) to empower the Supreme Court with 
Islamic interpretation and to incorporate this agreement in the constitution, but it was never 
adopted.655 In the end, the Pakistani Supreme Court adopted the theory of trusteeship for the 
judges on interpretation of Islamic law, which ended up putting the handling of Sharia law in 
their hands. As a result, the Supreme Court oversees decisions by lowers courts and legislation 
by parliament.656 
The Pakistani Objectives Resolution was a compromise drafted by the secular Liaqat ‘Ali 
Khan, one of the founding fathers of Pakistan, to balance divine sovereignty with the people’s 
dominion. This balance means to provide a system that combines superior positive law and 
Islamic-codified law. However, Lau notes that, in reality, when the Resolution was challenged 
by the ulama, “God had no difficulty trumping the other putative sovereigns.”657 The Pakistani 
Supreme Court in 1972 charted a path to interpret the Resolution as a “Grundnorm” of the 
constitutional system and concluded that God’s sovereignty surpasses the entire universe. 
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Although the decision left the ulama and Islamists satisfied, the Supreme Court secured its 
position as the arbiter in interpretive authority over any other institution or court.658 This tactic of 
the Supreme Court seemed to work— prominent Islamists supported the broadening of the 
court’s authority of Islamic interpretation against the other two branches.659 
In 1991, the Sharia Bill in Pakistan explicitly empowered the judiciary with Islamic 
interpretation resolving the conflict of who has the power of interpretation.660 In the 
constitutional interpretive process, the role of the Islamic scholars was not so clear. Nevertheless, 
scholars still occupy their meta-constitutional positions by directing unofficial teachings and 
issuing Islamic jurisprudential opinions, which led Martin Lau to suggest that it is possible that 
“in cases of constitutional breakdowns, references to Islam could offer legal continuity and 
stability.”661 
Unlike the Pakistani Islamic scholars’ cautious acceptance of judicial authority over 
interpretation, their Indian counterparts were disturbed by the Indian Constitutional Court’s 
decision of handling the interpretation of Islamic law.662 
In Malaysia, the judiciary resisted any Islamic interpretation that could provide a vehicle 
for Islamists and Islamic scholars to import Islamic constitutionalism.663 Courts in some other 
countries like Tunisia and Algeria tended to monopolize the authority of interpreting Islamic 
law.664 In a more rigid way, the Turkish Constitutional Court fought against religious authority 
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by adopting assertive secularism that did not just fight religion in public spaces but also espoused 
a “secularist” religious discourse against the traditional one. This, sometimes, would mean 
dissolving an elected parliament and toppling elected officials.665 
As we saw, the vast majority of the Muslim-majority states tend to present judiciaries as 
the arbiter in Islamic interpretation though these countries differ in the level of their distribution 
of (Islamic) interpretation, in their embracement of Islamic constitutionalism, and their 
recognition of divine sovereignty. Different proposals to make the legislatures the interpretive 
arbiter were not successful. The state authorities in these various countries were careful not to 
empower religious institutions, Islamic scholars, or lay Islamists with any actual interpretive 
authority. Judiciaries that presented themselves as the exclusive interpreter of Islamic law tended 
to mitigate Islamicity, and at the same time, kept a plausible degree of Islamic reasoning in order 
to gain Islamic legitimation. 
After dealing with Muslim states, their struggle over Islamic interpretation, and their 
attempt to answer the question of who has the right to interpret Islamic law, in the next 
subsection, the dispute over authority of interpretation will be discussed in the Egyptian context. 
The discussion will include the role of the three branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, and 
the possibility of consulting Islamic scholars. 
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4.3.3.2 In Egypt: Phases toward the establishment of the authority of Islamic 
interpretation: 
When the Islamization project was introduced, Egypt was torn between Islamization adopted by 
the executive, an ambiguous Islamic legislation, and a new-born constitutional court that was 
hesitant to deal with Islamic interpretation. In undertaking Islamization, the Egyptian regime 
faced the question of who interprets Islamic law, how, and what interpretive practices should be 
used in order to convince the public of its Islamic legitimacy.666 More importantly was the 
question to what level the government can lean on Islamic institutions and scholars in Islamic 
interpretation without abandoning the modern nature of the Egyptian state. 
The ambiguity of Article 2 in regards who interprets Islamic law helped create a space for 
different authorities to compete to determine who should be the interpreters, those from within 
the powers of the state or outside authorities. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
prominent Islamist movement in Egypt, advocated an interpretation that treats Islamic law 
principles like transcendent higher law that surpasses state laws.667 In this arrangement, the 
Islamist movement would be more influential in the interpretation process by presenting itself 
and the Islamic scholars as the groups more familiar and attached to Islam than the state’s 
institutions. Sometime later, the Islamists adopted a tone that presented them as the interpreter of 
Islamic law even at the expense of traditional Islamic scholars—a move that terrified the 
traditional interpreters of Islamic law, the ulama. At another point, as we will see, the Muslim 
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Brotherhood accepted the exclusive authority of the SCC while the legislature was never 
mentioned in this context.668 
In the SCC’s process of interpreting Islamic law, it intentionally rejected what Lombardi 
calls the “neo-traditional approach” that seeks Islamic interpretation directly from the 
traditionally trained Islamic scholars. While the court did not directly consult Islamic scholars, it 
could not articulate even its own approach without leaning on the jurisprudential legacy of 
Islamic scholars. The court on different occasions avoided the need to defer to ulama, and 
expressed its reservations on the idea that modern Muslims should submit Islamic judgment 
exclusively to Islamic scholars.669 The SCC dodged the question of what is the process of 
Islamic law-making and treated Article 2 as a “negative criterion,” where legislations do not 
have to implement any sort of Islamic scrutiny. On the other hand, however, legislations can be 
challenged if they are found to be repugnant to the rules of Sharia in the way the SCC interprets 
them (definite in authenticity and meaning).670 
In the next pages, I will discuss the state’s two main interpreters who practiced 
enforceable interpretive authority in Egypt, the legislature and the judiciary. I will start with the 
legislature, and then turn to the judicial claim of authoritative interpretation. The discussion will 
involve whether Islamic interpretation passed through phases and also whether the judiciary 
could establish an undisputed authority of Islamic interpretation. 
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4.3.3.2.1 The legislature’s initiative and the SCC’s deference to legislature 
This subsection will deal with the early phase of Islamic interpretation when the legislature 
seemed to have the upper hand in Islamic law and its interpretation. Moreover, the Egyptian 
judiciary seemed to accept Islamic interpretation from the legislature. In the early stages of 
Islamic articles and their debates, the SCC deferred to the legislature and withheld from 
engaging in real Islamic interpretive efforts until later stages. When the legislature abstained 
from dealing with Islamic legislation and interpretation, the SCC was gradually faced to deal 
with more and more Islamic-related issues as we will see in the following section. 
During the drafting stage of Article 2, the preparatory committee gave the legislature the 
power to define and articulate the meaning of Islamic law and its “principles.”671 Adel Omar 
Sherif narrates the idea of this report of 1981 saying: 
the amendment meant to mandate the revision of laws in affect 
before the application of the Constitution of 1971, and to amend 
these laws in such a manner as to make them conform to the 
principles of Islamic Sharia.672 
The report was a step forward for the legislature’s interpretive power in issues pertaining to 
Islamic law, but the initiative did not seem to go anywhere. The legislature did not seem to 
recognize this signal and, in the end, was probably weak and less representative of the people 
taking into account the authoritarian restrictions on the legislature’s process during Sadat.673 In 
1975, the Ministry of Justice established a committee to adopt Islamic legislation but the move 
was not clear about whether the committee was part of the legislature or if it was to perform 
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some sort of “repugnancy” scrutiny meaning to invalidate laws deemed repugnant to Islamic 
law.674 
From the judiciary’s side, we can understand its position by recognizing three different 
phases toward the authority of Islamic interpretation. The first phase was in 1976 when the SCC 
deferred the issue of Article 2 and the “principles of Islamic law” to the legislature to articulate 
“Islamicity.”675 In 1981, the Court of Cassation refused to void a ruling that was thought to be in 
contradiction with Sharia on Article 2, and instead, deferred the authority of interpreting Islamic 
law to the legislative branch in a strong move of holding the legislature responsible for the 
authority of interpreting Islamic law. 
The second phase was when the SCC stepped up to deal with Article 2 and the issue of 
“principles of Islamic law” but with some hesitation and self-restrictions. In this phase, the SCC 
seemed to present itself, at least relatively, to be the self-proclaimed arbiter in matters of Islamic 
law. It is relative because the court laid down restrictions and bounds on its own authority 
pertaining to Article 2. The SCC in this phase decided that it did not have the authority to hear 
cases against laws that were enforced before 1980.676 The SCC’s decision recognized the clear 
relativity of the SCC’s authority over Article 2. Thus, the court denied its own authority over 
laws before 1980, but this implied that the legislature could act to propose any change to laws 
enacted before 1980—changes upon which the court would then have the ability to act. 
The third phase was from 1984 onward when the SCC introduced the no-retroactivity 
doctrine where cases before 1980 cannot be decided on Article 2. The important and subtle shift 
here is that laws enacted before 1980, which were previously deferred to the legislature in the 
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second phase, became part of the judicial jurisdiction in the third phase. In this third phase, the 
court grew bolder in announcing its authority over Article 2 cases. This phase is the issue of the 
next subsection  
4.3.3.3 Deference to Judiciary 
The previous subsection examined the Egyptian legislature’s authority and the early phase of 
Article 2 of the Constitution when the legislature seemed to be in charge of articulating and 
defining “principles of Islamic law.” The later phases seemed gradually to introduce the SCC as 
the arbiter in issues concerning Islamic interpretation. 
If we go back to the time when Article 2 was introduced, the Egyptian regime under 
Sadat seemed to intend to keep the article ambiguous to provide some flexibility for the ruling 
party to play around with the language while claiming Islamic legitimacy for the state. In this 
arrangement, the regime anticipated that the ruling party would control the Islamic interpretation 
by predominating the legislature, and controlling the judiciary. Mubarak, al-Sadat’s successor, 
was no different from his predecessor in the sense that his adherence to Islamic principles was 
intentionally vague and flexible.677 The SCC was established during the constitutional 
momentum that accompanied the 1971 Constitution in order for the regime to control 
constitutional interpretation. 
The judicial jurisdiction was not clear. Lombardi and some commentators think that 
some, or maybe all, of the Article 2 cases do not fall under the SCC’s jurisdiction, as Article 2 
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cases were comparable to political questions that no court should decide.678 On the other hand, in 
the early 1980s, a public prosecutor stated that the courts should decide Article 2 issues and 
determine the meaning of Islamic principles applied in the cases.679 For its part, the court 
reluctantly started to deal with some issues relating to Article 2 but its interpretation implied 
some deference to the legislature and the executive.680 
By the mid-1980s, the SCC reached its later phase and grew bold in tackling Islamic 
interpretation. However, the court was confronted with critical questions regarding its authority 
and legitimate authoritativeness in deciding Islamic interpretation and whether they were trained 
or even qualified to do so. The court relentlessly asserted that Islamic principles can be 
interpreted by lay Muslims who exerted their efforts to reach the meaning. The approach that 
expands the authority of interpretation to lay Muslims seemed to cling to the concept of 
ijtihad.681 This ijtihad, nonetheless, is within the state’s jurisdiction meaning that the “Islamic 
jurisprudence” produced by the SCC is enforceable but it cannot be a religious ruling for the 
Muslim individual to follow. 
Struggling with the legitimacy of Islamic interpretation, the SCC in 1994 concluded with 
what Lombardi described as “unprecedented postscript” where the court emphasized the 
importance of the lower-court judges following the SCC’s interpretation and applying it as 
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prescribed.682 To entrench its authority over Islamic interpretation, the SCC adopted an approach 
that, while committing to modernist “secular” principles, posited a theory that is used by modern 
Islamists, whose legitimacy was never at stake. The Muslim Brotherhood then accepted the 
position of Islam in Article 2 and the authority of the SCC over Islamic interpretation.683 
Moreover, the SCC intentionally used traditional language and terms to clothe its rulings with 
what is called “enunciative legitimacy.”684 At the same time, the SCC grew more willing to 
present itself as the exclusive interpreter of (Islamic) laws in order to protect the state’s 
apparatuses from traditional religious views that had long been established in the traditional 
circles and madrasas.685 
Adel Omar Sherif, the SCC judge, described some lower-court decisions pertaining to 
Islamic principles as “ill-founded.” He attributed this not to the ill-founded jurisdiction of the 
judiciary over Islamic interpretation but to the lack of a moderate Islamic discourse that the SCC 
was willing to offer.686 
Researchers like Hirschl and Noah Feldman count on the power of the judiciary and 
assumed that its “legitimate” jurisdiction over the issue of Islamic principles was not only to 
mitigate Islamicity in the system but also to balance the executive branch. Therefore, according 
to these scholars, the “legitimacy” of the court’s power over Islamic legitimacy was also 
supported by the fact that the people saw the judiciary as a refuge from the executive’s long 
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hand.687 This constitutional formula presupposed that the constitutional judiciary, the SCC, 
would remain an independent entity entrusted by political players, including Islamists, with 
Islamic judicial review—an assumption proven wrong by the SCC’s unprecedented political 
involvement in 2012 and afterwards with its alliance with the army in the 2013 when the elected 
Islamist government was overthrown.688 
The post-2012 SCC has assumed a far more political position than it has ever done since 
its establishment. In the army’s overthrow of elected Islamists following massive protests against 
the latter, the SCC has become what Nathan Brown described as “a constitutional court in an 
unconstitutional setting.”689 Therefore, this interpretive Islamic “legitimacy” contingent upon the 
SCC’s independence on one hand, and the influential Islamists’ acceptance of it on the other is 
utterly questionable considering the events following the SCC’s political engagement in the 
aftermath of the 2011 Revolution. 
The initial question concerning who has the interpretive power over Islamic law seems to 
be far from settled. On the other hand, there is a continuous challenge to the SCC’s Islamic 
interpretive authority from religious circles and forums beyond the state’s institutions. 
Meanwhile, the SCC has functioned as a self-legitimized arbiter of Islamic interpretation and 
produced an Islamic judicial discourse that has intended to work Islamic law within the modern 
constitutional framework and universal principles.690 
After dealing with the issue of interpretive power and who has the right to Islamic 
interpretation, the following section explores the judicial application of Islamic law in Egypt. 
                                                 
687 Hirschl, WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW, 3&7. (2008);FELDMAN, 121-3 (2008). Compare, Backer, INDIANA 
JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES, 132 (2009);Stilt, TEX. INT'L LJ, 89 (2010). 
688 See, Brown, POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITIONS IN NORTH AFRICA: ACTORS AND FACTORS, 2-6 
(2014). 
689 Id. at, 6-11. 
690 See, Sherif, The Relationship between the Constitution and the Sharia in Egypt 131. 2011. 
202 
The judiciary here is represented by the SCC in the phase when the court decided that it could 
take cases related to Article 2 of the Constitution. 
4.3.3.4 The Judicial Application of Islamic Law 
When Article 2 was introduced into the 1971 Constitution, the Constitution did not specify the 
method of interpretation to be used or what approach or school should be adopted. The “Islamic 
principles” that the state should follow was too broad and vague. When the court was first 
confronted with Article 2 cases, it needed to establish its jurisdiction over these cases, as we saw 
in the previous section. This section will discuss the judicial application developed by the SCC 
and how different segments of the Egyptian society responded to the judicial discourse in regards 
to Islamic law. 
According to Lombardi and Nathan Brown, when interpreting Article 2 of the 
Constitution, the SCC used a mixed method of classical and contemporary Islamic jurisprudence 
in order to reach a liberalized approach that fits in the liberal rule of law and universal human 
rights concept.691 According to Justice Sherif, one of the prominent minds in the SCC, the court 
laid down three critical assumptions regarding Islamic interpretation and Article 2. The first 
assumption is that Article 2 cannot be isolated from the remaining articles of the Constitution 
and that the Islamic articles should be understood in the context of the “organic whole” of all of 
the articles. The second assumption is the rule of non-retroactivity, meaning that Article 2 as 
amended in 1980 cannot be enforced against laws and cases that took place before 1980. The 
                                                 
691 Lombardi & Brown, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, 379 (2006). 
203 
third assumption is the distinction between the definitive and non-definitive Islamic sources—a 
distinction that can define the interpretation and application of a principle.692 
The organic-whole doctrine established the ground for interpreting Islamic articles in a 
way that does not undermine the remaining articles especially those articles concerning human 
rights and basic principles of freedom and equality.693 For example, Article 64 and the 
subsequent articles of the 1971 Constitution (or 94 and subsequent articles in the 2014 
Constitution) founded and respected the rule of law. The court used to interpret “rule of law” to 
mean procedural legality irrespective of the “law” and its compatibility with accepted principles 
of human rights. Employing the “organic-whole” doctrine, the court started to interpret “rule of 
law” as a check on laws and began to impose certain standards that parties and institutions, 
including state institutions, should follow and respect.694 This universalist rule of law was part of 
the organic-whole interpretation that was supposed to limit the scope of the vague commitment 
to “principles of Islamic law.” 
The principle of universalist rule of law, along with the principle of Islamic law, are 
among the four pillars of the constitutional interpretation in the doctrine of “organic-whole.” The 
other two pillars are social justice and democratic principles. Human rights are to be observed as 
part of rule of law and as part of the commitment to democratic principles. Universal acceptance 
of principles and declarations in regards to human rights are incorporated into the court’s 
interpretation and treated as constitutional standards as well.695 
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The second doctrine of the court’s Islamic interpretation is the non-retroactive application 
of Article 2. While the constitutional principles in general were meant to have an effect on 
prospective as well as retroactive cases, the court seemed to partially circumvent the application 
of Islamic law by limiting its implementation to laws and cases after 1980.696 The SCC 
deliberately singled out Article 2 cases as amended in 1980 to have a non-retroactive 
enforcement. Haider Hamoudi assessed the court’s decision and concluded that non-retroactivity 
partially defeats the purpose of the constitutional amendment. Consider the following example: 
It would make little sense to amend a constitution to grant all 
citizens equal protection under the law and then for a court to 
suggest that existing slavery laws might be exempted because 
enacted before the amendment in question. Such a result would be 
one that courts would generally resist to the extent it was possible 
to do so, given how much violence is done to the amendment by 
the limitations. This would seem to be no less the case for a clause 
requiring legislative conformity with Islam.697 
The distinction between definite (qat‘i) and indefinite (zanni) Islamic rulings was the third 
doctrine adopted by the SCC in regards to interpreting Article 2. While the doctrine of non-
retroactivity is unorthodox, if not at odds with the Islamic jurisprudential norms,698 the 
distinction between definite and indefinite rulings echoed the long discussions and arguments in 
the classical Islamic scholarship.699 
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The SCC was committed to following certain sources of Sharia and enforcing rulings that 
are definite in authenticity and meaning. Outside this circle of absolute certainty, the state could 
exercise its ijtihad and enact whatever it thought was in the best interest of the state and its 
people. The court ruled that an Islamic ruling could invalidate a law if it meets not only the 
requirement of certainty in authenticity and meaning but also the standard that the ruling is 
religiously proved to be fit for all times and places. Although the court was vague about how it 
identified and reached this absolute certainty, it applied it in a very flexible way so that almost no 
case could meet this “absolutely-certain” test.700 
Therefore, there remains an open area of indefinite (zanni) rulings. The court made use of 
the “jurisprudential objectives” that were developed by the leading classical jurist al-Shatibi (d. 
1388). Al-Shatibi identified a three-tier theory of these goals that Islamic law should protect and 
consider. The first tier is “necessities,” without which a Muslim could not live, while the second 
and third are “needs” and “supplementaries.” What concerned the court was the first tier of 
necessities, because the other two tiers do not fall into the strict and certain “goals” of Sharia. 
The court adopted the main five necessities identified by al-Shatibi—the preservation of religion, 
self, reason, dignity, and property.701 To apply these standards, the court concluded that human 
rights are not just universally accepted principles, but also divinely ordained values.702 
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The court’s absolutely certain test was to serve as a negative criterion to check on laws 
whilst the jurisprudential objectives (or the goals of Sharia) were positive standards toward 
examining public policy issues that were classically discussed in the Islamic literature under 
siyasah shar‘iyyah (Islamic public policies, sometimes translated as “religious politics”).703 The 
court pronounced itself as interpreter provoking the classical interpreters, Islamic jurists, even 
though at times, it also leaned on classical jurists and their theories to support its arguments as it 
did with the theory of jurisprudential objectives.704 
As a result of the SCC’s interpretive approach, the court broadened the space where the 
state could work, and limited the Islamic check on laws. In Lombardi’s account, the court 
deliberately left the theory of Article 2 unelaborated to allow impressionistic interpretations that 
are consistent with the universal principles of human rights and rule of law.705 Therefore, it is not 
surprising to know that the court has never struck down a law based on Article 2 alone.706 To 
compensate for this modern unprecedented approach within the Islamic orthodoxy, the court 
tended to use classical terms and emphasize its classical concepts.707 For Vogel, “the 
traditionalism of this usage suggests that the SCC means to invoke the Islamically conventional 
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siyasa shar‘iyya version of state legitimacy,”708 a kind of legitimacy described, sometimes, as 
“enunciative.”709 
Commenting on the modern approach of the SCC along with the approaches of other 
constitutional courts in Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey, Hirschl argued that these courts 
have become “key secularizing agents for elites despite intense scrutiny from the more religious 
segments of the public.” In this take, constitutional courts and their modern interpretation are the 
secular rescue mission from the trap of constitutional theocracy and Article 2. According to 
Hirschl, Article 2 should remain symbolic, while secular judges armed with secular legal training 
should circumvent Islamic law and mitigate it, sometimes with classical terms and medieval 
concepts.710 He explains, “transferring these contested issues to the courts allows secularist 
leaders to talk the talk of commitment to religious values without walking the actual walk of that 
commitment.”711 
Hirschl’s approach intentionally reduced Article 2 to symbolic legislation and supported 
the SCC’s exclusive authority of interpretation in order to attain the legitimacy injected in Article 
2. Meanwhile, this interpretive exclusivity of the judiciary helps to avoid the hustle of real 
applications of Article 2 and the risks of Islamic enforcement.712 However, portraying 
constitutional courts as secularizing forces presupposes that these forces should have certain 
qualities and secular legal training—the conditions that not all Muslim-majority countries have. 
Thus, even if we look for secularization as understood by Hirschl, the mechanism to achieve it is 
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contingent on a specific constitutional setting, certain qualities and circumstances that not all 
countries have, and even if some do at times, there is no guarantee that they will always remain 
this way. Therefore, the proposal is temporary and conditional at best and dodges, rather than 
solves, this issue.  
Judicial secularization is not just a temporary and conditional solution to the risks of 
“constitutional theocracy,” it also risks defeating its purpose of legitimacy by overextending 
judicial authority to questions that are probably not legitimately judicial. Empowering the 
judiciary with Article 2 issues could jeopardize legitimacy by placing heavyweight Islamic 
decision-making in the hands of mainly secular individuals. Moreover, the secularizing approach 
of the Islamic articles assumed that Article 2 and its application should be employed to contain 
Islamism. As Hamoudi argues, Islamists seem to use Article 2 not to Islamize the system, but 
rather “to address their fears of further state secularization….”713 
Despite the problematic judicial authority over Islamic interpretation and its application, 
Islamists, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood, did not just accept the SCC’s power over the 
interpretation of Article 2 but also recognized and adopted its interpretive discourse toward 
Islamic articles.714 So, the secular task of the SCC to balance Islamists with a modern discourse 
seems pointless when these Islamists share the same discourse but armed with more familiarity 
with Islamic legitimacy. 
In the formula of the SCC and its application, Islamic jurists, the group that was typically 
more concerned with Islamic interpretation and was more equipped with the very accumulative 
jurisprudential instruments, was not part of the deal. Although the SCC leaned on concepts, 
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theories, and opinions developed by Islamic jurists, the court carefully proceeded to take the 
matter exclusively in its own hands.715 To sum up, the court applied Islamic articles in a way that 
partially defeated their purpose and stated already accepted discourse among Islamists. This 
brings us back to the basic issue of whether the SCC and judiciary in general is the right entity to 
tackle Islamic interpretation and issues with Article 2. The next section presents my proposal of 
who should have the right of interpretation within the state’s institutions. 
4.4 A PROPOSAL ON THE OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS 
The previous few sections have dealt with the question of who has the right to Islamic 
interpretation, specifically within the state’s institutions. Egypt has experienced different phases 
in respect to this question but has seemed to introduce the judiciary, namely the SCC, as the 
interpreter. Because of this arrangement, the court decided to apply Islamic articles in a modern 
and more-than-likely problematic way that sought to attain local legitimacy and universal 
principles. Nevertheless, the question is far from being settled in Egypt and elsewhere as 
constitutions have refrained from articulating “Islamic principles” and from empowering a 
specific institution with the authority of interpretation in Islamic issues.  
The current setting posits a dilemma of deference; the SCC had been refraining from 
ruling on Article 2 altogether, the Court of Cassation had referred to the legislature at first, and, 
later, the SCC has started interpreting Article 2. Eventually, the court has ended up claiming 
exclusive right to interpretation of Article 2 and Islamic provisions. While the SCC has sought 
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support from Islamic jurisprudential literature, it placed no interpretive authority whatsoever on 
Islamic jurists. In its defense, placing any binding state-like authority could qualify as a 
theocratic power in a modern state that is supposed to be civil and constitutional.  
On the other hand, Islamic law was developed through accumulative jurisprudential 
efforts and was articulated by jurists who interacted with people, responded to their objective 
conditions, and, sometimes, represented them. With these qualities, and with the silence of the 
Constitution toward interpretation, I propose that legislatures are more fit and equipped to deal 
with Islamic law through their interaction with society and their relative, but more interactive, 
representation of society. At the same time, Islamic jurists should conduct independent non-
binding interpretive efforts in the meta-constitutional sphere as they are historically accustomed 
to doing. In the following pages, I will further explain the current proposals and conclude with 
my own. 
4.4.1 Appraisal of the current proposals 
There has always been the question of who has the right to ijtihad (Independent Islamic 
reasoning). Islamic classical jurists settled on dividing individuals dealing with Islamic 
interpretation and jurisprudence into mujtahid(capable of independent reasoning) and 
muqallid(individual incapable of independent reasoning). The jurists developed a set of qualities 
and conditions for an ijtihad to be legitimately acceptable in Islamic jurisprudence.716 However, 
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the whole discussion was conducted in a free space and was not directly intended to control the 
state’s interpretive power except through public representation and social pressure.717 
As far as Islamic jurisprudence is concerned, the judge is either mujtahid or muqallid, and 
in either case, socially-recognized jurists check on their ijtihad through their social networks and 
presence. The state may determine its own ijtihad and decide who has the right to Islamic 
interpretation, but in order to be broadly acceptable, the power of interpretation should be vested 
in a socially accountable entity. If we incorporate the representative nature that used to 
characterize the jurists, the representative legislature of today’s modern state could form an 
Islamically plausible compromise where Islamic jurisprudential decision-making can be 
articulated. Meanwhile, Islamic jurists continue their non-state efforts and conduct their free 
ijtihad and opinion-making. In the next pages, I will summarize the different proposals, and then 
proceed to further explain my own. 
4.4.1.1 The judiciary’s exclusive power over Islamic interpretation 
One important and actually widely applied proposal is to entitle the judiciary, especially the 
constitutional courts and the SCC in Egypt, to Islamic interpretive power. Thus, the bottom line 
of this proposal is to continue vesting interpretive power in the constitutional judges, such as the 
SCC’s, in order to counterbalance Islamism with secular forces and modern discourse.718 In fact, 
most Muslim-majority countries place the “Sharia check” on the hand of supreme courts or 
constitutional judiciaries.719 Asifa Quraishi attributes the current judicial power of Islamic 
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interpretation to the modern desire for political balance and separation of powers. However, 
Quraishi notes that “empowering a high court with Sharia-based judicial review is not the same 
thing as [the classical Islamic arrangement of] balancing rulers with scholars.”720  
Constitutionally speaking, the specialized constitutional courts are supposed to decide 
constitutional cases, and settle constitutional disputes. Because constitutions deal with diverse 
basic aspects of laws, however, it is impossible and contradictory to expand the jurisdiction of 
constitutional courts to every principle or aspect of law mentioned in the constitution.721 There 
are questions that are not even supposed to be decided by the judiciary at all. Compared with 
different systems of the world, Lombardi concluded that the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional 
Court should probably not even have jurisdiction over Article 2 and issues related to “Islamic 
principles.” Lombardi suggested that the SCC could operate as a check on the interpretation 
provided by other branches of government more than as an interpreter per se.722 
At the early stages of the SCC’s response to Article 2 cases in Egypt, the court itself 
determined that Article 2 was a limitation on the legislature to decide whether laws had been 
consistent with Islamic law—a unique move of adopting jurisdictional deference to another 
state’s power in dealing with a constitutional article.723 However, the SCC ended up self-
proclaiming its exclusive authority over Islamic interpretation—a position that seemed 
problematic, if not totally wrong. 
To summarize my criticism of the judicial jurisdiction over Islamic interpretation: first, 
the Egyptian Constitution is silent about the jurisdiction of Article 2 and how to implement it. 
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Thus, the judicial jurisdiction over “Islamic principles” and its interpretation seemed to be 
gradually attained and self-proclaimed by the SCC. The court hesitated for some time and waited 
for the legislature to take the initiative, but after failed legislative attempts, the SCC decided to 
take the matter into its own hands. From this outcome, the jurisdiction of the judiciary over 
Islamic interpretation was neither granted by the constitution nor given as a genuine authority of 
the judiciary that had expected the legislature or another branch to take the initiative.  
Secondly, the SCC in Egypt pronounced itself as the exclusive authority over Islamic 
interpretation, ignoring what some constitutionalists describe as a universal practice of the 
distribution of interpretive authority among the state’s institutions. Constitutionalists assert that 
most constitutional democracies in the world have tended to distribute interpretive power to the 
extent that some countries have made the sharing of interpretive authority an explicit doctrine 
enshrined in the constitution and practiced in the system.724 Accordingly, restricting 
interpretation to a certain institution could carry the risk that the unelected officials and judges 
develop a system that practices a tyranny of its own or establishes a rule of lawyers instead of a 
rule of law.725  
Moreover, granting secular judges the exclusive authority over Islamic interpretation 
defeats the whole purpose of Article 2 and the Islamic articles altogether and empties even the 
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symbolic gesture of Article 2 of its role and meaning as a legitimizing vehicle.726 If the meaning 
of Islam is to be exclusively decided by unelected secular officials, then the whole point of using 
the word “Islam” is pointless.727 
Finally, the supposed secular balance of the judiciary with Islamism is conditional and 
partial if not totally meaningless. The presumptive balance could not be considered as such if the 
discourse adopted by the judiciary, the SCC here, resembles the rhetoric adopted by the Islamists 
that the court was supposed to balance. The main Islamist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
embraced ideas of the role of Islam and the state that are similar to those pronounced by the 
SCC.728 So, the presumptive balance to the Islamist discourse is not real if Islamists share the 
same rhetoric that the SCC promotes.  
In conclusion, the judiciary took the wrong direction when it proclaimed its exclusive 
authority over Islamic interpretation. If this is the case, is it constitutionally possible and 
plausible to consult or defer some interpretive power to a religious authority in order to involve 
the most specialized institution in matters related to religious principles and their interpretation? 
The next section deals with this issue and the proposal of involving religious institutions like al-
Azhar in the interpretive process. 
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4.4.1.2 The deference to appointed religious institutions (al-Azhar) 
This subsection examines the proposal that an Islamic jurisprudential institution, like al-Azhar, 
should have a say in the meaning of “Islamic principles” and the implementation of Islamic law 
in Muslim-majority states, more specifically, Egypt in this case. 
In the summer of 2007, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt circulated a constitutional 
platform that was supposed to express the movement’s political and constitutional vision.729 The 
platform sparked controversies, but one important issue that invited heated discussions was the 
proposal in regards to the “council of scholars.” The Muslim Brotherhood announced that, if they 
won, they would establish a council composed of scholarly experts in civil and Islamic law to 
draft a constitution in Egypt. The platform proposed a creation of council of Islamic scholars to 
advise lawmakers on the legislative process. According to the proposal, the members of the 
council should be elected freely from the Islamic scholars who are completely independent from 
the government and its influence.730  
The proposal was ambiguous on how to measure this independence from the executive 
branch although the qualities and required qualification of these scholars, in general, were left for 
the legislature to decide. Nevertheless, the platform was decisive on the fact that the council was 
strictly advisory, unless it was dealing with a ruling that is certain in meaning and authenticity. If 
the issue involved a definite Islamic ruling that was absolutely certain in both meaning and 
authenticity, the platform implied that the council’s decision would be binding for the 
legislature.731 
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The proposal of the Council of Scholars faced opposition even within the Brotherhood. 
The reformist wing of the Brotherhood criticized this conservative proposal. Shortly after this 
dispute, even leaders within the conservative wing of the Brotherhood retreated from their 
proposal of the Council of Scholars, and a prominent former Brotherhood leader, Muhammad 
Habib, considered the proposal a mistake. Later, official leaders of the Brotherhood modified 
their position to reduce the council to a strictly advisory body.732 
As a result of the 2011 Revolution, the Brotherhood’s political party was recognized, and 
in the following election, the Brotherhood won a victory. The Islamist-dominated constituent 
assembly drafted Article 4 that dealt with al-Azhar. The final clause in Article 4 declared that 
“Al-Azhar Senior Scholars are to be consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law.”733 The 
Brotherhood seemed to completely abandon the idea of the Council of (independent) Scholars, 
and they shifted the language toward specifically recognizing al-Azhar as the independent 
Islamic institution. Thus, they presented al-Azhar as a body responsible for legislative 
consultation in regards to legislation. The language of Article 4 of the 2012 Constitution was not 
clear concerning whether the opinion of al-Azhar is merely advisory or binding.734 At any rate, 
the whole clause was suspended along with the 2012 Constitution, and a new constitution took 
effect in 2014—a constitution that made sure that there is no legislative role whatsoever for 
scholars of al-Azhar or Islamic scholars in general.735 
The Brotherhood’s 2007 proposal of the Council of Scholars and the shift of Article 4 of 
the 2012 Constitution could indicate the two different and long-recognized forces in Islamic 
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literature: Islamic scholars, ulama, on one hand, and lay Islamists, brotherhood movements on 
the other. Although the two forces could cooperate and agree on some issues, the dispute grew 
between the officially-recognized scholars and politically active Islamists, mainly the 
Brotherhood members.736 Accordingly, the required “independence,” which was previously 
stipulated by the Brotherhood, hinted at the current scholars’ subordination to the state. In any 
event, the proposal of the legislative role of the scholars went nowhere. 
The idea of a state-like legislative role for scholars or for any Islamic scholarly institution 
could qualify for one type or another of theocracy. If there is any binding religious authority, the 
chances of a Taliban-style state become greater.737 The theocratic proposals did not just 
contradict the universal understanding of civil government, it also contradicts the long-
established literature of the Islamic scholars themselves as we saw in the second chapter. If this 
theocratic proposal is doomed to fail, the next proposal is to defer the interpretation of “Islamic 
principles” to the legislature as initially suggested by the SCC. The next section will discuss this 
proposal.  
4.4.1.3  The legislative initiative 
After exploring two different proposals for how to deal with the interpretive authority within the 
state, the third proposal is to return to the initial position toward Article 2 and “Islamic 
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principles.” The initial position of the state powers was to entitle the legislature with Islamic 
interpretation, and leave much of the work on these issues to the legislative branch to figure out 
and articulate. While the judiciary may have some say, its role should be reduced to the 
minimum check on the legislature; i.e., it should not decide and articulate the meaning and 
bounds of Islamic principles. 
The position of deferring to the legislature was the previous stand of the SCC until 
probably the mid-1980s.738 The idea of deferring to the legislative branch came not just from the 
legislature but also from within the judiciary itself when, in 1975, the SCC put the legislature in 
charge of checking the Islamicity of laws.739 Even after that, as we saw, in 1982, the Court of 
Cassation refused to void a ruling that was thought to be in contradiction with Sharia and 
deferred that authority of interpreting Islamic law to “legislative branches.”740 
Theoretically, in Islamic constitutionalism, as Mohammad Hashim Kamali argues, 
separation of powers in an Islamic context can be exercised when legislation is in the hands of 
the ummah (nation) by adopting a modern form of ijma‘(the traditional Islamic jurisprudential 
concept of consensus). This practice of Islamic consensus represents the nation in the modern 
sense and can provide a form of separation of powers in the idea that representatives of the 
nation are separate from the judiciary and the executive. Those representatives, although mostly 
secular, are better equipped to deal with the meaning and bounds of Islamic law in the state than 
unelected secular officials. The representatives interact directly with people and can better 
represent their values and draw boundaries.741 
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The idea of Kamali not only Islamically contextualizes a modern democratic concept of 
representation and separation of powers through the Islamic idea of consensus, but also makes it 
more plausible to entrust the consensus-makers within the state with Islamic interpretation. 
Khaled Abou El Fadl reinforces the representation of the nation and suggests that there are two 
approaches toward Islamic law in the state.  
The first school toward Sharia in Muslim-majority states is to enforce the prevailing 
subjective commitments of the community and leave the articulation and interpretation of 
Islamic law to the community. In this approach, Islamic principles are like any other principles in 
the sense that what matters in the state is communal commitments while the state is completely 
neutral toward religion. The mechanism of how to figure out these communal commitments, or 
where to draw a line between communal commitments and enforceable state law, is not so clear. 
In the context of Muslim-majority states, this approach means that there should be no article 2 or 
repugnancy clauses of any sort because religion is merely a communal commitment. 
According to Abou El Fadl, the other approach toward Islamic law is to “enforce what 
the majority believes to be closer to the Divine Ideal.” This means that the majority is entrusted 
to figure out and decide the meaning and bounds of Islamic law, and this can be exercised by 
their representatives in the modern parliaments. The discussion here all stemmed from the 
premise that “Islamic law” is not law per se as long as the state is concerned, and that it becomes 
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enforceable law if it was enacted and articulated for the state by representative councils in the 
Muslim-majority countries.742 
The idea of having a legislature representing the nation to articulate the meaning and 
bounds of Islamic law and its “principles” in the state resonates partially with the idea of meta-
constitutionalism. The dynamics of the meta-constitutional sphere is to work within the social 
networks in the implied conviction that society is who decides issues and determines meanings in 
regard to Islamic law at the state level.  
I assume that the state arrangement should lead to the legislature being in charge of 
interpretation within the state as this is in line with different proposals and with the fact that 
Sharia is more with “people” than with unelected secular judges deciding Islamic law. However, 
for debates to be legitimately Islamic, the typical articulators of Islamic law in the social level, 
the Islamic scholars, should be allowed and recognized in their meta-constitutional sphere. 
Because the mere proposal of having the legislature decide Islamic law at the state level does not 
suffice for Islamic law in the traditional context, another, and more important element should be 
incorporated in the proposal to make more sense of it all—the element of the meta-constitutional 
sphere where Islamic scholars operate, articulate Islamic law, and develop it at the social level. 
The next section will discuss this proposal and defend it in the modern constitutional context. 
4.4.1.4 The Meta-Constitutional Proposal 
This section does not reject the legislature’s authority over Islamic interpretation, but rather 
provides it with a complex formula which considers cultural and religious contexts. Islamic 
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jurists are a crucial group that can help in this process by lending support to the state’s 
arrangement through the mechanism of legitimacy. Therefore, I will discuss my two-prong 
proposal that attempts to bring conformity between Islamic law at the social level on one hand, 
and its conceptions at the state level on the other. At the social level, the meta-constitutional 
sphere facilitates traditional legitimacy, while at the state level, the legislature engages in the 
main interpretive tasks in regards to Islamic law. 
In his appraisal of the rule of law and constitutionalism in the Arab world, Nathan J 
Brown emphasizes that effective constitutionalism emerges from political struggles within 
society more than legal and procedural efforts.743 Therefore, the problem is not interpretations at 
the state level, but obstructions of political and social struggles that could establish the 
constitutional rules. In addition, when we talk about social struggles and recognition, we are 
describing the backbone of very old and lasting activism, the meta-constitutional sphere that 
allows jurists and scholars to interact and debate as their principles guide. In this sphere, Islamic 
law was interpreted and developed in different times and places. Several leading scholars agreed 
that Islamic law was interpreted and elaborated in different times and places, which made it 
flexible and able to fit different contexts, but overlooked the fact that these jurists were never 
state officials or scholars within state-controlled religious institutions.744 
In dealing with the free-floating jurists or even (loosely) affiliated scholars, Backer 
expresses the need for dealing with this “priesthood”, or institutions charged with legitimately 
interpreting holy texts at the social level.745 At the same time, if these institutions are granted a 
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state-like power, it paves the way for some modern form of theocracy. In Abdullahi An-Na'im’s 
words: 
any principles or rules of Sharia simply cease to be part of a 
religious normative system by the very effort to enact and enforce 
them by the organs of the state, because the state can only enforce 
its own political will, not the will of God.746 
In addition to the fear of modern theocracy if clergy are granted state’s power, mainstream 
Islamic scholars struggle to gain recognition of their autonomy, not a binding power that is 
unique to the state’s institutions.747 The sphere of these juristic societies has existed for a long 
time and does not seem to fade, and may indeed never fade. This is because the operation of the 
sphere is substantially linked to the very core of Islamic law, and its jurisprudence. The key point 
is to suggest a kind of recognition of this meta-constitutional sphere. This would not need be 
established, as it has been already established. Nevertheless, one very vital advantage of this 
already established sphere is that it is not state-patronized. This is why the proposed recognition 
means to respect the crucial feature of the autonomy of this sphere, and its institutions as this 
recognition would benefit from this legitimation tools. At the same time, it keeps the state from 
establishing a religious institution as a state office. Acknowledging the meta-constitutional 
sphere means constitutionally recognizing the sphere’s autonomy and its importance, not one 
institution or another, and not providing any official or legally-binding authority in the state. 
Consequently, al-Azhar should be no different from any other religious institution in the 
sense that they are all part of the respected independent meta-constitutional sphere. If the 
Egyptian constitution is to respect al-Azhar’s independence, it should respect all similar plural 
institutions existing in the same sphere as al-Azhar. It is not only about al-Azhar, but also every 
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other institution that could present itself with Islamic knowledge and authority. The previous two 
constitutions (in the post 2011 Revolution period) mentioned al-Azhar by name, and respected its 
independence - a step forward. Al-Azhar, however, was treated as if it had a monopoly over 
Islamic interpretation. This reminds us of Nasser’s regime granting al-Azhar monopoly over 
Islam as a technique to control the institution, and Islamic interpretation.748 
To deal with the traditional community of the jurists, and its concepts in the Islamic 
constitutionalist field, ceaseless efforts by researchers including Abou El Fadl, An-Na‘im, and 
Kamali try to contextualize universal democratic principles into Islamic culture and literature. 
The Islamic concepts like shura (consultation) and ijma‘ (consensus), and amanah (trust) are 
elaborated to reflect universal democratic and modern liberal principles.749 An-Na‘im 
acknowledges that, although the concepts of consultation and consensus in the Islamic context 
could be developed and realized to support universal constitutional and democratic principles, “it 
would be grossly misleading to suggest that this notion has already been understood and 
practiced in this [universalistic modern] sense.”750 As a result, it is more likely that efforts 
outside the traditional Islamic juristic community could inject untraditional elements into 
traditional concepts. Without recognizing the jurists and their free sphere, the conceptual efforts 
would gain less authority from within the community itself. Moreover, although the approach 
that tends to tackle Islamic concepts and relate them to the modern state and its system of values 
contributes greatly to the Islamic constitutional literature, some efforts seem to miss one 
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important component—the traditional community that introduced these concepts in the first 
place—the Islamic scholars. 
Similarly, there are other constitutionalists like Hirschl and Backer who deal with the 
theocratic elements in some modern states. In their attempts to mitigate this theocracy, they 
discuss the problem from the vantage point of state related issues (up-to-down). As a result, they 
overlook another important aspect (the bottom-up).751 The bottom-up approach involves the very 
community that traditionally has dealt with Islamic jurisprudence, and continues to strongly 
retain their sphere as a forum for Islamic jurisprudential debates and discussions. At the same 
time, at the state level, the legislature could be the main interpreter that poses a very plausible 
solution constitutionally, and Islamically, to the dilemma of interpretive deference and the crisis 
of legitimacy. 
4.5 THE TWO-PRONG PROPOSAL 
As demonstrated in the previous sections, there is a dilemma of the right to interpretation among 
state institutions in Egypt and in other Muslim-majority states. On the other hand, there is a 
profound predicament related to legitimacy, as well as the legitimate authority that carries an 
Islamic discourse that gains the trust and confidence of people. 
In the previous chapter, I reinforced the idea that the meta-constitutional sphere was well-
established in meaning and function by classical jurists and had, and practically has, been 
practiced for centuries. The sphere was functioning as the typical arena for jurists, and was 
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supported by narrations and literature. In this chapter, I focus on the second part of my proposal -
the role of the representative legislature in interacting with the people to establish and articulate 
the meaning of Islamic articles and codes. In the previous sections, I attempted to underpin the 
supposed upper hand of the legislatures in articulating Islamic law as long as the state is 
concerned. 
In this concluding section, I will summarize my proposal which contains two parts: the 
first part is to support the legislative initiative in matters respecting Islamic interpretation in the 
state level, and the second part addresses the meta-constitutional sphere.  
The elected legislature is more reflective of the people’s beliefs. “As creators of the 
compact, they have authority to define its parameters. Elections may allow them to do so 
indirectly.”752 To give a modern example from the American experience, constitutionalists 
invoke the founding fathers who championed the direct interpretive role of the people by their 
deputies in the representative assemblies.753  
From the Islamic context, to have the nation decide disputed interpretive matters echoes 
the reasoning that legislative authority lies with the community.754 The community here could 
combine the two parts by introducing the elective legislature as representative of the community 
at the state level. The meta-constitutional sphere, which carries the religious authority, could do 
so at the social level. By stressing the “social level,” I emphasize the power-free sphere where 
residents of this sphere conduct their work without state control and, at the same time, without 
the state establishment behind them. 
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In the meta-constitutional sphere, Islamic jurisprudential differences, disagreements, 
scholastic debates, and even sectarian disputes take their natural course by retaining their 
scholastic nature. The political interference between these schools and jurisprudential disputes 
does not “solve” anything other than controlling some religious segments. Sometimes this in the 
name of patronage and adoption of religion, and thereby escalates the dispute and involves the 
state’s institutions that can use enforcement and violence.755 
Despite its being meta-constitutional, this sphere could greatly contribute to the 
formation of a stable constitutional structure in the Muslim world. Some constitutionalists affirm 
that constitutional law develops over time in different countries according to the productive 
interaction of political players with influential cultural segments.756 Cass R. Sunstein argues that, 
especially in newly formed systems, constitutionalism is best developed “as precomittment 
strategy.”757 H. W. Okoth-Ogendo puts it perfectly, when she says: 
The paradox…is that all law, and constitutional law in particular, 
is concerned, not with abstract norms, but with the creation, 
distribution, exercise, legitimation, effects, and reproduction of 
power…. The very idea of power, hence of a constitution as a 
special body of law, entails commitment or adherence to a theory 
of organized power, as appears evident in the historical experience 
and shared aspirations of all societies.758 
I would also argue that meta-constitutionalism is the typical arena that can largly contribute to 
forming such cultrual and religious comitments. 
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In dealing with meta-constitutionalism and its indirect role on constitutionalism, I invoke 
what Vicki Jackson and Mark Tushnet call “grass-root constitutionalism.” Jackson and Tushnet 
explain this concept as a slow construction of constitutional principles “from below” by 
involving powerful social and cultural segments in the discussions of pre-legal (or perhaps, pre-
constitutional) principles.759 Although different, grass-root constitutionalism and meta-
constitutionalism share the notion that social and cultural forces can contribute in forming and 
strengthening a healthy constitutional structure directly or indirectly.  
The fine line between the meta-constitutional sphere and the constitutional domain is that 
the first is free from state-like power, while the latter is supposed to produce binding laws that 
are enforceable. According to Kamali, Muslim scholars developed the notion that religious (dini) 
commitments are different from judicial (qada’i) obligations, and only judicial obligations are 
enforceable before courts.760 
Therefore, as I explained in the second chapter, in Muslim society we can distinguish two 
sets of laws. One is located outside the political sphere but powerfully affects it—this is Islamic 
law while the other is politically-binding law, which is enforced by the state apparatuses. When 
Sherman Jackson studies al-Qarafi, one remarkable notion that al-Qarafi articulated is the 
variation between “fatwa” (jurisprudential ruling/opinion) and “hukm” (judicial ruling/decision). 
The variation resembles the differentiation here between the effect of the two laws.761 According 
to al-Qarafi the fatwa is non-binding, while hukm is binding.762 This difference between the two 
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spheres is what Wael Hallaq describes as the separation between the political and the legal in 
Islamic jurisprudence.763 
Noah Feldman analyzed the position of the class of jurists in the Islamic traditional model 
as a counterbalance to state institutions—a dynamic that presented the Islamic separation of 
realms instead of separation of powers.764 Quraishi explains the Islamic separation of realms 
between rulers and scholars as a “mutually independent relationship stemmed largely from a 
division of law-making authority that distinguished ruler-made law, siyasah, from scholar-
crafted law, fiqh.”765 
The separation between the constitutional realm and meta-constitutional sphere is a 
notion that is established in the Islamic culture and history, which has been practiced for 
centuries. This long-held idea helps establish a stable constitutional structure, and legitimize the 
system if there is respect for the scholarly-developed sphere. 
To conclude this section, if we apply the two-prong proposal in the Egyptian case, the 
legislature should have the main authority over Islamic interpretation because of its 
representation of the nation, and its ability to interact with traditional jurisprudential forces. 
Second, Article 7 of the 2014 Constitution concerning al-Azhar implies that al-Azhar has a 
monopoly over interpretation and that the state controls al-Azhar despite the firm assurance of its 
“independence,” a negative connotation. When the article deals with Islamic scholars, it should 
deal with a whole sphere that institutions and scholars in general occupy to render their 
jurisprudential opinions on the daily basis. Moreover, the “independence” of al-Azhar granted by 
the same article seems to be essentially abridged by a clause of the same article that ensures that 
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all financial matters are provided for, and controlled by the state.766 Therefore, I proposed the 
two-prong solution that attempts to bring conformity to Islamic law at the social level, on one 
hand, and its conceptions at the state level on the other. At the social level, the meta-
constitutional sphere can facilitate traditional legitimacy, while at the state level, the legislature 
can engage in the main interpretive tasks in regards to Islamic law. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I studied the current constitutional setting of Muslim-majority countries, 
specifically Egypt as a case study. The main issue is the current position of Islamic scholars and 
religious institutions within the constitutional order.  
I divided the chapter into four main sections. I started by exploring the current 
constitutional context in the Muslim and Arab world, and the different early phases of Islamic 
constitutionalism. I ended the first section by introducing the constitutional framework in Egypt, 
the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, and the project of al-Sanhuri and codification. 
The second section explains the role of Islamic scholars in the constitutional orders, and 
in constitution-making. I examine the role of scholars in two areas: law-making and judicial 
adjudication. A legislative task was given to scholars in different countries, either in legislative 
committees or as state religious institutions. I show that the direct constitutional involvement of 
the scholars in state institutions does not seem to have worked. It results in the entanglement of 
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ruler-made law, siyasah, and scholar-crafted law, fiqh in a manner that clashes with the nature of 
Islamic jurisprudence. 
In the third section, I discussed Islamic constitutional articles with special emphasis on 
the genesis of repugnancy laws in the Muslim world, and Article 2 of the respective 
constitutions. Then I turned to constitutional interpretation by discussing the question of who has 
the right to Islamic interpretation. At first, the legislature seemed to have the initiative, but the 
judiciary ended up proclaiming its own exclusive authority over Islamic interpretation. The 
section concluded with the Supreme Constitutional Court’s application of Islamic law in Egypt, 
where the court took a modern universalistic approach in interpreting Islamic principles. 
The fourth and final section examines my two-prong proposal in the overlapping 
jurisdictions. The two-prong proposal will involve the very community that traditionally dealt 
with Islamic jurisprudence, and has continued to retain its importance in this sphere as a forum 
for Islamic jurisprudential debates and discussions. At the same time, at the state level, the 
legislature could be the main interpreter that poses a very plausible solution constitutionally and 
Islamically to the dilemma of interpretive deference and the crisis of legitimacy. 
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CONCLUSION OF THE DISSERTATION 
In the First chapter, we saw that Islamic religious institutions acquire their importance by being 
the body that carries the values and principles of the public. Achieving normative legitimacy, 
then, is to adapt the state to people’s values as reflected in the religious institutions. This process 
of making the system compliant to social values needs initial legitimization of the very existence 
of the state, while continuous legitimacy ensures that the state is living up to that cause. A 
regime may come into existence without responding to the expectation or imagination of the 
people continuously, but it will lack long-term stability. A state that lacks popular faith is 
doomed to collapse, and is the reason why even the most authoritarian regimes use popular signs 
and language as a way of achieving what has been described above as enunciative legitimacy. 
The Latter is a set symbolic references that invoke cultural, religious and historical events or 
concepts in order to legitimize a current system.  
Muslim-majority countries are particularly sympathetic to religious discourses. As a 
result, Islamic legitimacy is a political requirement that can be exercised by the typical 
legitimizers, jurists. The jurists use acceptable juristic language and mechanisms to either 
legitimize the system or challenge it. Thus, the locus of power of the jurists and their interaction 
with the system is through societal channels by means of public faith, confidence, and support. 
Legitimacy is the tool that jurists use to influence politics, an exercise that needs to be 
independent of the control of the system in order to legitimize that same system, if that 
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legitimization is to be credible. The nature of jurists’ political exercise can be described as a soft, 
indirect presence that sweeps like their fatwas do, as long as they appeal to the public and speak 
the language that the people believe and support.  
In the second chapter, I have aimed to craft a role that historically, and normatively fits 
the ulama’s nature according to their own literature and social dynamics, in order to stabilize 
society and its religious authority. At the same time, it is an attempt to place the ulama in a locus 
that is both constitutionally possible and plausible in today’s society. 
I have divided the second chapter into four sections. I start by examining the concept of a 
“religious institution” in the Islamic context, and conclude that it is more important to look at 
religious institutions as imagined, rather than formal brick and mortar institutions. The fact that 
there is no comprehensive religious body leaves us with a dispersed authority within Sunni 
jurisprudence. 
The second section explains the different roles and modes of scholars focusing on their 
relationship to the political authorities, especially in pre-modern times. 
The third section is devoted to the proposal that the meta-constitutional sphere is the 
locus of authority for scholars. This sphere is not political but also not merely public. The case of 
the Islamic Inquisition (mihna) is discussed as a historical example to avoid in the Sunni 
subconscious. 
The fourth section discusses the concept of independence among these imagined and 
formal institutions of scholars and jurists. The ability to dissent that characterizes the medieval 
and modern jurists demonstrates the extent and importance of their autonomy intellectually and 
economically. The case of al-Azhar in Egypt was given special attention to show that infringing 
on scholars’ independence, as occurred in Egypt, produces the phenomenon of peripheral ulama 
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that are even more independent and resistant. I emphasized the idea that the independence of 
scholars is central to their nature, but independence and the autonomy of these Islamic 
institutions and scholars never means that they have power or political control. 
In the third and final chapter, I studied the current constitutional setting of Muslim-
majority countries, specifically Egypt as a case study. The primary concern is the current 
position of Islamic scholars and religious institutions within the constitutional order.  
I divided the third chapter into four main sections. I started by exploring the current 
constitutional context in the Muslim and Arab world, and the different early phases of Islamic 
constitutionalism. I ended the first section by introducing the constitutional framework in Egypt, 
the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, and the project of al-Sanhuri and codification. 
The second section explains the role of Islamic scholars in the constitutional orders, and 
in constitution-making. I examine the role of scholars in two areas: law-making and judicial 
adjudication. A legislative task was given to scholars in different countries, either in legislative 
committees or as state religious institutions. I show that the direct constitutional involvement of 
the scholars in state institutions does not seem to have worked. It results in the entanglement of 
ruler-made law, siyasah, and scholar-crafted law, fiqh in a manner that clashes with the nature of 
Islamic jurisprudence. 
In the third section, I discuss Islamic constitutional articles with special emphasis on the 
genesis of repugnancy laws in the Muslim world, and Article 2 of the respective Egyptian 
constitutions. Then I turn to constitutional interpretation by discussing the question of who has 
the right to Islamic interpretation. At first, the legislature seemed to have the initiative, but the 
judiciary ultimately proclaimed exclusive authority over Islamic interpretation. The section 
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concluded with the Supreme Constitutional Court’s application of Islamic law in Egypt, where 
the court took a modern universalistic approach in interpreting Islamic principles. 
The fourth and final section examines my two-prong proposal in the overlapping 
jurisdictions. Pursuant to this proposal, on the one hand, at the state level, the legislature could be 
the main interpreter of Islamic Law. This poses a plausible solution constitutionally and 
Islamically to the dilemma of interpretive deference. However, as to the second prong, the very 
community that traditionally dealt with Islamic jurisprudence, and has continued to retain its 
importance in this sphere, the jurists, will continue to hold sway. They will exercise their power 
metaconstitutionally. This is to say, they are not a formal state power, and have no formal role in 
lawmaking or adjudication. However, as the source of legitimating authority for the state, 
derived by virtue of their connection to and support from the people, they will continue to 
exercise considerable influence over the state’s activities. The jurists, in other words, ensure that 
the state is legitimate, by ensuring that it is Islamic, precisely as they have always done 
throughout Islamic history. 
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